SYNAPSE CHANNEL README

The local-first coordination bus for fleets of AI agents.
One WebSocket hub is the shared source of truth for presence, file-scope claims, a shared plan, task status, and capabilities — for agents working in one repository or across a whole ecosystem of them.

Flagship example: coordinate parallel AI coding agents through declared file scopes — the hub refuses a second overlapping live claim, while covered provider hooks and the staged Git gate enforce only their documented mutation boundaries.

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A local-first coordination bus for a fleet of AI agents working in parallel — within a single repository or spread across a whole ecosystem of them. One WebSocket hub is the shared source of truth for presence, work claims, chat, task status, and resource offers: agents address each other across projects and share one plan, while file-scope claims keep the agents in any one repository from receiving overlapping live authority. Documented provider hooks and the staged Git gate enforce that authority only on their covered mutation surfaces.

Watch the presentation

Watch the SYNAPSE CHANNEL presentation on YouTube (8 minutes; starts from the beginning).

New here? Read Why SYNAPSE CHANNEL — a five-minute read on what it is, what you build on it, how it differs from the tools next to it, and why coordination becomes the bottleneck once you run more than one agent.

Project lineage: SYNAPSE CHANNEL dates back to September 2025.

The bus is transport-light (one dependency, websockets), hub-centric by design (one place owns presence, leases, and history), and runs entirely on the local machine. Model workers reply on-channel through any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, including a local Ollama server, with a deterministic rule-based fallback for offline use.

Your existing agents plug in without new code. Any Model Context Protocol host — Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor — reaches the bus through the bundled synapse mcp server, which exposes send, durable inbox, status, claim, release, handoff, and task verbs as MCP tools plus the board, agents, and resources as read-only MCP resources. Agents that speak A2A connect through the Agent Card face instead. The hub itself stays protocol-agnostic and the core install keeps its single dependency — the MCP and A2A adapters are optional extras (pip install 'synapse-channel[mcp]'). See the MCP guide.

python -m pip install synapse-channel && synapse demo

Get the Python package  ·  Run the first 60 seconds  ·  Read the quickstart

Coordinate. Observe. Govern.

Synapse's daily promise is three explicit loops:

• Coordinate declared work and surface collisions: synapse git-init, synapse git-claim, synapse git-claim-check --staged, synapse task, and syn ack turn work scope, dependencies, and evidence into shared state instead of side-channel notes.
• Observe the fleet from durable state: synapse who, synapse state, synapse dashboard, synapse event-query, and observed peer rows show who is present, what is claimed, what changed, and which peer-hub facts are advisory.
• Govern risky actions with evidence: policy checks, approvals, release receipts, Merkle roots, ACL surfaces, federation, and encryption-key commands make operator decisions auditable. Governance surfaces report by default; operators decide what blocks a merge, release, or cross-hub action.
• Protect the durable log at rest with optional SQLCipher page encryption for the live hub event store (plus whole-file AES-GCM envelopes for relay logs, A2A state, cursors, and archives). See SQLCipher live event store below.

What it does, surface by surface

Seven shipped coordination surfaces, each named by the command or doc that delivers it today:

• Claim before edit. synapse git-init installs claim-aware Git hooks; synapse git-claim records an exact worktree, branch, and path scope so an overlapping claim can be refused before files diverge.

  

• Block unclaimed native file edits. Provider file-edit claim hooks adapt Claude Code Edit|Write, Codex apply_patch, Gemini CLI replace|write_file, and Kimi Edit|Write to one live-claim decision engine.

  

• Share the plan. synapse task and synapse board keep task state, dependencies, and ready work on the hub instead of in separate agent notes.

  

• Hand work over without an ownership gap. Atomic handoff moves the held task, scope, status, and checkpoint to an online recipient without a release-and-reclaim window.

  

• Expose a dark seat. After 30 continuous seconds without the owner's exact waiter, the hub emits one dark_seat_alert for affected claims or assigned work, including the permanent-arm remedy; it does not release or reassign work automatically.

  

• Read the fleet from one cockpit. synapse dashboard serves the local command centre, exact-status task columns, claims, conflicts, security posture, and an optional durable event feed; the read-only Studio projection adds no new hub authority.

  

• Connect existing agent protocols at the edge. synapse mcp exposes coordination tools and read-only resources over stdio; the A2A bridge exposes a local Agent Card and HTTP+JSON surface while keeping its partial validation boundary explicit.

  

At a glance

graph LR
    A1["Agent"] --> H
    A2["Agent"] --> H
    A3["Worker"] --> H
    SUP["Supervisor"] --> H
    H["SynapseHub<br/>single source of truth"] --> CL["Claims & leases<br/>scope · epoch · checkpoint"]
    H --> BB["Blackboard<br/>plan + progress"]
    H --> CAP["Capabilities<br/>cards + routing"]
    H --> LOG["Event log (SQLite WAL)<br/>durable · optional SQLCipher at rest"]

A claim leases a declared unit of work with a file scope, so the hub refuses overlapping live claims. Provider hooks and the staged Git gate enforce that authority on their documented surfaces; they do not sandbox every filesystem or external side effect. Plans, handoffs, checkpoints, and a stall supervisor keep the work moving, and the durable event log means a hub restart resumes live leases rather than losing them.

Core and Optional Layers

SYNAPSE CHANNEL ships as one installable package, but the public surface is tiered so the lean bus stays clear:

The authoritative map is synapse_channel.surface_taxonomy and the generated operator view is Public surface and stability. Adapters and lab surfaces can be installed and used from the same package, but they do not change the single-dependency local core.

Six measurable discovery profiles keep those layers explicit without hiding or removing commands: first-use, core, adapters, governance, labs, and all. Inspect any profile without starting a hub or optional process:

synapse commands --profile first-use
synapse commands --profile first-use --json

The JSON contract records three first-use concepts and three shell commands, against a hard limit of eight concepts, with zero optional extras and zero implicitly started persistent services. Profile inspection is read-only; optional capabilities activate only through their documented package extra and command or flag, and deactivate by stopping that exact process or omitting the opt-in. See installation profiles.

Optional Participant memory recall

participant ask, participant exchange, and participant convene can wrap their seats with bounded, read-only recall from REMANENTIA's lightweight HTTP API. Recall is disabled unless --memory-url is present; no memory process is started implicitly. Tokens are accepted only through --memory-token-file, and recalled snippets enter TurnRequest.context inside a data-only fence while the operator prompt remains unchanged.

synapse participant ask claude "review this design" \
  --memory-url http://127.0.0.1:8001 \
  --memory-token-file /run/secrets/remanentia

Current HTTP results omit REMANENTIA's honesty axes, so every recalled hit is shown as boundary data; similarity is relevance evidence, not truth evidence. No-hit and unavailable states remain visible without failing the provider turn. See Participant memory recall for setup, limits, CLI flags, library use, and audit boundaries.

Coming: Studio — the dashboard is growing into an operator Studio: a control plane that answers, at a glance, what is happening, what is at risk, and what is safe to do next. The instrument-panel design system, /studio reference, live /studio/command shell, security-posture panel, and event-log LiveFeed have shipped. Local-first and read-only by default — an organisation-level workbench is planned as a separate layer.

Install

python -m pip install synapse-channel       # the release from PyPI
python -m pip install -e ".[dev]"           # or an editable dev checkout
# optional: live hub event-store page encryption (SQLCipher)
python -m pip install 'synapse-channel[sqlcipher]'
# optional: whole-file AES-GCM envelope helpers (encrypt-key profile/migrate/rekey)
python -m pip install 'synapse-channel[encryption]'

For an editable checkout, keep the local .venv aligned with the repository's declared dev, docs, and benchmark extras:

.venv/bin/python tools/check_dev_dependency_drift.py --check
.venv/bin/python tools/audit_dependency_tooling.py --check

The second check is offline. It verifies that local preflight still covers the expected tool gates, GitHub Actions are pinned to full commit SHAs, Dependabot covers actions/Python/Docker, and the PyPI publish/download metadata surfaces remain wired.

This installs the synapse command. To run the hub as an always-on local service or a container, see the deployment guide (a systemd user unit and docker compose are both included). On Linux, install only a permanent exact-identity waiter with synapse arm install --identity myproject/agent --start; it uses mailbox replay and Restart=always, without installing a hub. Its myproject/agent-rx receiver can coexist with agent-tmux's distinct myproject/agent-pane-rx bridge, preserving durable gap recovery and active pane delivery without name takeover. The pane bridge fails closed on busy, modal, unknown, or ambiguous provider screens: it persists the pending wake and submits its fixed prompt only after two provider-specific idle-composer probes. It acknowledges delivery only after the pane shows prompt consumption; an Enter ignored during asynchronous provider startup leaves the single staged prompt pending for a safe Enter-only retry. It accepts only exact identity, role, or group targets; global priority and CEO broadcasts remain durable inbox traffic but never inject into provider panes.

For unattended active delivery, supervise that pane bridge independently of agent turns:

synapse waker install \
  --identity myproject/agent \
  --session myproject-agent \
  --cwd "$PWD" \
  --agent-command codex \
  --start
synapse waker status --identity myproject/agent

The generated synapse-waker@.service has Restart=always and a main-loop watchdog, so a dead bridge is recreated without relying on the agent to remember to re-arm it. waker stop --reason ... first persists an inhibited state and then stops only the exact bridge; systemd cannot immediately resurrect it, and the tmux provider terminal is not killed or restarted. Only an explicit waker resume clears the inhibit. Native Windows service setup is not claimed; use WSL with systemd as documented in the deployment guide.

