Passive security scanner: audits MCP servers against the OWASP MCP Top 10, graded A-F.
Copy the AI prompt to install this server into Claude Code, Cursor, or another agent β or use 1-click editor setup below.
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π‘ Paste the JSON block into your client's configuration file under mcpServers, then restart the application.
Passive security scanner for Model Context Protocol servers. Point it at any running MCP server; it audits the live server against the OWASP MCP Top 10 and grades it AβF. Read-only, so it is safe to run against production.
I ran it against the 12 most-installed MCP servers. 9 of them failed. No install, no config, no exploiting anything.
MCP tool descriptions are fed straight into your model's context, and most public servers were never security-reviewed. A bad one can hide instructions in a description, expose a raw-shell tool, or leak a key; and your agent acts on it. Endor Labs found 82% of servers prone to path traversal, 34% to command injection.
mcp-scan is the gut-check before you wire a server in. It's passive: it reads advertised capabilities and analyzes them statically, never invoking tools, so it's safe against production servers.
toxic-flow reasons across the whole toolset for the lethal trifecta (reads private data + ingests untrusted content + can exfiltrate), the shape single-tool scanners miss.It never calls a tool, never fuzzes, and never sends an exploit. The worst it does is read what the server already tells everyone.
12 popular npm servers, actual output (snapshot 2026-07-11, full benchmark):
| Server | Tools | Grade | π΄ | π | π‘ | Notable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
firecrawl-mcp | 26 | F | 2 | 11 | 1 | lethal trifecta (MCP10) + code exec (MCP05) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem | 14 | F | 0 | 1 | 11 | unconstrained path params (MCP01) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-puppeteer | 7 | F | 1 | 2 | 0 | script param executes JS (MCP05) |
tavily-mcp | 5 | F | 0 | 3 | 1 | untrusted-input + exfiltration (MCP10) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-memory | 9 | F | 0 | 3 | 0 | delete_* tools, no confirmation (MCP02) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-github | 26 | D | 0 | 0 | 2 | state-changing tools (MCP02) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-slack | 8 | C | 0 | 1 | 0 | reads + posts = data + exfil (MCP10) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-everything | 13 | A | 0 | 0 | 0 | clean β |
@kazuph/mcp-fetch | 1 | A | 0 | 0 | 0 | clean β |
9 of 12 flagged, 3 clean, every row audited finding-by-finding, false positives stripped rather than padded. Reproduce any row yourself:
CLI
As an MCP server, let your agent scan servers on demand ("scan this MCP server before I add it"). Add to any client; this mcpServers shape works in Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code, and Gemini CLI:
OpenAI Codex (~/.codex/config.toml):
Exposes two tools: scan_mcp_server (audit a stdio/HTTP target) and list_checks.
Claude Code plugin
Also on the official MCP registry as io.github.CodingSelim/mcp-scan. Publishing steps: PUBLISHING.md.
Full OWASP MCP Top 10 (2025) coverage, 12 checks:
| Check | OWASP | Catches |
|---|---|---|
secret-exposure | MCP01 | AWS / OpenAI / Anthropic / GitHub / GitLab / Stripe / SendGrid / npm / HF / DB URIs / JWT / private keys in advertised text |
transport | MCP01 | Plaintext http:// to a non-loopback host |
path-traversal | MCP01 | file:///{path} templates and unconstrained path params |
excessive-scope | MCP02 | Destructive tools (delete, drop, transfer) with no confirmation |
tool-poisoning | MCP03 | Instruction overrides, hidden exfiltration directives, zero-width / Unicode-tag smuggling |
tool-shadowing | MCP03 / MCP09 | Duplicate tool-name collisions and "call me first" precedence injection |
supply-chain | MCP04 / MCP09 | Unpinned/placeholder versions and homoglyph server names |
command-injection | MCP05 | Unconstrained command / shell / code params, raw SQL, advertised execution |
ssrf | MCP05 | Arbitrary url / host params with no allowlist |
tool-poisoning (dynamic) | MCP06 | Injection in resource contents and server instructions |
authn | MCP07 | HTTP servers that complete an unauthenticated handshake |
telemetry | MCP08 | High-impact tools with no audit trail (advisory, unscored) |
toxic-flow | MCP10 | Lethal trifecta: one server that reads private data, ingests untrusted content, and can exfiltrate |
toxic-flow is the standout, it reasons across the whole toolset, catching the GitHub-MCP / email-agent injection shape that per-tool checks miss.
console (default) Β· json Β· sarif (GitHub Code Scanning). Exit code is non-zero at/above --fail-on (default high), so it gates CI:
Checks are pure and isolated (src/checks/), reusing detectors in src/detectors/. See CONTRIBUTING.md.
OWASP MCP Top 10 Β· MCP Security Cheat Sheet Β· Vulnerable MCP Project Β· MCPTox
MIT Β© CodingSelim
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