The static analyzer your AI agent reads β fix-ready, machine-readable scan reports over MCP.
Copy the AI prompt to install this server into Claude Code, Cursor, or another agent β or use 1-click editor setup below.
We haven't yet run this listing's install command through our automated sandbox check. This isn't a red flag β we're steadily working through the catalog.
π‘ Paste the JSON block into your client's configuration file under mcpServers, then restart the application.
AI agents ship code fast β and ship bugs fast. CodeMore scans the code, then hands the agent that wrote it a machine-readable report with the exact fix and the criteria to verify it. The agent closes its own findings.
Website Β· Docs Β· Rule Catalog Β· Report Schema Β· Changelog
64 native rules Β· 8 external adapters Β· CLI Β· MCP server Β· VS Code extension Β· GitHub Action β one report, byte-identical on every surface.
AI-assisted coding ships vulnerabilities at a measured, growing rate:
| Finding | Source |
|---|---|
| 45% of AI-generated code carries an OWASP Top-10 vulnerability | Veracode 2025/26 |
| 98% of 1,072 scanned vibe-coded sites had β₯ 1 security flaw | Symbiotic |
| 70% of audited Lovable apps shipped with Supabase RLS disabled | DEV |
| 2Γ baseline secret-leak rate on AI-tool-assisted commits | GitGuardian SOSS 2026 |
| 35 CVEs/month attributed to AI-generated code (was 6/month in January) | March 2026 |
Existing scanners (SonarQube, DeepSource, Snyk) target human reviewers sitting at dashboards. But this code wasn't written by a human β and the LLM that wrote it is fully capable of fixing its own bug, if the report is shaped for a machine reader.
That's the wedge. CodeMore is not another SAST dashboard. It's the report contract between a scanner and a coding agent: every finding carries a suggestedFix with a patch template and explicit verificationCriteria β not just "here's a problem," but "here's exactly how to know you fixed it."
The agent that wrote the bug can also write the fix β if it can read the report.
Prints a summary to the terminal. Add --json for the full report on stdout, or --out codemore-report.json to write it to disk: every finding pinned to file:line:column with rule citation, fix template, and verification criteria. Pipe it to your agent and watch findings close.
Six tools exposed: scan_project Β· scan_file Β· explain_issue Β· suggest_fix Β· apply_fix Β· validate_fix.
Per-client setup, exact config paths, and verified handshake evidence (Claude Code, Cursor, Claude Desktop, Codex CLI): docs/ide-matrix.md.
Install CodeMore from the VS Code Marketplace (Extensions β search "CodeMore" β Install), or build the VSIX yourself:
Inline diagnostics; code-action quick-fix invokes the agentic loop (plan β generate β validate β retry, max 3 attempts).
PR-comment bot; only fails the build on findings new since the committed .codemore-baseline.json. A full copy-paste security gate chaining CodeMore + Ruff + Biome + Bandit + Gitleaks + npm-audit + pip-audit + Checkov lives at templates/.github/workflows/codemore-security-gate.yml (walkthrough).
Sign in at codemore.tech, paste a public GitHub URL or upload a ZIP β same report, same fingerprint, zero install.
64 native rules across 6 packs, every rule mapped to a cited real-world incident class β not a hypothetical:
| Pack | Rules | Highlights |
|---|---|---|
core-security | 22 | SQL injection (concat), path traversal, weak crypto, insecure deserialization, eval, shell injection, TLS-off, hardcoded secret patterns, hardcoded passwords (B105-class), SSRF, secret-in-log, LLM-output β eval/exec/SQL sinks, prompt-injection sinks, DB write-without-WHERE, hallucinated imports |
core-quality | 21 | Unused vars/imports/exports, cyclomatic complexity, dead conditionals, leftover console/prints, async-without-await, unreachable code, loose equality, as any, non-null-assertion abuse |
vibe-frontend | 9 | XSS (dangerouslySetInnerHTML), CORS-with-credentials, missing rate limit, missing cookie flags, file-upload validation, missing input validation β CORS, cookie flags and input validation each in TS + Python (Flask/FastAPI) form |
vibe-secrets | 4 | Public env leaks (NEXT_PUBLIC_* / VITE_* / REACT_APP_*), hardcoded JWTs, MCP config secrets, CI/CD YAML secrets |
vibe-auth | 5 | BOLA (TS + Python), missing session/auth checks (TS + Python), inverted auth |
vibe-supabase | 3 | RLS-off, RLS-permissive (USING (true)), anon-key bundled to client |
8 external adapters (off by default, opt in via --external-tools): ruff Β· golangci-lint Β· clippy Β· biome Β· bandit Β· gitleaks Β· npm-audit Β· pip-audit. Findings are namespaced ext:<tool>:<rule-id> β no collision with native rules; a missing binary skips silently instead of crashing.
The walker catches what .gitignore hides. When a developer "hides" a leaked secret file by gitignoring it, most scanners stop seeing it β but it's still on disk, in tarballs, in Docker images. CodeMore always scans secret-shaped filenames (.env*, *.pem, *.key, firebase-adminsdk*.json, credentials.json, .npmrc, .pypirc, β¦) even when gitignored. This is exactly how the audits found real production OpenAI keys, Google API keys, and Firebase admin SDK creds that other tools silently missed. Opt out with --respect-gitignore-fully.
Per-rule documentation: docs/rules β 64 pages, one per rule.
Every surface emits the same schema-stable codemore-report.json β verified byte-identical (modulo timestamps and instance IDs) on every release by test/parity.test.ts:
One brain, four skins. The schema is the API; surfaces are interchangeable.
codemore-report.json v1.0.0Factual signals from GitHub, npm, and our automated checks β not a rating.
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