For agent-assisted environment preparation, synapse setup spec, inspect, plan, authorize, apply, verification-plan, authorize-verification, and verify expose the packaged synapse-setup.v1 contract. The first three describe requirements, observe the host, and bind a credential-free target to a non-executable SHA-256 plan. authorize emits a short-lived envelope for one reviewed plan. Restart authority must match the exact hub PID observed in that plan; first-start authority carries no PID. On Linux with systemd-user, apply re-inspects the target and plan-bound executable generation, atomically reserves the authorization in a private replay ledger, and may install or start only the package-owned local hub and exact waiter units. It preserves declared PIDs, emits a digest-bound receipt, and restores prior unit and service state on failure. After a successful application, the separate verification transaction sends one directed canary, requires the exact waiter's durable ACK, restarts only the authorized hub PID, proves replay through a new hub PID, re-inspects the bound generation, and preserves declared terminal/provider PIDs. It emits a single-use, digest-bound verification receipt; an application receipt alone is not strict end-to-end readiness evidence. Package, Python, identity, secret, remote, macOS, native Windows, and container changes remain blocked. See Machine-readable setup for the schema, expiry, nonce-consumption, and exact-PID authority rules.

Two optional shell conveniences ship with the CLI: synapse completions bash|zsh|fish prints tab completion for every subcommand (generated from the live parser, so it never drifts), and synapse install-shell-hook adds the guarded block that auto-arms a wake listener in each new terminal:

synapse completions bash > ~/.local/share/bash-completion/completions/synapse
synapse install-shell-hook          # auto-arm Bash, Zsh, and Fish terminals

Who it's for

• A developer running two or three coding agents on one repository, tired of merge collisions and duplicated work.
• A team operating a fleet of agents across several services that needs one plan, one roster, and cross-repository task dependencies.
• A builder of long-running autonomous agents who wants event-driven wakeups, durable coordination, and a resume-after-restart story instead of a polling loop and lost state.

See use cases for when it fits, when it is overkill, and who reaches for it.

Getting started

The one path to follow. Run the three-command self-contained proof below, then follow the multi-seat golden path for persistent agents. Optional adapters and generated workspaces come later.

First 60 seconds

On a clean Python environment, verify the installed CLI before wiring agents into a real repository:

python -m pip install synapse-channel
synapse doctor
synapse demo --output ./synapse-golden-demo

synapse doctor reports local setup issues such as identity, hub exposure, root-filesystem pressure, and missing waiters. A brand-new machine may warn that no hub or waiter is running; that is expected before service setup. synapse demo starts its own local hub, drives a planner/worker coordination flow, and succeeds when it prints:

The CLAUDE and CODEX names in that flow are scripted in-process SynapseAgent identities. The demo launches no provider CLI and spends no model turn.

success: coordination demo completed

After the self-contained proof, synapse quickstart-coding remains available as an optional generated-workspace demo. It creates a temporary coding-fleet workspace, runs the live overlapping-claim refusal demo, removes the workspace after success, and prints:

success: coding fleet demo completed

Or run the whole first-run sequence as one command:

synapse fleet-init

It runs the doctor (--fix to repair the default local hub and waiter), scaffolds a persistent ./synapse-fleet workspace, probes which provider CLIs this machine can seat (claude, codex, kimi, ollama, …), runs the demo smoke, and prints the next-steps plan — waiter arming, per-provider seat commands, git-init, dashboard — with the workspace's project name filled in.

Fastest safe trial path

Use one self-contained path before changing a real checkout:

python -m pip install synapse-channel
synapse doctor
synapse demo --output ./synapse-golden-demo

The demo starts and stops its own local hub, uses a disposable committed Git repository, proves separate claims and overlapping-claim refusal, denies a mutation before handoff, permits it after handoff, and writes an observed verification receipt plus a static dashboard. It needs no persistent hub, provider CLI, Git hook, MCP host, or A2A bridge. The same exact three-command block is regression-bound across this README, the quick start, and the CLI reference, and its synapse demo command is exercised as a real subprocess.

After that proof passes, use synapse fleet-init --fix to prepare a persistent local workspace, hub, and waiter, then run synapse git-init --name trial-agent inside the real repository before an agent edits it. Optional A2A interoperability is a follow-on in the A2A bridge guide; it is not a prerequisite for first coordination value.

Releases

This package is developed in the open and dogfooded daily: a fleet of coding agents runs its own coordination on it, so problems surface in real use and are fixed quickly. Releases are therefore frequent and mostly small — fixes and hardening rather than churn. Current 0.x releases do not promise backward compatibility across minor releases. The wire vocabulary and public Python API are guarded against accidental drift, but a reviewed 0.x minor release may deliberately change either surface. Every such change updates the frozen contract tests, bumps WIRE_PROTOCOL_VERSION for a wire-incompatible change, and ships changelog plus migration notes. Starting with 1.0.0, a breaking stable public Python API change requires a package major release; a breaking wire change requires a wire-protocol version bump. See API and wire stability.

1.0.0 is planned as the first stable commercial release of SYNAPSE CHANNEL, with the operational contracts, packaging, support surface, and commercial licensing terms documented as part of that release.

SYNAPSE CHANNEL is seeking startup funding, strategic partners, and aligned ecosystem co-owners who want to help mature the coordination layer for production multi-agent development. See commercial licensing or write to protoscience@anulum.li.

If you need a fixed target, pin a version (synapse-channel==X.Y.Z); to get the latest fixes, track the newest release. Both are supported.

Usage

Run a hub with model workers

Launch a hub plus one or two local model workers in one command:

synapse team

If Ollama isn't running, synapse team falls back to a single offline rule-based worker (deterministic canned replies) so the flow still works; start Ollama and re-run for real model replies.

Then, from another terminal, watch the channel or send a message:

synapse listen --name USER                                 # terminal A: watch the channel as USER
synapse send --target FAST "what is the status of TASK-1?"  # terminal B: one-shot, unique ephemeral sender
synapse send --require-recipient --target FAST "ping"  # also print the positive receipt

A send without --name uses a unique ephemeral sender, so a one-shot send never trips the hub's one-owner-per-name rule against a listener you already have connected under the same name. One-shot sends also avoid the waiter-name collision: synapse send --name api-dev-rx ... sends as api-dev, leaving the persistent api-dev-rx wake socket connected. Directed sends request a private receipt by default and exit non-zero when no consume-live recipient matches — including when a stale socket is still connected but has neither a recent reaction nor a live waiter. The message remains journalled and best-effort routed, while the hub records a dead letter instead of reporting socket presence as delivery. Each one-shot send uses a unique message identity and accepts only its matching receipt, so an old pending receipt replayed when the sender reconnects cannot be reported as the new send's result. Add --require-recipient when the positive receipt should also be printed and a hub too old to return receipts must fail closed.

For selected sensitive payloads, encrypt the body before it reaches the hub and decrypt it only on the recipient side:

synapse send --target FAST \
  --encrypt-key-file ./payload.key \
  --encrypt-key-id project-main-v1 \
  --encrypt-recipient FAST \
  "private handoff note"
synapse listen --name FAST --for FAST --decrypt-key-file ./payload.key

The hub still sees sender, target, channel id, key id, recipient names, nonce, ciphertext, and delivery metadata. This does not manage key discovery or rotation.

Running pieces individually

synapse hub --port 8876
synapse hub --port 8876 --db ./synapse.db            # crash-safe: resumes leases + history on restart
synapse hub --port 8876 --relay-log ./feed.ndjson    # mirror the channel to a compact file for observers
synapse hub --shutdown-close-timeout 5               # bound active socket close handshakes on stop
synapse hub --max-progress-per-author 500            # cap retained board progress per author
synapse hub --max-findings-per-agent 200             # cap durable findings admitted per agent
synapse hub --tls-certfile ./hub.crt --tls-keyfile ./hub.key  # native wss://
synapse worker --name FAST --provider ollama --model gemma3:4b
synapse worker --name OFFLINE --provider rule        # no network, canned replies
synapse worker --name TIER --provider tiered --model small --heavy-model big  # route trivial→rule, hard→heavy
synapse relay ./feed.ndjson                          # decode and print that file as readable lines
synapse ingest ./synapse.db --memory --cursor ./mem.cursor  # stream durable memory events since a seq cursor (NDJSON)
synapse memory-recall ./synapse.db "transport handoff"       # local recall over durable memory records
synapse compact ./synapse.db --all --max-checkpoints-per-task 3 --archive-report ./compact-report.html
synapse board                                        # print the shared task/progress blackboard
synapse task declare BUILD --title "compile" --idem-key build-v1  # retry-safe durable write
synapse task update BUILD --status done              # mark a plan task done so dependents unblock
syn ack BUILD --evidence "pytest -q"                 # post evidence and mark a board task done
synapse supervisor --idle-seconds 300 --history-multiplier 3  # re-offer stalled plan tasks
synapse manifest                                     # print capability cards, including contract counts
synapse capability-card keygen --key-id PROJECT:worker:v1 --private-out ./card.pem --agent PROJECT/worker --project PROJECT --trust ./card-trust.json
synapse directory                                    # print discovery-only agents/resources
synapse route-task BUILD --limit 3 --event-store ./synapse.db  # add observed evidence
synapse resource-bids BUILD --resource-kind gpu      # rank live resource offers without reserving capacity
synapse a2a-card --endpoint-url https://agent.example.com/a2a/v1  # emit A2A Agent Card JSON
synapse a2a-serve --endpoint-url http://127.0.0.1:8877             # run the HTTP+JSON A2A bridge
synapse doctor                                       # check for common misconfigs (identity, exposure, hub, waiter)
synapse demo                                         # installed self-check: local hub + planner/worker flow
synapse quickstart-coding                            # create a temporary coding fleet workspace and run it
synapse new coding-fleet ./demo-fleet                # scaffold a runnable two-agent coding demo workspace
synapse hub --host 0.0.0.0 --token s3cret            # require a shared secret when binding off-loopback
synapse hub --host 0.0.0.0 --token s3cret --tls-certfile ./hub.crt --tls-keyfile ./hub.key
synapse hub --max-connections-per-host 4             # cap simultaneous sockets from one remote host
synapse send --token s3cret --name USER "hello"      # agents present the token to a secured hub

For an observed cross-hub task revision, task declare and task update also accept --causal-parent HUB_ID:SEQ:SHA256. The SHA-256 is the complete event fingerprint exposed in multi-hub board provenance. A verified same-task parent lets the observed fold discard only that proven ancestor; a missing or mismatched reference remains unresolved and never becomes a concurrency claim. This metadata changes the advisory observed board, not local claim authority.

