The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the Codemore listing page.
AI agents ship code fast — and ship bugs fast. CodeMore scans the code, then hands the agent that wrote it a machine-readable report with the exact fix and the criteria to verify it. The agent closes its own findings.
Website · Docs · Rule Catalog · Report Schema · Changelog
64 native rules · 8 external adapters · CLI · MCP server · VS Code extension · GitHub Action — one report, byte-identical on every surface.
AI-assisted coding ships vulnerabilities at a measured, growing rate:
| Finding | Source |
|---|---|
| 45% of AI-generated code carries an OWASP Top-10 vulnerability | Veracode 2025/26 |
| 98% of 1,072 scanned vibe-coded sites had ≥ 1 security flaw | Symbiotic |
| 70% of audited Lovable apps shipped with Supabase RLS disabled | DEV |
| 2× baseline secret-leak rate on AI-tool-assisted commits | GitGuardian SOSS 2026 |
| 35 CVEs/month attributed to AI-generated code (was 6/month in January) | March 2026 |
Existing scanners (SonarQube, DeepSource, Snyk) target human reviewers sitting at dashboards. But this code wasn't written by a human — and the LLM that wrote it is fully capable of fixing its own bug, if the report is shaped for a machine reader.
That's the wedge. CodeMore is not another SAST dashboard. It's the report contract between a scanner and a coding agent: every finding carries a suggestedFix with a patch template and explicit verificationCriteria — not just "here's a problem," but "here's exactly how to know you fixed it."
The agent that wrote the bug can also write the fix — if it can read the report.
Prints a summary to the terminal. Add --json for the full report on stdout, or --out codemore-report.json to write it to disk: every finding pinned to file:line:column with rule citation, fix template, and verification criteria. Pipe it to your agent and watch findings close.
Six tools exposed: scan_project · scan_file · explain_issue · suggest_fix · apply_fix · validate_fix.
Per-client setup, exact config paths, and verified handshake evidence (Claude Code, Cursor, Claude Desktop, Codex CLI): docs/ide-matrix.md.
Install CodeMore from the VS Code Marketplace (Extensions → search "CodeMore" → Install), or build the VSIX yourself:
Inline diagnostics; code-action quick-fix invokes the agentic loop (plan → generate → validate → retry, max 3 attempts).
PR-comment bot; only fails the build on findings new since the committed .codemore-baseline.json. A full copy-paste security gate chaining CodeMore + Ruff + Biome + Bandit + Gitleaks + npm-audit + pip-audit + Checkov lives at templates/.github/workflows/codemore-security-gate.yml (walkthrough).
Sign in at codemore.tech, paste a public GitHub URL or upload a ZIP — same report, same fingerprint, zero install.
64 native rules across 6 packs, every rule mapped to a cited real-world incident class — not a hypothetical:
| Pack | Rules | Highlights |
|---|---|---|
core-security | 22 | SQL injection (concat), path traversal, weak crypto, insecure deserialization, eval, shell injection, TLS-off, hardcoded secret patterns, hardcoded passwords (B105-class), SSRF, secret-in-log, LLM-output → eval/exec/SQL sinks, prompt-injection sinks, DB write-without-WHERE, hallucinated imports |
core-quality | 21 | Unused vars/imports/exports, cyclomatic complexity, dead conditionals, leftover console/prints, async-without-await, unreachable code, loose equality, as any, non-null-assertion abuse |
vibe-frontend | 9 | XSS (dangerouslySetInnerHTML), CORS-with-credentials, missing rate limit, missing cookie flags, file-upload validation, missing input validation — CORS, cookie flags and input validation each in TS + Python (Flask/FastAPI) form |
vibe-secrets | 4 | Public env leaks (NEXT_PUBLIC_* / VITE_* / REACT_APP_*), hardcoded JWTs, MCP config secrets, CI/CD YAML secrets |
vibe-auth | 5 | BOLA (TS + Python), missing session/auth checks (TS + Python), inverted auth |
vibe-supabase | 3 | RLS-off, RLS-permissive (USING (true)), anon-key bundled to client |
8 external adapters (off by default, opt in via --external-tools): ruff · golangci-lint · clippy · biome · bandit · gitleaks · npm-audit · pip-audit. Findings are namespaced ext:<tool>:<rule-id> — no collision with native rules; a missing binary skips silently instead of crashing.
The walker catches what .gitignore hides. When a developer "hides" a leaked secret file by gitignoring it, most scanners stop seeing it — but it's still on disk, in tarballs, in Docker images. CodeMore always scans secret-shaped filenames (.env*, *.pem, *.key, firebase-adminsdk*.json, credentials.json, .npmrc, .pypirc, …) even when gitignored. This is exactly how the audits found real production OpenAI keys, Google API keys, and Firebase admin SDK creds that other tools silently missed. Opt out with --respect-gitignore-fully.
