The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the Sysknife listing page.
Your sysadmin co-pilot. Plan. Approve. Audit.
Distros
Install · How it works · Why not X? · Distro matrix · Roadmap · Contribute · Discuss
A deterministic reproduction of the Claude Code MCP flow on Ubuntu 24.04, rendered offline by
ubuntu-flow-mock.sh so it replays identically from a
fresh checkout. Every action name, risk level and command shown is the one the catalogue
carries. The same flow works in Cursor and Codex CLI.
On an atomic host the plan uses rpm-ostree instead:
the Fedora Atomic recording.
Looking for the standalone CLI? See the CLI guide.
Describe what you want in plain language. Review a typed plan with risk levels. Approve explicitly. Watch it execute with live output. Atomic-host changes (rpm-ostree) roll back automatically on failure. Every action is Ed25519-signed and audited.
The AI never supplies a command. Every action is a typed operation with a
formal risk level, and the daemon builds the command line itself from the
action's own definition — some actions do run through sh -c, but the shell
fragment is constructed by SysKnife, never by the model. The AI cannot touch
your system directly. A privileged daemon executes only what you approve, writes
a tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit chain, and rolls back atomic-host
(rpm-ostree) changes automatically on failure.
Why typed actions and not a guarded shell? Red-team research (GuardFall) found that 10 of 11 AI agents bypass raw-string shell guards — an allowlist or regex is filtering a language rich enough to hide intent. SysKnife removes the shell string entirely: the model emits typed actions, and a public-key-verifiable audit chain records every one.
The fastest path is the setup wizard. It installs the daemon and wires SysKnife into your AI IDE — Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI — so you can plan and execute from chat.
Needs Node 22 or newer; older Node releases no longer receive security fixes.
On Ubuntu 22.04 apt install nodejs gives Node 12, which is too old; the installer
says so and how to get a current Node. No Rust
toolchain and no compile: it downloads verified prebuilt binaries.
What this does:
Downloads the prebuilt sysknife + sysknife-daemon binaries for your
architecture (x86_64 / aarch64) from GitHub Releases, SHA-256-verifies
each against the release checksum file — a mismatch aborts the install — and
places them in ~/.local/bin (no sudo). Pass --no-binary to skip the
download and build from source instead.
Asks for your LLM provider, key, and model — OpenAI / Anthropic / Gemini / Ollama / Groq / DeepSeek / Mistral / xAI (Ollama needs no key). The key prompt is skipped when the matching env var is already set.
Asks which AI integration to wire up (or pick --claude / --cursor /
--codex / --all) and your daemon target(s) — socket, plus an optional
vsock token for a remote VM.
Writes the integration-specific MCP config (merging into any existing
file, never clobbering) so the next chat session sees the sysknife_* tools —
sysknife_plan, sysknife_execute, sysknife_history, sysknife_doctor,
sysknife_audit_verify, and distro-compatible direct read-only queries such
as sysknife_get_disk_usage — as first-class tools.
Installs and starts the daemon as a service (last step) — a systemd
user service by default (no sudo; kept alive across logout via linger).
That service runs as you, so read-only actions work but mutating ones do
not: installing packages or restarting services needs the system-level
service, whose sudoers grants belong to the sysknife system user. Pick the
system service on any host where you intend to change something, and pass
--daemon-mode=system|user|skip to choose without a prompt. --daemon-mode=system
does not install the system service from the wizard — it needs root-owned
sudoers, polkit and helper policy that sudo make install owns — so it prints
the exact sequence and reports the daemon as not yet installed.
To verify the download against a checksum list you trust independently of the
release, set SYSKNIFE_PINNED_SHA256SUMS=/path/to/sums; see
SECURITY.md.
| Client | Files written |
|---|---|
| Claude Code | .mcp.json + .claude/hookify.*.local.md |
| Cursor | .cursor/mcp.json + .cursor/rules/sysknife.mdc |
| Codex CLI | ~/.codex/config.toml (appended) + AGENTS.md |
Then in your chat: ask for what you want and review the plan with risk pills.