Use it with your coding agent

Synapse coordinates the agents you already run; it does not replace them. Its MCP and A2A adapters are interop surfaces: they let Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, Codex, Copilot-style hosts, Aider, orchestration frameworks, and other agent tools participate in one local coordination bus while those tools still own prompting, model choice, tool use, and editor/runtime behavior. The integration demo matrix lists three narrow, repeatable paths and the unsupported behavior that remains outside each demo.

• Claude Code / Codex / Claude Desktop / Cursor (MCP): register the stdio server and its coordination tools load automatically — no shell hook or Synapse-specific client code.

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  python -m pip install 'synapse-channel[mcp]'
  claude mcp add synapse -- synapse mcp         # resolves <git-project>/mcp
  codex mcp add synapse -- synapse mcp --name my-repo/codex
  

  Claude Code can instead use the optional, separately versioned Synapse plugin, which packages this MCP face with the existing claim-aware edit hook and reversible profile onboarding. The vendor compatibility watch checks official releases daily and records which host versions have actually been verified. Vendor and provider discovery reviews bounded public candidate feeds weekly before an integration is considered. Its host intake rejects the reviewed Pages download lure and does not rank cron pushes as code provenance. The host integration catalog reports accepted versions and provides one inspect/install/diagnose/uninstall entry point for the host packages whose lifecycle has been verified.

  The optional pi participant uses pinned pi 0.86.0 RPC. Its separate extension checks live claims before supported file writes; the default participant runs without tools.

  Cursor and Claude Desktop can reuse the secret-free examples/mcp/.mcp.json template. MCP does not wake an idle provider in this adapter; call synapse_inbox at turn start and keep synapse arm install --identity NAME --start active for prompt delivery.

• Claude Code / Codex / Gemini / Grok / Kimi native file edits: print a provider-native pre-tool recipe (PreToolUse for the Claude family, Grok, and Kimi; BeforeTool for Gemini CLI) that checks the authoritative live claim before a supported file tool runs.

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  synapse adapters claude-claim-hook --identity my-repo/claude --print-config
  synapse adapters codex-claim-hook  --identity my-repo/codex  --print-config
  synapse adapters gemini-claim-hook --identity my-repo/gemini --print-config
  synapse adapters grok-claim-hook   --identity my-repo/grok   --print-config
  synapse adapters kimi-claim-hook   --identity my-repo/kimi   --print-config
  synapse adapters kimi-claim-hook   --identity my-repo/kimi   --install-config
  

  --print-config is read-only. Save the Grok fragment under ~/.grok/hooks/*.json; synapse adapters install grok separately installs the kebab-case ~/.grok/skills/synapse/SKILL.md coordination skill. Kimi's opt-in installer writes only one marked block in $KIMI_CODE_HOME/config.toml (default ~/.kimi-code/config.toml), and --uninstall-config removes only that block. The equivalent combined Kimi path is synapse adapters install kimi --identity my-repo/kimi --with-hook.

  The provider claim-hook guide documents exact tool coverage, token-file setup, and the native-host limits. These are bounded file guards, not complete Bash or filesystem isolation.

• Aider, or any non-MCP tool: claim a file scope before editing and let a git hook release it on commit. The claim prevents conflicting grants; enforcement of the tool's working-tree writes remains the operator's responsibility, with the staged Git gate providing a separate commit-time check.

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  synapse quickstart-coding                    # optional: run a temporary overlapping-claim refusal demo
  synapse new coding-fleet ./demo-fleet        # optional: keep the generated workspace
  synapse git-init --name aider-1              # one step: install the hooks + write the conventions guide
  synapse git-claim --task-id AUTH --paths src/auth --name aider-1
  aider src/auth/*.py                          # ... edit; the post-commit hook releases the claim
  

• Check the wiring: synapse doctor reports the common setup mistakes — no live waiter, a hub exposed without a token, an accidental identity, or a pressured root filesystem — each with its fix. With a durable hub it also reports N undelivered messages pending for <identity> from the receiver watermark; this is mailbox transport acknowledgement, not proof a model processed the messages. Use --disk-path <path> to check the filesystem that holds a specific workspace or cache.

• Inspect the live board: synapse dashboard --port 8765 opens a loopback-only read-only HTML view of roster, exact blackboard/claim status columns, progress, fleet visibility, task-dependency graph edges, branch-conflict candidates, release receipts, and advertised capabilities, with the same snapshot available at /snapshot.json for local tooling. Pass --a2a-state-file <path> to add persisted A2A task and push-config counts to the fleet section. The dashboard derives task dependencies from the blackboard snapshot and uses live claim metadata for branch conflicts; run synapse conflicts --check-diff when you need client-side git-diff refinement. The state snapshot also carries dead_letters — directed chats that reached no live connection, per target with counts — so a message nobody is listening for shows up on the page instead of being discovered by a human relaying it. The dashboard is growing into an operator Studio — open /studio for the design-system reference — and ships a React cockpit under clients/cockpit/ (build instructions in its README; serve the built bundle with synapse dashboard --cockpit-dist clients/cockpit/dist). If you deliberately expose the dashboard with --allow-non-loopback, pass --dashboard-token <token> and require clients to send Authorization: Bearer <token>; the React cockpit loads its token-free static shell, asks for that bearer, and retains it only in the tab's session storage. It never accepts the bearer in a URL. When the token is omitted on an exposed bind, Synapse generates and prints a startup token. Teams can instead pass an owner-only --dashboard-access-file mapping separate viewer/operator/admin token files to browser principals and distinct relay identities. The server-authored capability descriptor removes unauthorized write controls from the DOM and command search, but every POST is still re-authorized server-side and at the hub; admin currently gains no mutation beyond the three shipped operator writes. With --operator, the authorized command palette exposes governed message, task-declaration, and task-update forms; each reports the hub's strict outcome and grants no authority beyond the hub's validation, ACL, rate limit, and audit decision. With --feeds-db, the cockpit's Audit tab incrementally renders the universal receipt ledger and governed operator-relay history as two distinct, bounded store-attested feeds. The receipt ledger includes minimized claim and guard denials, dead-letter escalations, and identity-pin reclaim outcomes; every declared durable EventKind is explicitly classified as receipt-bearing or intentionally omitted. Absence and stale last-good data remain visible. Add --observed-peer HUB=URI to include advisory peer-hub rows in the browser and /snapshot.json; those rows are labelled observed@HUB and never grant local claims.

• Verify a release redeploy: synapse doctor --redeploy-checklist prints package, service, roster, durable-state, and git-hook checks for a post-release local fleet restart. It does not restart services by itself, and restart commands are withheld by default. After inspecting the exact live hub PID and roster, an operator with fresh disruption authority can add --redeploy-authorize-restart-pid PID; the rendered command rechecks that PID while holding a fail-fast host-local custody lock. Dogfooding requires every new release tag to be adopted by the local hub immediately after publication, using that bounded authorised path and post-restart health verification.

• Install the always-on local services: synapse init prints or installs the hub, project presence, and non-LLM wake listener units. doctor --fix prints the exact commands when a waiter is missing.

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  synapse init --project myrepo --identity myrepo/worker --install-user-services
  synapse init --project myrepo --identity myrepo/worker --start-user-services
  synapse doctor --fix
  

• Launch a provider command with Synapse identity: worker-session exports the identity variables before the provider starts. Interactive terminal providers such as Codex, Claude, Kimi, and Grok run in a persistent tmux session by default when launched from an interactive terminal, with a directed waiter kept alive in the background. Non-terminal commands keep the temporary syn arm sidecar path.

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  synapse worker-session --identity myrepo/worker -- codex --sandbox danger-full-access
  

• Inspect or control the tmux wake path manually: codex-tmux is the diagnostic/admin surface behind the automatic provider launch path. It keeps a provider TUI in a named tmux session and injects a fixed wake prompt when Synapse receives a directed message. It does not paste the Synapse payload into the terminal; the provider reads the inbox itself after waking. Existing sessions are accepted only when their live tmux environment matches the configured SYN_PROJECT and exact SYN_IDENTITY; a session already owned by another seat is refused by start, status, and wake before any keys are sent. A successful tmux send-keys call is not treated as provider delivery: the bridge observes prompt consumption and retains an unacknowledged staged prompt for a later Enter-only retry, so provider startup cannot strand or duplicate it. While waiting, the bridge disconnects at a bounded interval and re-proves the session, binding, and live agent pane before registering again, so a vanished pane cannot remain advertised indefinitely.

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  synapse codex-tmux start --identity myrepo/codex-main --session myrepo-codex --cwd "$PWD"
  synapse codex-tmux wait --identity myrepo/codex-main --session myrepo-codex --cwd "$PWD"
  

  For unattended operation, replace the manually maintained wait process with synapse waker install --identity myrepo/codex-main --session myrepo-codex --cwd "$PWD" --agent-command codex --start. The waker supervises only the delivery bridge and attaches to the existing bound session; it never owns the provider terminal lifecycle.

