
Sysknife
Security-hardened MCP server for Linux system administration via 189 typed actions instead of shell strings, with an Ed25519-signed hash-chain audit log, one-time TTL approval receipts, and automatic rollback. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex CLI.
Quick Install
Automated & IDE SetupCopy the AI prompt to install this server into Claude Code, Cursor, or another agent โ or use 1-click editor setup below.
Manual Client & Custom JSON ConfigExpand JSON โพ
Install Config Generator
๐ก Paste into ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows)
Documentation Overview
SysKnife
Your sysadmin co-pilot. Plan. Approve. Audit.
Distrosย
Install ยท How it works ยท Why not X? ยท Distro matrix ยท Roadmap ยท Contribute ยท Discuss
Illustrative reproduction of the Claude Code MCP flow โ same flow works in Cursor and Codex CLI.
Looking for the standalone CLI? See the CLI guide.
Describe what you want in plain language. Review a typed plan with risk levels. Approve explicitly. Watch it execute with live output. Atomic-host changes (rpm-ostree) roll back automatically on failure. Every action is Ed25519-signed and audited.
The AI never supplies a command. Every action is a typed operation with a
formal risk level, and the daemon builds the command line itself from the
action's own definition โ some actions do run through sh -c, but the shell
fragment is constructed by SysKnife, never by the model. The AI cannot touch
your system directly. A privileged daemon executes only what you approve, writes
a tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit chain, and rolls back atomic-host
(rpm-ostree) changes automatically on failure.
Why typed actions and not a guarded shell? Red-team research (GuardFall) found that 10 of 11 AI agents bypass raw-string shell guards โ an allowlist or regex is filtering a language rich enough to hide intent. SysKnife removes the shell string entirely: the model emits typed actions, and a public-key-verifiable audit chain records every one.
Install
The fastest path is the setup wizard. It installs the daemon and wires SysKnife into your AI IDE โ Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI โ so you can plan and execute from chat.
Needs Node 18 or newer. On Ubuntu 22.04 apt install nodejs gives Node 12,
which is too old; the installer says so and how to get a current Node. No Rust
toolchain and no compile: it downloads verified prebuilt binaries.
What this does:
-
Downloads the prebuilt
sysknife+sysknife-daemonbinaries for your architecture (x86_64 / aarch64) from GitHub Releases, SHA-256-verifies each against the release checksum file โ a mismatch aborts the install โ and places them in~/.local/bin(no sudo). Pass--no-binaryto skip the download and build from source instead. -
Asks for your LLM provider, key, and model โ OpenAI / Anthropic / Gemini / Ollama / Groq / DeepSeek / Mistral / xAI (Ollama needs no key). The key prompt is skipped when the matching env var is already set.
-
Asks which AI integration to wire up (or pick
--claude/--cursor/--codex/--all) and your daemon target(s) โ socket, plus an optional vsock token for a remote VM. -
Writes the integration-specific MCP config (merging into any existing file, never clobbering) so the next chat session sees the
sysknife_*tools โsysknife_plan,sysknife_execute,sysknife_history,sysknife_doctor,sysknife_audit_verifyโ as first-class tools. -
Installs and starts the daemon as a service (last step) โ a systemd user service by default (no sudo; kept alive across logout via linger). That service runs as you, so read-only actions work but mutating ones do not: installing packages or restarting services needs the system-level service, whose sudoers grants belong to the
sysknifesystem user. Pick the system service on any host where you intend to change something, and pass--daemon-mode=system|user|skipto choose without a prompt.--daemon-mode=systemdoes not install the system service from the wizard โ it needs root-owned sudoers, polkit and helper policy thatsudo make installowns โ so it prints the exact sequence and reports the daemon as not yet installed.To verify the download against a checksum list you trust independently of the release, set
SYSKNIFE_PINNED_SHA256SUMS=/path/to/sums; see SECURITY.md.
| Client | Files written |
|---|---|
| Claude Code | .mcp.json + .claude/hookify.*.local.md |
| Cursor | .cursor/mcp.json + .cursor/rules/sysknife.mdc |
| Codex CLI | ~/.codex/config.toml (appended) + AGENTS.md |
Then in your chat: ask for what you want and review the plan with risk pills.
Approve each transaction with sysknife approve <transaction-id> in a
terminal, return the one-time receipts, and watch it execute. The daemon, not
the prompt, enforces the receipt boundary.
Prefer the standalone CLI? Same engine, no IDE โ see the CLI guide for
sysknife "...",--dry-run,--json, approval prompts, and audit-log inspection.