Approve each transaction with sysknife approve <transaction-id> in a
terminal, return the one-time receipts, and watch it execute. The daemon, not
the prompt, enforces the receipt boundary.
Prefer the standalone CLI? Same engine, no IDE — see the CLI guide for
sysknife "...",--dry-run,--json, approval prompts, and audit-log inspection.
Needs Rust stable and a C compiler (build-essential): the TLS and SQLite
dependencies build native code, so a rustup-only machine stops at
error: linker cc not found. cmake is not required. Budget 7 to 12
minutes for the ~400-crate build (6m56s on Ubuntu 24.04, 11m43s on 22.04).
Whichever way you installed, there is one command for it.
Your audit history is kept by default. Removing the software should not
destroy the record of what it did, so the audit database, the safety-audit log
and ~/.config/sysknife are left in place and their paths printed. Delete those
too, only if you mean to, with:
If you installed the system service with sudo make install, remove it with
the Makefile that owns its sudoers grants, polkit rules and privileged helpers.
--uninstall deliberately will not touch those, because half a removed
privilege boundary is worse than none:
All three Ubuntu LTS releases record a live-VM run of the 79-story Ubuntu
suite, and each run has a replay twin that reproduces it: 22.04, 24.04 and 26.04
all at 79/79, every twin serving every call with zero misses. The runs are in
tests/evidence/story-runs/. The suite grew from 50 when every Debian-only
action got a story, GetHostState first.
Fedora Atomic is the rpm-ostree target; record a current Silverblue 44 VM run
before treating a release as current-validated. Plain Fedora Workstation and
Server remain experimental until the dnf action family ships. See the
distro support matrix for evidence and scope.
Same engine, no IDE and no MCP client — plain language to a typed plan to live
execution, straight from your shell, with --dry-run, --json, --yes up to a
risk ceiling, and sysknife audit verify. This is a fully supported way to run
SysKnife, not an afterthought. See the CLI guide.
A deterministic reproduction of a real planning and execution session, rendered offline by demo-mock.sh. Live LLM calls are nondeterministic and the tape has to render with no daemon or provider configured, so the recording is scripted rather than captured; the output styling is generated from the same code paths as the real CLI.
Also: a desktop GUI — development paused. An experimental Tauri desktop app (
sysknife-shell) wraps the same plan → approve → execute loop in a window. Its development is paused for now, and effort is going to Ubuntu across its supported versions instead. The code stays in the tree and still builds, but it is not being reviewed, tested, or extended, so reach for it only if you specifically want a graphical approval flow and can live with that. The MCP integration and the CLI are the maintained surfaces.
The approval gate is a surface, not a component. In the maintained paths it is
sysknife approve <transaction-id> in your terminal — for the CLI and for MCP
alike, which is why an AI client cannot approve its own plan. The paused Tauri
GUI (sysknife-shell) is a third implementation of that same gate, not a step
the other two route through.
Low · Medium · High).--yes up to a risk ceiling).sysknife audit verify.The brain proposes; only the daemon is privileged. The daemon enforces policy, executes typed actions, writes the signed chain, and triggers atomic-host rollback (rpm-ostree) on failure. The trust boundary is mechanical: no shell strings cross the wire.
| Tool | The gap |
|---|---|
| Open Interpreter | Runs arbitrary Python/Shell. No formal risk model. No audit chain. |
| Goose / Continue | General-purpose. Ad-hoc confirmation, not typed risk levels. |
| Claude Computer Use | Uncontrolled desktop automation, not system administration. |
| Ansible | YAML written in advance. Not conversational. No risk classification. |
| shell-gpt / Copilot | Suggests raw shell commands. You still run raw shell. |
| AIShell-Gate | Closest peer, but proprietary and closed; audit is symmetric HMAC (the verifier holds the signing secret, so a proof convinces no one else). No rollback. |
| Manual | No audit trail. No rollback. One typo = lost work. |
SysKnife is different by construction: typed actions, an Ed25519-signed audit chain, explicit approval gate, automatic rollback for atomic-host (rpm-ostree) changes, polkit-mediated privilege boundary. The AI never holds a shell. See the full SysKnife vs. alternatives breakdown (AIShell-Gate, gate-oc-audit, MCP gateways, generic mcp-shell).