Agent ergonomics — the syn commands

For the short loop an agent runs every session — arm a waiter, send a message, read the inbox, glance at the board — the package also ships syn, a thin, identity-correct front end over the commands above:

syn name                          # resolve and print this terminal's identity
syn arm                           # keep a directed-only waiter armed (named <project>-rx, distinct from the sender)
syn say REMANENTIA,CEO "ack"      # send to one, several, or all
syn ask CEO "status?"             # send, require an online recipient, and wait for replies
syn inbox                         # print messages addressed to you since the cursor
syn inbox --project-wide          # explicitly include every identity in this project
syn inbox --name PROJ/role        # read one exact identity under its own cursor
syn board                         # the shared task/progress board
syn who --me                      # show whether this identity and its -rx waiter are online
syn reap                          # list this identity's shell-hook waiter pidfile
syn reap --pid 1234               # remove a dead pidfile or SIGTERM only the verified waiter PID
syn locks                         # list this project's active leases with release commands
syn ack BUILD --evidence "pytest -q" --artifact coverage.xml
syn commit README.md -m "document the change"

The one thing it gets right that a hand-rolled shell alias does not is identity. The project is resolved from --project, then $SYN_PROJECT, and the working directory only as a last resort. Ambient $SYN_IDENTITY is never a silent source: it refines the identity to a full project/<type>-<id> only when $SYN_PROJECT is also set and agrees with it — the pair the shell hook exports together is the opt-in. A SYN_IDENTITY standing alone or disagreeing (the borrowed-shell signature) is dropped out loud: the command proceeds as the local identity and says so, or refuses entirely when the local fallback also looks accidental (the home directory, a system path). Set $SYN_PROJECT once per terminal and the identity is stable across tool calls. syn inbox filters on that full resolved identity and advances a cursor named for that identity. It never falls back to a shared project cursor. Use --project-wide when the broader project feed is intentional, --name PROJ/name for another exact address, or repeat --as PROJ/name to drain standing role addresses under independent cursors. A bare --as PROJ is the explicit project-wide alias form; $SYN_ALIASES supplies the same standing alias list. On the hub side the waiter identity is protected by a name-ownership lease: the first synapse wait/arm for a name is granted an opaque token (persisted under ~/synapse/owner-lease/), every re-arm presents it and re-takes its own name, and a stranger claiming the name — takeover flag or not — is refused with close code 4016 until the lease lapses (--lease-offline-ttl, default one hour offline). Beneath the lease sits a zero-config machine identity: the first connect provisions a per-machine Ed25519 key, the hub pins each signed name to it on first use (durable across hub restarts, --identity-pins), and a claim from any other machine is refused until the operator clears the pin. One name, one owner, across reconnects and restarts. While the hub is running, it also watches every unexpired claim and assigned non-terminal board task. If that exact owner has no fresh -rx waiter for 30 continuous seconds, the hub broadcasts one machine-readable dark_seat_alert with the affected work and the exact permanent-arm command. Re-arming clears the episode; the monitor never releases or reassigns work on its own. Hyphenated aliases (syn-name/syn-wait/syn-say/syn-ask/syn-inbox/syn-board/syn-reap/syn-locks/syn-ack/syn-commit) are installed too.

Two follow-ons complete that loop. Adding --mailbox to synapse arm also wakes the waiter on directed messages that arrived while it was disconnected — the reconnect or re-arm gap — by asking the hub to replay them on connect, resuming from a per-identity cursor under ~/synapse/mailbox-cursor/ so a re-arm does not replay the whole backlog (off by default; needs a wire version 2 hub). Agent-tmux uses a distinct <identity>-pane-rx receiver, so the mailbox arm can stay online beside live pane injection without either sidecar taking over the other's name. synapse release can attach a hub-echoed receipt with evidence, artifacts, changed files, approvals, known failures, confidence, and evidence freshness; the receipt carries advisory epistemic_status metadata (supported, needs_freshness, stale, degraded, or unsupported) with reasons derived from the submitted evidence, and --receipt-json prints it for automation.

To make fresh terminals connect automatically, install the shell hook once:

synapse install-shell-hook --shell auto

New Bash/Fish/Zsh terminals then export SYN_PROJECT/SYN_IDENTITY and keep a cheap synapse arm sidecar running. The hook does not silently join whatever git checkout the terminal happens to start in. It joins the neutral SYNAPSE_DEFAULT_PROJECT lane, or user when unset, unless you explicitly set SYN_PROJECT/SYN_IDENTITY or opt a repository in with .synapse/project:

mkdir -p .synapse
printf '%s\n' myrepo > .synapse/project

For legacy CWD-derived behavior, set SYNAPSE_AUTO_PROJECT_FROM_CWD=1 in that terminal. The hook also wraps common provider commands (codex, claude, kimi, grok, gemini, agent, ask, ollama) through synapse worker-session, so cloud and local LLM sessions inherit the same Synapse identity from process start. In an interactive terminal, Codex/Claude/Kimi/Grok launch through a persistent tmux session and directed wake bridge automatically; the user still types only the provider command. Set SYNAPSE_PROVIDER_TMUX=0 to keep those providers on the direct execution path, or SYNAPSE_AUTO_CONNECT=0 to disable the hook for a terminal.

Durability

Passing --db backs the hub with an append-only SQLite event log (standard library, WAL mode). Claims, releases, task updates, resource offers, task-board writes, and chat messages are recorded, and the hub rebuilds its state by replaying the log on start-up. The guarantee is split honestly by workload: keyed covered coordination mutations commit their event, canonical request digest, exact response, and evidence intent together at synchronous=FULL (durable across an OS crash); the high-volume chat/history path commits at synchronous=NORMAL (durable across an application crash, may lose the last commit on power loss).

Native Agent Evidence Format (AEF) v0.1 emission is an explicit opt-in on top of that durable log. Generate an owner-only Ed25519 receipt key, give the hub a stable identity, and enable the route:

synapse merkle keygen ~/synapse/aef-receipt-key
synapse hub \
  --db ~/synapse/hub.db \
  --hub-id hub.example \
  --aef-signing-key ~/synapse/aef-receipt-key

Supported evidence rows and their AEF outbox cursor commit in one SQLite transaction. Before serving, the hub reconciles every pending cursor; while serving, a dedicated worker drains new rows in order (default cadence one second, configurable with --aef-drain-interval). A crash after receipt emission but before acknowledgement reuses the verified receipt rather than emitting a duplicate. A failed drain leaves the durable cursor pending and retries; legacy rows and their historical Merkle serialization are never rewritten or merged with the native AEF chain. Without --aef-signing-key, the hub retains its legacy-only posture.

Use synapse compact to bound the durable memory spine after every read-side consumer has advanced past a floor sequence. Add --archive-report when the maintenance run should leave an operator-readable HTML record of the pre-compaction event snapshot:

synapse compact ./synapse.db --all --max-checkpoints-per-task 3 \
  --archive-report ./compact-report.html

The report is written owner-only and includes event counts, the compaction floor, checkpoint/finding removal counts, board tasks, release receipt notes, and a bounded coordination timeline. It is an audit aid for a local event store; it does not certify that release evidence is sufficient.

SQLCipher live event store (at rest)

SQLCipher completes the at-rest encryption story for the live hub. The default install stays dependency-free and uses ordinary SQLite. When you need page-level confidentiality for the durable coordination log while the hub holds it open, install the optional extra and pass an owner-only key file:

python -m pip install 'synapse-channel[sqlcipher]'
synapse encrypt-key generate ~/synapse/hub.key
chmod 600 ~/synapse/hub.key

# New encrypted store (main DB + WAL stay ciphertext on disk):
synapse hub --db ~/synapse/hub.db --db-key-file ~/synapse/hub.key

# Plaintext → encrypted offline migration (hub stopped; destination must not exist):
synapse encrypt-key migrate-sqlcipher \
  --key ~/synapse/hub.key \
  --source ~/synapse/hub-plain.db \
  --destination ~/synapse/hub.db

# In-place key rotation via PRAGMA rekey (hub stopped):
synapse encrypt-key generate ~/synapse/hub.key.new
synapse sqlcipher rekey \
  --db ~/synapse/hub.db \
  --old-key ~/synapse/hub.key \
  --new-key ~/synapse/hub.key.new

Passphrase-derived keys (optional) tune scrypt cost on generation:

synapse encrypt-key generate --from-passphrase \
  --scrypt-n 65536 --scrypt-r 8 --scrypt-p 1 \
  ~/synapse/hub.key

Operators and analysis CLIs open the same store with the same key material — missing or wrong keys fail closed (no silent empty report):

synapse doctor --db-path ~/synapse/hub.db --db-key-file ~/synapse/hub.key
synapse event-query ~/synapse/hub.db --db-key-file ~/synapse/hub.key 'task T timeline'
synapse postmortem ~/synapse/hub.db --db-key-file ~/synapse/hub.key T
synapse reliability ~/synapse/hub.db --db-key-file ~/synapse/hub.key
synapse causality contention ~/synapse/hub.db --db-key-file ~/synapse/hub.key
synapse dashboard --feeds-db ~/synapse/hub.db --feeds-db-key-file ~/synapse/hub.key
synapse multihub observe --peer-db ~/peer/hub.db --db-key-file ~/peer/hub.key

Complementary whole-file envelopes (optional [encryption] extra) protect relay logs, A2A state files, cursors, and archives with AES-256-GCM via synapse encrypt-key profile|migrate|rekey|backup|restore. They do not replace page encryption for a live open SQLite database — that is SQLCipher's job.

Honest limits: SQLCipher does not protect hub RAM, does not replace filesystem permissions or connect authentication, and is not multi-tenant isolation. Stock installs without [sqlcipher] refuse --db-key-file with an install hint.

Full operator profile, key handling, and rotation: at-rest encryption.

Token-thrifty observation

--relay-log mirrors every broadcast to a newline-delimited file in a compact short-key form (encode_lite), so a token-budgeted agent can watch the channel by tailing a file instead of holding a socket. synapse relay <file> decodes it back to readable lines and can resume from a saved --cursor. Version 2 retains structured JSON payloads and every auxiliary envelope field under a compact extension mapping; the decoder remains compatible with existing version-1 logs. Timestamps retain millisecond precision, and --relay-max-lines bounds the file. A committed benchmark compares the same full field set in wire, minified, and lite forms — see benchmarks/.