Per-rule documentation: docs/rules — 64 pages, one per rule.
Every surface emits the same schema-stable codemore-report.json — verified byte-identical (modulo timestamps and instance IDs) on every release by test/parity.test.ts:
One brain, four skins. The schema is the API; surfaces are interchangeable.
codemore-report.json v1.0.0Schema source-of-truth: shared/report/schema.json. Breaking changes bump schemaVersion major and ship a migration guide.
apply_fix runs a four-stage loop, up to 3 retries per finding — it terminates on first PASS and never silently keeps a failing patch:
agenticFixer.ts — orchestrator; reads finding + rule citation + framework contextvalidatorHarness.ts — applies the patch in a tempdir copy, re-runs the rule, re-runs file-scoped tests, returns pass | fail + diagnosticsCODEMORE_LLM_PROVIDER env (CLI)Synthetic benchmarks lie; real codebases don't. Every release is audited against real projects, and the numbers are published — including the bad ones.
2026-07-07 audit (full report) — 7 codebases (Python app, 1.35M-LOC TS monorepo, polyglot Rust, synthetic ground-truth apps, self-scan): 100% of planted vulnerabilities detected, a real OpenAI key caught in a production .env, ~90% BLOCKER true-positive rate, self-scan noise reduced 85% after fixing four false-positive classes.
2026-06-12 audit (full report) — 10 real codebases, aggregate ~85% BLOCKER TP rate, above DeepSource's ≥ 75% production bar:
| Project | Findings | BLOCKERs | TP rate | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EchoVault | 122 | 10 | 100% | Real Supabase RLS holes |
| ProofSnap | 134 | 4 | 100% | |
| AImentor | 224 | 5 | 100% | Real OpenAI keys hidden by .gitignore |
| Hackathonnn | 129 | 3 | 100% | |
| shopsec | 113 | 5 | 100% | |
| Senti | 155 | 8 | 100% | |
| open-design | 8,615 | 101 | ~80% | |
| Gen ai | 63 | 4 | 75% | Real Firebase admin SDK creds |
| codemore self | 282 | 6 | 17% | Intentional landing-demo data |
| Aggregate (excl. self) | 9,755 | 140 | ~85% |
corpus/rules/<rule-id>/{tp,fp}/experimental → beta → stable, promotion requires fixture pairs plus real-world FP-rate evidence via opt-in telemetry; rules below the precision bar are gated behind --enable-experimental or ship with reduced confidence so agents weight them lower| Lifecycle | Default | Promotion bar |
|---|---|---|
experimental | off by default | one fixture pair |
beta | on by default | ≥ 3 fixture pairs + 14-day FP rate < 15% |
stable | ships in default pack | 30-day FP rate < 5% + reference apps clean |
deprecated | warns, removed next major | — |
Out of scope by design — static analysis can't judge these, and an agent can't auto-fix them from a source diff. The rule is "agent-actionable or it's not a rule":
Weak password policies · audit-log completeness · business-logic flaws · race conditions · open S3/GCS buckets · DAST findings · MFA presence.
Full list with reasoning: docs/limitations.md. For these, pair CodeMore with OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite, checkov, or your IdP's compliance dashboard.
Off by default. Enable per-scan with --telemetry. Collected: tool version, hashed project fingerprint, surface, rule-fire events. Never collected: file paths, contents, snippets, evidence text — the endpoint enforces a Zod strict() schema and rejects any payload containing those keys with HTTP 400. 64 KB payload cap, per-fingerprint rate limiting, RLS denies all reads.
One brain (shared/), four skins (CLI, MCP, extension, Action), one report schema — kept honest by the parity test, not by a slogan.
VS Code extension: F5 in VS Code, or npm run watch + code --extensionDevelopmentPath=.
Two paths:
CONTRIBUTING-RULES.md. The PR bot gates every submission: rule module + TP fixture (must fire) + FP fixture (must not fire) + docs page + pack registration. The bot is the first reviewer; humans review after it passes.CONTRIBUTING.md.Before opening a PR:
Found a false positive? Open a rule-FP report — FP reports directly feed the beta→stable promotion pipeline.
Security findings: do not open a public issue — use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting flow (SECURITY.md).
benchmark/REPORT.md (40% of 50 AI-built repos had ≥ 1 BLOCKER; 24% after honest FP triage)auto-demote-rules.yml opens a review issue when a rule's FP rate crosses 10%Details: docs/roadmap.md.
MIT — see LICENSE. CodeMore is open source from line one and stays that way. The wedge is the report contract, not gatekeeping.