The trust chain is built, tested, and shipping. Multi-distro is the active milestone.
| Component | State |
|---|---|
sysknife-brain — LLM planner, tool loop, safety fence | ✅ |
sysknife-daemon — 192 typed actions, auth, preview, transactions | ✅ |
| Live IPC + streaming + atomic-host rollback (rpm-ostree) | ✅ |
| Terminal approval gate — one-time, TTL-bounded receipts | ✅ |
| MCP server (Claude Code / Cursor / any MCP client) | ✅ |
| Tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit chain | ✅ |
| RFC 5424 syslog forwarding (Splunk / Sentinel / QRadar) | ✅ |
| Postgres backend (RDS / Cloud SQL / Neon / Supabase) | ✅ |
Ubuntu support — 79/79 stories on a live 22.04 VM, recorded in tests/evidence/story-runs/ | ✅ |
| Every Ubuntu LTS validated — 22.04, 24.04 and 26.04 all at 79/79, each with a replay twin that reproduces it | ✅ |
| Telegram approval interface | 📋 roadmap |
1,866 Rust tests and 72 frontend tests form the current deterministic release baseline.
SysKnife works with Ollama (no key, recommended for privacy / offline / homelab) or OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Groq, DeepSeek, Mistral, xAI.
Env vars always win over the config file. Full reference in
docs/configuration.md.
SysKnife implements the Model Context Protocol
and exposes approval-gated planning and execution tools. sysknife_plan
returns a daemon-issued transaction ID for each step. After reviewing the
plan, the user runs sysknife approve <transaction-id> in a real terminal and
gives the one-time receipt to the agent. sysknife_execute rejects missing,
expired, mismatched, or replayed receipts. The MCP server cannot mint approval
receipts itself.
Use the setup wizard (above) to wire it into Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI.
All config files that may contain API keys are created with chmod 0600.
See ROADMAP.md for the full milestone breakdown.
tests/evidence/story-runs/)sysknife audit export — stored signed chain rows as JSON with --since / --limitSysKnife is the reference implementation of the LACS (Linux Agent Control Standard) protocol — typed actions, risk classification, approval gates, audit requirements. The spec is CC0 (public domain):
Other implementations for other distros and languages are explicitly encouraged.
We want help. Multi-distro is the highest-impact area to plug into right
now — see docs/distro-support.md for the
roadmap matrix and CONTRIBUTING.md for the workflow.
Issues labelled
good first issue
are scoped with clear acceptance criteria.
Patches so far from @ITSMERNB, @QinXi-ai, @Osheun, @danial-razi, @vsolano9 and @Georgefifth. Every release names who fixed what in CHANGELOG.md.
If you send a patch, watching
Releases is the quickest way
to see it ship and to catch new good first issue entries as they land. A star
helps other people find the project.
| Channel | Install | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| npm | npx sysknife-setup | npmjs.com/package/sysknife-setup — setup wizard; needs Node 22+, no compile |
| crates.io | cargo install sysknife-cli / cargo install sysknife-daemon | Needs build-essential; ~7-12 min build. Published by reviewed version tags; see docs/release.md |
| MCP Registry | io.github.lacs-project/sysknife | registry.modelcontextprotocol.io — resolves to the crates.io install above. Directory pages that sandbox a server list every tool but cannot call the ones needing the daemon; docs/mcp-registry.md explains the split |
| GitHub Releases | Download from Releases | Prebuilt x86_64 + aarch64 binaries with SHA-256 checksums on every tag |
MIT. Free to use, modify, distribute, and embed in proprietary products without restriction.
The LACS specification is CC0 1.0 — public domain.
Built by Vladimir Rotariu. · Issues, ideas, war stories — come say hi.