Exposure

By default the hub binds to loopback and runs with no authentication — the right posture for one operator on one machine. When that is not enough (a worker with tool-use, or a hub bound off-loopback), --token requires a shared secret that connecting agents present with --token. Binding off loopback without a token is refused rather than silently exposed: the hub will not start unless you set a token (and --metrics-token when metrics are on), or explicitly pass --insecure-off-loopback to accept the risk. This is a proportionate gate, not a cryptographic identity system. For native wss://, pass both --tls-certfile and --tls-keyfile. TLS protects the transport but does not replace --token; an off-loopback hub still needs the shared secret unless you explicitly opt into --insecure-off-loopback. Off loopback TLS is also required, not just recommended: a token presented over plaintext ws:// off loopback is refused (the token and every frame would be readable on the wire), so add native TLS or a wss:// proxy — or pass --insecure-off-loopback to accept the risk on a trusted LAN.

MCP server face

Any MCP-compatible agent — Claude Desktop, Claude Code, an editor assistant — coordinates through Synapse with no Synapse-specific code. Install the optional extra and register the host in one command:

python -m pip install 'synapse-channel[mcp]'
claude mcp add synapse -- synapse mcp
# or: codex mcp add synapse -- synapse mcp --name my-repo/codex

synapse mcp runs a Model Context Protocol server over stdio that is itself a hub client, exposing send, bounded durable inbox, status, claim, release, handoff, and plan updates as MCP tools, with the board, state, and manifest as live resources. It also exposes read-only resource templates for a single board task, one agent, and one resource kind. The bridge derives a visible project identity when --name is omitted, but concurrent clients should pin distinct names. It does not wake an idle provider; the permanent waiter remains a separate path. The hub stays MCP-agnostic and the core install keeps its single dependency — see the MCP guide.

Discovery, advisory routing, and memory

Every surface in this group is advisory by design: it prints ranked, provenance-tagged evidence for a human or an agent to act on, and none of it claims work, reserves capacity, mutates the board, or turns a capability card into executable trust.

Capability cards can also carry declarative capability contracts: per-task-class input_schema and output_schema mappings plus optional preconditions and postconditions — discovery metadata for routing and review, not a grant of executable trust.

They can now carry a domain-separated Ed25519 signature from a separate card-signing key. synapse capability-card keygen|sign|verify manages the local profile; worker --capability-card-key ... signs live advertisements and hub --capability-card-trust ... verifies them. Every projection exposes an explicit result, including valid, missing_signature, key/signature/expiry failures, replay, downgrade, binding, digest, and history-capacity failures. Verification remains advisory and unsigned cards remain compatible. History is bounded and in memory by default; hub --capability-card-history-db FILE adds an owner-only SQLite replay/downgrade floor across hub restarts and fails visibly as history_unavailable when it cannot commit lifecycle state.

Official Go client

clients/go/synapse provides the official Go client for read-only ops and CI tools. It fetches HTTP JSON surfaces such as synapse dashboard /snapshot.json through DashboardSnapshot or GetJSON, with optional bearer authentication for dashboard tokens on exposed HTTP surfaces. It does not implement the WebSocket mutation protocol for claims, chat, board writes, release receipts, or presence. See the Go client guide.

Official TypeScript/JavaScript client

clients/js provides the official typed WebSocket client, published to npm as @anulum/synapse-channel. Unlike the read-only Go client it speaks the mutation protocol — chat, claims, releases, board reads, presence, and receipts — and runs unchanged in the browser and in Node 20+ with no runtime dependencies. See the TypeScript/JavaScript client guide.

A2A HTTP bridge

synapse a2a-serve --endpoint-url ... runs the Agent2Agent edge directly — an intentionally local-first HTTP+JSON bridge:

• Serves the public Agent Card; forwards POST /message:send text/data/file parts into SYNAPSE chat; supports immediate POST /message:stream Server-Sent Events; exposes bridge-local task list/get/cancel and push-notification configuration routes; exposes authenticated task-scoped, credential-free push-delivery evidence; accepts JSON-RPC 2.0 on /rpc.
• Operational bounds: Bearer auth plus request size/depth limits, durable task state with --state-file, stale-task failure with --task-timeout, one bounded subscription wait with --subscribe-timeout, plus a fixed bounded three-attempt webhook retry schedule whose exhaustion dead-letters delivery without rewriting the stored task transition.
• Bearer custody: prefer owner-only --a2a-token-file PATH on serving and outbound commands. Explicit --a2a-token remains a process-visible compatibility override. Outbound clients refuse bearer-over-HTTP except to a literal loopback IP unless --a2a-allow-insecure-http accepts the risk.
• Task correlation travels in structured chat metadata (a2aTaskId, a2aContextId) — the bridge never appends or trusts inline markers in chat text, so user-authored message bodies stay data rather than task selectors.
• Safety posture: owner-only state/temp files, unsafe caller ids and webhook targets rejected (including delivery-time DNS or redirect targets that resolve to local networks), bounded task/history/artifact/replay retention with terminal-task GC, and subscription replay only from the current bridge process.

Independent validation now includes an official a2a-sdk==1.1.0 discovery/send/get/list/cancel lifecycle and an official A2A TCK HTTP+JSON MUST run (55 passed, 5 structured-response failures, 175 skipped). That is partial interoperability evidence, not certification or full conformance: structured artifact/direct Message scenarios, an outbound external-server pass, public webhook and proxy/TLS receipts, durable replay, and operator deployment sign-off remain open. Validation stays a track of reproducible validation receipts — discovery, task lifecycle, webhook, proxy/TLS, replay, and threat-model — rather than one score. The installed support matrix is available with synapse a2a-conformance and in the A2A conformance matrix; exposed deployments should also follow the A2A deployment threat model.

Git-native claims

A claim can be scoped to the git branch it happens on, resolved client-side:

synapse git-init --name project/agent            # persist exact identity/URI + install release hooks
synapse git-claim TASK-1 --paths src/auth.py     # or: synapse git-claim --task-id TASK-1 ...
synapse git-claim-check --staged                 # fail unless this owner covers the staged index
synapse git-claim TASK-2 --diff-base main        # optional [semantic] extra narrows safe edits to symbols
synapse git-hook install                         # (git-init already does this) auto-release on commit/merge
synapse conflicts --check-diff                   # predict cross-branch merge conflicts

Around those claims sits a family of security and governance profiles. Each one is documented with an honest status — what runs today, and what each layer explicitly does not claim:

synapse git-init records the exact identity and hub URI in local Git config, optionally records a token-file path (never token content), installs only the non-blocking post-commit/post-merge auto-release hooks, and writes a short .synapse/git-claims.md guide. This repository separately wires git-claim-check --staged into pre-commit: it reads the NUL-delimited Git index itself and fails closed unless the configured owner has editable claims covering every staged path on the same canonical worktree and branch. For semantic claims it resolves HEAD versus the index and checks the exact tree-sitter declarations touched; incomplete evidence widens to a whole-file requirement, and parser failure denies. A Git serialization lock is not a path claim. An empty staged index succeeds without a hub so pre-commit run --all-files remains hermetic. synapse state shows each claim's branch, while synapse conflicts flags agents about to edit the same files on branches that merge into the same base. --check-diff narrows directory or whole-worktree claims to files both branches actually changed when both branch diffs are available. With the optional semantic extra, --check-semantic further compares named declarations on pinned revisions. Enclosing declarations overlap their members; unavailable or ambiguous evidence retains a warning. A missing hub snapshot returns an error. This committed-diff view neither reserves work nor proves behavioural independence or a conflict-free merge. The hub stays git-agnostic — it stores the branch as opaque metadata and never runs git or reads a filesystem — so all git work is on the client. See the git-native claims guide.

For a concise lease view while coordinating a session:

syn locks              # current project only
syn locks --all        # every active lease
syn locks --owner api  # one owner or project namespace

When a manual release is also the closeout record, attach the evidence directly:

synapse release BUILD --name api-dev \
  --evidence "pytest tests/test_feature.py -q: passed" \
  --changed-file src/synapse_channel/feature.py \
  --artifact coverage.xml \
  --receipt-json

When closeout evidence should be observed rather than hand-entered, synapse verify-release runs declared commands, records exit codes and stdout/stderr SHA-256 digests, hashes named artifacts, captures Git HEAD, tree, and changed files, then writes receipt JSON for synapse release --receipt:

synapse verify-release BUILD --name api-dev \
  --run ".venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_feature.py -q" \
  --artifact coverage.xml \
  --output verified-release.json
synapse release BUILD --name api-dev --receipt verified-release.json --receipt-json

The resulting supported status remains advisory: it describes fresh submitted evidence, not independent proof that the checks or artifacts are sufficient.

For safer task selection and release receipts, the local test ownership map connects source files to likely owning tests using AST imports plus a conservative filename fallback:

python tools/test_ownership_map.py --check \
  --source src/synapse_channel/core/receipts.py \
  --require-owned src/synapse_channel/core/receipts.py

It is a deterministic local aid for choosing focused tests; it does not replace review, coverage, or the release receipt evidence itself.

When a source change can stale generated outputs, ask the generated-output dependency map which generated paths should be included in the same claim:

python tools/generated_dependency_claims.py --claim-args \
  --source src/synapse_channel/core/receipts.py

The command prints --paths ... arguments for synapse git-claim and can also emit JSON for release tooling. It is a deterministic coordination aid; the owning generator, such as python tools/capability_manifest.py --check, remains the freshness check for the generated artefact itself.

For semantic task scopes, resolve modules, public symbols, API surfaces, tests, generated artefacts, migrations, or source paths into ordinary claim paths:

python tools/semantic_claims.py --selector \
  symbol:synapse_channel.core.receipts.build_release_receipt \
  --claim-args

For a symbol or API selector, the resolver prints a synthetic descendant such as src/synapse_channel/core/receipts.py/.synapse-symbol/build_release_receipt; likely owning tests and generated outputs remain whole-file companions. Module, source, test, generated, and migration selectors also remain whole-file. The hub uses its existing path ancestry rule: different functions can coexist, while a class, whole-file, or parent-directory claim still conflicts with every symbol below it.

For daily claims, synapse git-claim can resolve the same selectors directly:

synapse git-claim TASK-RECEIPTS \
  --symbol synapse_channel.core.receipts.build_release_receipt \
  --semantic-evidence-json semantic-evidence.json

The command resolves the current git root locally, expands the selector into canonical claim paths, and writes receipt-ready selector evidence when requested.

To infer scopes from an actual tracked diff, install the optional local parser bundle and claim from a base revision:

pip install 'synapse-channel[semantic]'
python tools/semantic_diff_claims.py --base main --claim-args
synapse git-claim TASK-WORKER \
  --diff-base main \
  --diff-path src/synapse_channel/core/worker.py \
  --semantic-evidence-json semantic-evidence.json

The client maps zero-context hunks on both old and new source sides to the smallest named Python, JavaScript/JSX, TypeScript/TSX, Rust, Go, Java, C#, or Ruby declaration. Renames claim both symbol names. Add/delete/rename statuses, module-level edits, unsupported or invalid syntax, oversized sources, and every other incomplete mapping widen to the whole file. Grammar wheels are installed with the extra; there is no runtime download, new wire field, or hub-side Git access. The JSON is planning evidence, not a correctness proof.

Semantic scopes are enforced end to end on the client. Precise provider edits (Edit/replace/search_replace-style tools) may provisionally use a symbol claim only when no competing owner holds another symbol in that physical source and worktree. Whole-file writes and patch tools require whole-file claims. The staged gate proves the exact index symbols before commit, while auto-release repeats the committed diff and releases only the symbol actually changed. Ambiguous or unavailable semantic evidence fails closed at the staged gate and retains the claim at non-blocking post-commit release. Use isolated Git worktrees for concurrent sibling-symbol edits.

Before merge or handoff, the import graph merge-risk radar compares changed files with claimed paths, package-local Python import neighbours, CODEOWNERS, and mapped test owners:

python tools/import_merge_risk.py --changed src/synapse_channel/core/receipts.py \
  --claimed src/synapse_channel/core/state.py --check

Use --base main --head HEAD instead of --changed to read a local branch diff, or --claims-json claims.json to feed paths from an external claim snapshot. The radar is an advisory local planning check; it predicts likely contention but does not replace tests, review, or release receipt evidence.

For post-hoc coordination forensics, query the durable event log directly:

synapse event-query ./synapse.db "task TASK-1 timeline"
synapse event-query ./synapse.db "task TASK-1 at seq 120" --json
synapse event-query ./synapse.db "path src/auth.py between 0 9999999999"
synapse event-query ./synapse.db "conflicts at seq 120"
synapse event-query ./synapse.db 'timeline("TASK-1").'
synapse event-query ./synapse.db 'MATCH (task:TASK {id:"TASK-1"}) RETURN timeline'
synapse postmortem ./synapse.db TASK-1
synapse debug ./synapse.db --fork-at 142 --set status=blocked
synapse reproduce ./synapse.db TASK-1 --expect 9f2c…
synapse causality causes ./synapse.db 142
synapse causality causes ./hub.db peer:96 --peer peer=./peer-hub.db
synapse merkle root ./synapse.db
synapse reliability ./synapse.db
synapse accounting report ./synapse.db --pricing pricing.json --budget budget.json
synapse fleet-scorecard ./synapse.db --trend bench-trend.db --out fleet-scorecard.json
synapse approval request --name dev --subject TASK-1 --reason "needs sign-off"
synapse approval status ./synapse.db --pending
synapse ttl-advice ./synapse.db

This temporal event-log query path is read-only. It reconstructs task timelines, task state at a sequence or timestamp, path-touch windows, and historical file-scope conflicts from the SQLite event store created by synapse hub --db. The Datalog-like and Cypher-like examples are prototype aliases for the same small query model, not a separate graph database or mutable policy engine.

Use synapse postmortem ./synapse.db TASK-1 when a task needs a replayable postmortem for a handover or incident note. The report includes the durable task timeline, owners, releases, assessment evidence, reconstructed path-overlap conflicts, and candidate unanswered messages. Candidate unanswered messages mean the log contains a directed chat mentioning the task id and no later matching chat reply; it is an audit signal, not proof of intent.

Use synapse debug ./synapse.db --fork-at 142 to rewind a task in the log and inspect a what-if. It reconstructs the exact claim state — owner, status, paths, and the saved resume checkpoint — that the task held at that sequence, then prints the resume manifest an agent would pick up from there (with --set FIELD=VALUE overriding a resume field) next to the events that really followed. The hub runs no task, so this is read-only inspection, not re-execution; it exits 1 when the task held no live claim at that point.

Use synapse reproduce ./synapse.db TASK-1 to fingerprint a task's authoritative history into a portable SHA-256 digest. Hub state is a pure fold of an append-only log, so the same claim snapshots and releases replay to the same digest on every machine; --expect DIGEST turns it into a gate that fails on any divergence, the way a release receipt is verified.

Use synapse causality causes ./synapse.db 142 to trace coordination causality over the log. It folds the durable events into a directed acyclic graph of three recorded relations — a task's own lifecycle, a declared depends_on satisfied by the dependency's completion, and a release that let a later, path-overlapping claim proceed — and answers against an event sequence: causes for what preceded it, effects for what it enabled, and counterfactual for the downstream events that would lose their recorded cause without it. This is coordination causality inferred from recorded scheduling semantics, not statistical causal discovery; every edge is backed by a concrete event, and the counterfactual is a structural what-if over the inferred graph. With --peer HUB=PATH the same queries trace causality across federated hubs: the logs merge in the deterministic multi-hub order, events are addressed as HUB:SEQ, and an edge whose endpoints two different hubs authored is tagged federation — clock-ordered evidence, since hubs share no sequence, and observe-only like the multi-hub read side; --clock-skew HUB=SECONDS annotates offline federated reports with measured local-minus-peer skew warnings, and --dot renders the federated answer as a Graphviz digraph, one cluster per hub with federation edges coloured, so the cross-hub topology is visible at a glance. synapse causality otel projects the graph onto OpenTelemetry spans — one trace per task, cross-task dependency/contention edges as span links, ids deterministic — written as JSON (--out) or pushed as real OTLP over HTTP (--endpoint, optional extra: pip install 'synapse-channel[otel]'); --service-name distinguishes hubs sharing one observability tenant, --filter TASK_ID narrows the projection to named tasks without truncating their cross-task links, an event recording the lifecycle failure terminal projects span status ERROR, and --watch re-exports on a fixed cadence — idempotent collector-side thanks to the deterministic ids. synapse causality health walks the same graph and flags orphaned claims (claimed, then silence), declared dependencies that never completed, and unreleased claims silent past a threshold — ages measured against the log's own final timestamp, deterministic and replayable; exit 1 signals an anomaly.

Use synapse merkle root ./synapse.db to commit the durable log to a single Merkle root — a 32-byte fingerprint of every event, so two operators or two federated hubs holding the same log derive the same root and a mismatch proves they differ. synapse merkle prove ./synapse.db 142 emits an O(log n) inclusion proof for one event, and synapse merkle verify proof.json checks that proof offline against a trusted root with no event store — the light-client verification a follower runs. The tree follows RFC 6962 (Certificate Transparency), so a leaf hash cannot be forged as an interior node. It commits what the log contains — integrity and inclusion — complementing reproduce (a per-task digest) with a log-wide, incrementally provable commitment.

A hub with a journal also persists that commitment as a hash-chained checkpoint OUTSIDE the log — an owner-only <db>.checkpoint.db beside it — and verifies the log against the newest link before serving: a tail-truncated or replaced log is a hard AntiRollbackError at startup, not a quiet restart, and a verified tip is anchored as the next chain link. synapse merkle checkpoint ./synapse.db shows the newest link, and --verify re-checks the log against it (exit 0 clean, 2 on detection). This is the local anti-rollback layer; external witnessing stays owner-gated. An intentional rewrite such as synapse compact trips the detector by design; the operator remedy is to remove the checkpoint store and let the hub anchor a fresh chain.

Use synapse reliability ./synapse.db for evidence-only reliability memory. It tracks stale claims, declared failed-check evidence, broken handoff candidates, and merge-conflict frequency as audit signals, not scores. It does not rank agents, assign trust grades, or replace review of the underlying event rows.

Use synapse accounting for opt-in model cost/token usage. Synapse never calls a model provider and collects no telemetry, so usage exists only when you record it: synapse accounting record posts a usage-kind progress note, and synapse accounting report ./synapse.db aggregates those notes into per-agent and per-model totals, with optional --pricing for cost estimates and --budget for budget evidence. Budgets are evidence, not an enforcement gate.

Use synapse fleet-scorecard ./synapse.db --out fleet-scorecard.json to compose the existing causality spans, opt-in accounting, advisory claim contention, and evidence-only reliability report into one atomic owner-only JSON bundle. --trend bench-trend.db includes the full host-context-labelled benchmark history. With the optional otel extra, replace --out with --endpoint http://127.0.0.1:4318: the command pushes traces and current scorecard gauges to the collector's standard HTTP signal paths. It does not collect usage, rank agents, pre-empt claims, or pretend that current gauges backfill historical benchmark timestamps.

Use synapse approval for human-in-the-loop approval gates on held tasks or policy-gated releases. synapse approval request puts a subject in awaiting_approval, synapse approval decide --approve|--reject records the decision, and synapse approval status ./synapse.db replays the notes into the current state per subject (the latest event wins, so a re-request re-opens the gate). It is advisory evidence and an audit trail, not a hard runtime gate; an approved subject can be cited in a release receipt via synapse release --approval.

Use synapse attention to project pending approvals, failed delivery, recovery and optional private quota freshness into one owner-local queue. synapse attention list distinguishes a quiet queue from a missing observer; snooze and resolution affect only the alert, never the underlying approval or delivery. The authenticated cockpit can read the same queue when synapse dashboard --attention-store names its database. Generic desktop summaries require an explicit --desktop opt-in.

The agent trust graph connects those reliability signals, positive release receipts, handoff outcomes, and conflict history into an inspectable evidence graph: synapse trust-graph ./synapse.db prints typed evidence edges with event-log provenance, filtered by --agent, --task, or a --since decay window, as text, JSON, or Graphviz DOT. It does not rank agents, assign trust grades, authorize execution, replace code review, or replace identity and ACL; the routing integration and the owner-annotation workflow remain design targets.

The federated trust model has an opt-in runtime: deny-by-default peer policy and lifecycle stores, signed-frame authorisation, guarded multi-hub paths, and federation offer/fetch/import/list/rotate/revoke bundle workflows. Operators still establish trust out-of-band by comparing fingerprints; there is no automatic trust distribution, certificate authority, or external federation certification, and the local-first default is unchanged.

The Agent Air Traffic Control architecture names how the shipped parts compose into one control loop — separation (claims), merge-risk radar (conflicts), evidence-gated completion (receipts, policy-check, approval), post-incident replay (postmortem, reliability), and memory (the ingest seam). It is an architecture, not a scheduler: only claims gate a mutation, and everything else is read-only or advisory.

The shipped cross-agent adapter kits expose synapse adapters to detect installed coding tools and write a thin claim-aware adapter into each tool's native config. Kimi Code supports both its user-level kimi skill (under $KIMI_CODE_HOME) and an explicit higher-priority kimi-project skill; its native claim hook is a separate opt-in. Python-framework shims remain a documented thin-client pattern. Adapters carry only "claim before edit, release on commit, reach the hub" — Synapse stays persona-neutral and adds no new coordination primitive.

The multi-hub sync (CRDT) research asks whether several hubs could synchronise state while keeping claim safety and local-first. Its honest core: an honest append-only event log with unique (hub_id, seq) identities converges, but conflicting content for one identity fails closed before state or cursor publication and quarantines the peer. Claims are mutual exclusion and not a CRDT — they are routed by single-owner-per-namespace and fail closed on a partition. The shipped surface is operator-managed peering: synapse multihub follow and --observed-peer HUB=URI views observe peer logs as advisory observed@HUB state; local claim authority remains local or explicitly routed to the owning hub. A stopped durable watcher can record explicit recovery with synapse multihub recover only after an operator accepts a new log generation or checkpoint; reconnect alone never clears quarantine. Network observed-peer pulls also carry cursor lag and peer welcome-frame clock skew, so operators can see when timestamp-ordered cross-hub evidence depends on clocks outside their configured agreement.

The sandboxed tools and marketplace research asks what it would take to run untrusted tool code safely — a capability-limited WebAssembly sandbox (deny-by-default filesystem, network, and resources) — and only then a marketplace built on signed capability cards, an explicit permission manifest, and run receipts. No untrusted code runs without the sandbox, and no executable marketplace ships before all the preconditions exist. The sandbox ships behind the optional [wasm] extra, while signed capability cards, the permission model, and bounded run receipts supply the other runtime prerequisites; the WASM sandbox getting-started guide walks an operator from a tool's source through validate, test, and run. The marketplace distribution layer remains a boundary specification — local-first and deny-by-default throughout.

The managed GitHub App design pins the boundary for hosted cross-PR conflict prediction: the prediction itself reuses the existing local-core conflict finder, while everything that makes it managed — webhooks, GitHub auth, checks API, hosting — stays out of the local core. The independently installable App skeleton verifies signed webhooks and writes neutral checks; registration and hosting are separate gates. The local review-feedback workflow preserves signed review evidence, requires an independent hub decision and routes a notice to the exact author seat and native session binding without automatic merge or model execution.

Use synapse ttl-advice ./synapse.db for read-only adaptive lease TTL advice. It derives completed-task duration samples, active live-claim counts, and stale claim counts from the event log, then prints an advisory default. It never changes the hub default and explicit manual TTL values still win.

Coordination model

1. Claim before you work: an agent leases a task by id; a live lease blocks other agents from claiming the same task.
2. Declare a file scope on the claim (a worktree and paths); the hub refuses a claim whose files overlap another agent's live claim. This is grant-time mutual exclusion, while documented provider hooks and the staged Git gate enforce supported mutation paths. Different worktree labels do not contend at the hub, so use actual isolated Git worktrees for concurrent edits.
3. Leases auto-expire, so a crashed agent never holds a claim forever, and each lease carries an epoch so a superseded agent cannot act on a dead claim. An owner can save a durable checkpoint on the task; if its lease lapses, the next agent to claim the task inherits that checkpoint and resumes rather than restarting.
4. Release on completion; status and an optional artefact reference can be attached while the task is in progress. A held task can also be handed off atomically to another online agent — keeping its scope, status, and context, with no window for a third agent to grab it mid-transfer.
5. Presence, who, full state snapshots, and chat history are queryable at any time. After a reconnect to the same running hub, an agent can resume by idem_key (retried claims are not applied twice while the hub retains its idempotency cache) and a resume cursor (fetch exactly the messages it missed).

Alongside the lease registry, a shared blackboard holds the team's plan: a task ledger of declared work with dependencies (the hub refuses dependency cycles, so ready tasks are well-defined) and an append-only progress ledger a supervisor can read to spot stalls. A declared LedgerTask is the plan; a claim is the lease on doing it — the two share a task id but stay independent, so the simple claim flow keeps working. The hub keeps the progress view bounded globally, per author, and per task id (--max-progress, --max-progress-per-author, --max-progress-per-task), while the durable event log remains append-only until explicit compaction. Durable findings also have a per-agent admission cap (--max-findings-per-agent) so one producer cannot fill the shared memory spine. View the board with synapse board.

synapse supervisor remains deterministic and LLM-free. It re-offers in_progress tasks after the fixed --idle-seconds ceiling, and, by default, can lower that ceiling when completed-task progress cadence in the same board shows a faster local pattern. Use --no-predictive-stall to disable the historical-cadence supplement; it is an advisory local board heuristic, not a guarantee that work is actually abandoned.

See TEAM_PROTOCOL.md for the working agreement and message reference.

Why not just git worktrees?

Worktrees are a good tool and SYNAPSE composes with them rather than competing: a claim declares its worktree, and claims carrying different canonical worktree identities do not contend on files. But worktrees alone solve only file isolation, and they solve it by deferring the collision to merge time. What they do not give you:

• Work deduplication — two agents in two worktrees can happily build the same feature twice; a claimed task on the shared board cannot be claimed again while its lease is live.
• Live claim admission — inside one worktree (the common case for a shared checkout), the hub refuses a second overlapping file-scope claim while the first authority is live. This refusal governs claim admission; covered provider hooks, the staged Git gate, and isolated worktrees supply their separately documented mutation boundaries.
• Visibility — presence, live claims, a task board with dependencies, and progress you can query, instead of discovering what each agent did from its branch diff.
• Continuity — leases expire, checkpoints survive crashes, tasks hand off atomically; a worktree left behind by a dead agent is just a stale directory.
• A durable record — an append-only event log of who claimed, did, and released what, replayable after an incident (synapse causality, synapse debug), which no branch topology records.

If per-agent worktrees already work for you, keep them — and let the hub carry the claims, the plan, and the audit trail across them.

Library use

import asyncio
from synapse_channel import SynapseHub, SynapseAgent


async def main() -> None:
    hub = SynapseHub()
    asyncio.create_task(hub.serve("localhost", 8876))
    agent = SynapseAgent("ALPHA", uri="ws://localhost:8876")
    # ... drive the agent: claim, chat, request state ...

The typed log_recall(..., idem_key=...) and record_finding(..., idem_key=...) helpers accept caller-retained retry keys. With SynapseHub(journal=...), each admitted memory write and its exact response commit together: an identical retry replays after restart, while reusing the key for changed content is refused without exposing the key or prior values. The key does not make a non-journalled hub durable, and rejected findings remain non-events rather than durable successful operations.

Two self-contained, runnable demos live in examples/: coordination_demo.py narrates a full task through the bus (declare, block, claim, refuse an overlap, unblock, hand off), and llm_team_demo.py asks an on-channel model worker a question. Each starts its own in-process hub, so python examples/coordination_demo.py runs with nothing else set up.

Architecture

Capability inventory

Documentation and project

• New here? Use cases · How it compares · FAQ · Troubleshooting · Glossary
• ARCHITECTURE.md — the module map and coordination model.
• TEAM_PROTOCOL.md — the working agreement and wire reference.
• VALIDATION.md — how it is tested and the gates a change clears.
• CONTRIBUTING.md · SECURITY.md · GOVERNANCE.md · ROADMAP.md
• Full documentation site: https://anulum.github.io/synapse-channel

Security posture

Coordination guarantees are tracked in the invariant-conformance programme. Its generated six-boundary registry is machine checked and currently reports partial overall conformance; incomplete boundaries remain explicit rather than inheriting a green status from ordinary test coverage.

Local-first by default: the hub binds to loopback, and it refuses a non-loopback bind unless a token is configured (or the operator explicitly accepts the exposure with --insecure-off-loopback). When a deployment crosses that boundary, every control is opt-in and deny-by-default:

• Connect authentication — a shared-secret token compared in constant time (--token-file or SYNAPSE_TOKEN preferred over --token, which is visible in the process list).
• Per-message authentication — --message-auth-key with --require-message-auth demands sender-bound HMAC authentication on selected mutating frames after connect authentication. With --db, the CLI also persists accepted nonces in <DB>.message-auth.db, so replay refusal survives restart; --db-key-file encrypts both stores. A journal-free authenticated hub warns that its nonce cache is process-local unless --message-auth-replay-db is supplied.
• Signed events and trusted peers — embedded hubs can accept Ed25519 event signatures as the per-message alternative, and guarded multi-hub/federation paths compose live certificate pins with operator-confirmed peer policy. The packaged hub CLI does not load an Ed25519 event-trust bundle or client CA, so --tls-certfile --tls-keyfile alone is server TLS, not mTLS.
• Deny-by-default ACL — --acl-policy with --require-acl rejects mutating frames from identities the policy does not grant.
• Authenticated guard evidence — native file-claim hook denials can be journalled through a separately token-authenticated, digest-only guard_denial frame; open or journal-free hubs refuse the evidence path.
• Bounded resources — connection, frame-size, JSON-depth, rate, and history caps keep one runaway agent from exhausting the hub.
• One-flag strict mode — synapse hub --paranoid turns the strict set on together.

Beyond the wire, several subsystems harden data at rest and privileged actions, each opt-in and documented:

• At-rest encryption (complete dual profile) —
  • SQLCipher — optional page encryption for the live hub event store (pip install 'synapse-channel[sqlcipher]', synapse hub --db-key-file, migrate/rekey-sqlcipher, doctor and analysis readers with the same key). Completes the story for a database that stays open under WAL. See SQLCipher live event store.
  • Whole-file AES-256-GCM envelopes — relay logs, A2A state, cursors, and archives via synapse encrypt-key, with fail-safe profile checks, migrate/ rekey/backup/restore, and optional passphrase / PKCS#11 / TPM 2.0 key wrapping ([encryption] extra). See at-rest encryption.
• Capability-limited tool sandbox — synapse sandbox runs a WebAssembly tool under a deny-by-default capability manifest (filesystem, network, and resource grants bound to the module's content digest), refuses a preopen whose host path resolves through a symlink, and returns a bounded, attestable run receipt. Experimental, behind the optional [wasm] extra. See WASM sandbox.
• Governed cross-hub relay — a cross-hub force-release requires a reason, is tagged when it is break-glass, and can require two distinct operators (opt-in two-person approval) before it applies. A durable hub reconstructs only validated pending inbound approvals after restart; it never reconstructs an approval verdict. A single-person, pending, or quorum-completing relay can carry a stable --idem-key so an authorised retry replays the exact committed verdict without releasing twice; the key is also bound to the verified federation principal, and live authorization still runs before replay.
• Durable auto-action arming — which automatic actions a hub may take is an explicit, operator-managed policy persisted across restarts, not a per-session default.

The supply chain is gated the same way: a gitleaks pre-commit hook on staged changes plus a digest-pinned full-tree gitleaks sweep in CI; a hash-locked CI toolchain (uv-compiled with --generate-hashes, installed with --require-hashes) with GitHub Actions pinned to full commit SHAs and Docker base images pinned to digests; and pip-audit on every push alongside the CodeQL and OpenSSF Scorecard workflows. make install-hooks also installs the repository's commit-msg gate: every new commit needs exactly one vendor-neutral Seat: <seat-suffix> trailer and the exact project authorship line. A dedicated workflow audits every introduced commit and rechecks the complete forward-only history weekly. Main-branch CI also gives each push head its own concurrency group and never cancels it; pull-request and manual runs may still replace stale work on their shared ref. Staging Python or pyproject.toml also runs strict whole-tree mypy through the repository virtual environment—never only the changed filenames. SYNAPSE_MYPY_PYTHON=/absolute/path/to/python selects an intentional alternate environment and fails closed when the path is invalid. The installed pre-push stage stays seconds-scale: it rejects a stale capability snapshot, invalid commit-trailer history, or version-surface drift. It runs no pytest, coverage, or exhaustive preflight; CI owns those checks on every push. The threat model and how to report a vulnerability are in SECURITY.md.

Known limitations

• Single hub, single machine. There is no built-in failover or horizontal scale; the hub is one process and the design is deliberately local-first. A hub restart resumes from the durable log, but it is not a high-availability cluster. The federation primitives for reaching beyond one machine are all in this package; operating them as a production service is the job of the commercial Fleet tier below.
• Connect authentication is a proportionate shared secret, not a cryptographic identity system. With the encryption extra, default clients sign registration with a machine key and the hub pins names on first valid use; operator-managed deployments can instead require an enrolled identity bundle. Per-message authentication, Ed25519 event-signature trust, peer certificate pins, and deny-by-default ACLs remain separate opt-ins (see Security posture). Every federation peering is still an out-of-band trust decision: bundle bytes can move over the wire (synapse federation offer/fetch, fingerprint-compared, never automatically trusted), but there is no automatic trust distribution. Do not expose the hub on an untrusted network and rely on the token alone.
• Graceful shutdown is bounded, not transactional. SIGTERM/SIGINT stop accepting new sockets, close active WebSocket sessions within --shutdown-close-timeout, and rely on per-mutation persistence for durable state already accepted by the hub.
• Takeover is a local recovery tool, not authentication. The hub rate-limits repeated takeovers with --takeover-cooldown and logs takeover/conflict outcomes with sender, remote host, and close reason, but agents remain trusted local processes.
• Agents are trusted. The bus coordinates agents; it does not sandbox them. An agent is trusted to the extent the operator trusts the process it runs in.
• Task-class routing is heuristic. The classifier sorts a request by length and a keyword set; tune the thresholds for your workload. Per-tier model latency is not benchmarked offline (it needs a live model server).
• File-scope claims are advisory, not filesystem access. The hub never reads a filesystem; a claim's paths are opaque strings compared only for overlap. Normal relative paths stay narrow, while absolute or traversal-like declarations such as ../../etc/passwd widen to the whole worktree so they cannot underclaim and miss a conflict. They do not grant filesystem access. See SECURITY.md.
• Metrics are opt-in and off by default. synapse hub --metrics exposes a Prometheus /metrics and a JSON /health endpoint on the hub's port; without the flag the hub serves no HTTP. The endpoint carries operational metadata, so keep it on a loopback bind, or require --metrics-token before exposing it. The header form, Authorization: Bearer <token>, is the default token presentation. The query-string form ?token=<token> is disabled by default and is accepted only with the deprecated --metrics-query-token-ok compatibility flag, which warns at parse time and will be removed in 0.101.0 because query tokens leak easily into logs and history. The live board, state, and manifest also remain available over the CLI and the MCP resources.
• synapse --version is network-silent by default. Set SYNAPSE_UPDATE_CHECK=1 to opt in to a best-effort PyPI newer-release check (once a day, cached, no payload beyond the request itself). Set SYNAPSE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1 to suppress the check even when opt-in is present.

Beyond one machine: SYNAPSE CHANNEL Fleet

The open-source core ships every federation primitive: the multihub follower, claim forwarding, the deny-by-default federation gate with mTLS + Ed25519, and the wire protocol. SYNAPSE CHANNEL Fleet is the commercial package that operates those primitives across machines as a durable service. It is proprietary — distributed as a private wheel to licensees under the SYNAPSE Enterprise Licence, never on public PyPI — and it builds against an exact pinned release of this core, so wire compatibility and federation logic stay in the open where every peer can verify them.

graph LR
    subgraph MA["Machine A"]
      HA["SynapseHub (OSS core)<br/>event log"]
      FD["synapse-fleet sync daemon<br/>persisted per-peer mirror<br/>fail-closed cursors"]
      OV["fleet status · doctor · observed<br/>advisory views from the mirror"]
      HA --- FD --> OV
    end
    subgraph MB["Machine B"]
      HB["SynapseHub (OSS core)"]
    end
    subgraph MC["Machine C"]
      HC["SynapseHub (OSS core)"]
    end
    FD -- "mTLS + Ed25519 pins<br/>deny-by-default, live trust generations" --> HB
    FD -- "budgeted polls<br/>backoff-isolated per peer" --> HC

Fleet changes none of this package's features and removes nothing from it; it adds the multi-machine operations layer on top. For licensing, see commercial use below or write to protoscience@anulum.li.

Commercial use

SYNAPSE CHANNEL is dual-licensed, and there is no feature difference between the open-source and the commercial build — the package on PyPI is the full product. A commercial licence changes the terms, not the code. The separately licensed Fleet package is an addition for multi-machine operations, built on this core's public federation primitives — nothing here is held back to make room for it. You can run the whole platform yourself, forever, at no cost; the paid layers add permission, hosting, support, and convenience on top of the free core, and nothing is ever moved behind a paywall.

• Use it free under the AGPL-3.0 for open-source, research, internal, or personal work — including inside a company — as long as you do not expose a closed-source or hosted derivative over a network to third parties.

• Buy a commercial licence to ship a closed-source product or a SaaS without the AGPL's network-copyleft obligation — the same code, under your own terms.

• Running it free and it helps you? Development is independent and self-funded — you can buy us a coffee: ☕ Buy Me a Coffee · GitHub Sponsors · PayPal · TWINT (CH) — or send crypto (the same addresses published at anulum.li):

  Coin	Address
  BTC	bc1qg48gdmrjrjumn6fqltvt0cf0w6nvs0wggy37zd
  ETH	0xd9b07F617bEff4aC9CAdC2a13Dd631B1980905FF
  LTC	ltc1q886tmvtlnj86kmg2urd8f5td3lmfh32xtpdrut

SYNAPSE CHANNEL FLEET is separately entitled private software, not a hidden commercial build of the public core.

Plans and checkout are at remanentia.com/synapse/pricing.html (Polar.sh, USD; each buyer sees their local currency at checkout, CHF invoicing on request). For enterprise, OEM, academic, non-profit, managed-hosting, or co-ownership terms, write to protoscience@anulum.li with the evaluation details listed in docs/commercial.md. The full terms are in COMMERCIAL-LICENSE.md.

How to cite

If you use SYNAPSE CHANNEL in your work, please cite it. Metadata is in CITATION.cff; a BibTeX entry:

@software{sotek_synapse_channel,
  author  = {Šotek, Miroslav},
  title   = {SYNAPSE CHANNEL: Local-first multi-agent coordination bus},
  url      = {https://github.com/anulum/synapse-channel},
  doi      = {10.5281/zenodo.20801559},
  version = {0.99.27},
  year     = {2026}
}

Licence

Dual-licensed: AGPL-3.0-or-later, with a commercial licence available — see Commercial use for the plans and pricing. LICENSE holds the full AGPL text, COMMERCIAL-LICENSE.md the commercial terms, and NOTICE.md the licensing boundary. The repository is REUSE 3.x compliant.

© 1998–2026 Miroslav Šotek · anulum.li · protoscience@anulum.li