Manual install โ Ubuntu 20.04+
Needs Rust stable and a C compiler (build-essential): the TLS and SQLite
dependencies build native code, so a rustup-only machine stops at
error: linker cc not found. cmake is not required. Budget 7 to 12
minutes for the ~400-crate build (6m56s on Ubuntu 24.04, 11m43s on 22.04).
Ubuntu 22.04 records 49/50 stories on a live VM; the run that produced that
figure is in tests/evidence/story-runs/. Ubuntu 24.04 and
26.04 have passed bootstrap and smoke tests but not the full story suite.
Fedora Atomic is the rpm-ostree target; record a current Silverblue 44 VM run
before treating a release as current-validated. Plain Fedora Workstation and
Server remain experimental until the dnf action family ships. See the
distro support matrix for evidence and scope.
Dry run โ plan only, nothing executes
Prefer the terminal? The CLI is a first-class path
Same engine, no IDE and no MCP client โ plain language to a typed plan to live
execution, straight from your shell, with --dry-run, --json, --yes up to a
risk ceiling, and sysknife audit verify. This is a fully supported way to run
SysKnife, not an afterthought. See the CLI guide.
Also: a desktop GUI โ a distant third option. An experimental Tauri desktop app (
sysknife-shell) wraps the same plan โ approve โ execute loop in a window. It is the least frequently maintained surface, well behind the MCP integration and the CLI, so reach for it only if you specifically want a graphical approval flow.
How it works
- You type a natural-language request.
- The brain proposes a plan โ each step is a typed action with
a risk level (
LowยทMediumยทHigh). - The shell shows the plan with previews, side-effects, and rollback metadata.
- You approve each step explicitly (or set
--yesup to a risk ceiling). - The daemon executes, streams live output, rolls back automatically on high-risk failure.
- Every execution is logged to a hash-chained SQLite or Postgres audit
trail you can verify with
sysknife audit verify.
The brain proposes; only the daemon is privileged. The daemon enforces policy, executes typed actions, writes the signed chain, and triggers atomic-host rollback (rpm-ostree) on failure. The trust boundary is mechanical: no shell strings cross the wire.
Why not just X?
| Tool | The gap |
|---|---|
| Open Interpreter | Runs arbitrary Python/Shell. No formal risk model. No audit chain. |
| Goose / Continue | General-purpose. Ad-hoc confirmation, not typed risk levels. |
| Claude Computer Use | Uncontrolled desktop automation, not system administration. |
| Ansible | YAML written in advance. Not conversational. No risk classification. |
| shell-gpt / Copilot | Suggests raw shell commands. You still run raw shell. |
| AIShell-Gate | Closest peer, but proprietary and closed; audit is symmetric HMAC (the verifier holds the signing secret, so a proof convinces no one else). No rollback. |
| Manual | No audit trail. No rollback. One typo = lost work. |
SysKnife is different by construction: typed actions, an Ed25519-signed audit chain, explicit approval gate, automatic rollback for atomic-host (rpm-ostree) changes, polkit-mediated privilege boundary. The AI never holds a shell. See the full SysKnife vs. alternatives breakdown (AIShell-Gate, gate-oc-audit, MCP gateways, generic mcp-shell).
Status
The trust chain is built, tested, and shipping. Multi-distro is the active milestone.
| Component | State |
|---|---|
sysknife-brain โ LLM planner, tool loop, safety fence | โ |
sysknife-daemon โ 189 typed actions, auth, preview, transactions | โ |
| Live IPC + streaming + atomic-host rollback (rpm-ostree) | โ |
| Terminal approval gate โ one-time, TTL-bounded receipts | โ |
| MCP server (Claude Code / Cursor / any MCP client) | โ |
| Tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit chain | โ |
| RFC 5424 syslog forwarding (Splunk / Sentinel / QRadar) | โ |
| Postgres backend (RDS / Cloud SQL / Neon / Supabase) | โ |
Ubuntu support โ 49/50 stories on a live 22.04 VM, recorded in tests/evidence/story-runs/ | โ |
| Ubuntu 22.04 / 26.04 VM tooling โ smoke tests pass on all three LTSes | โ |
| Telegram approval interface | ๐ roadmap |
1,711 Rust tests and 72 frontend tests form the current deterministic release baseline.
Configure your LLM
SysKnife works with Ollama (no key, recommended for privacy / offline / homelab) or OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Groq, DeepSeek, Mistral, xAI.
Env vars always win over the config file. Full reference in
docs/configuration.md.
MCP protocol
SysKnife implements the Model Context Protocol
and exposes approval-gated planning and execution tools. sysknife_plan
returns a daemon-issued transaction ID for each step. After reviewing the
plan, the user runs sysknife approve <transaction-id> in a real terminal and
gives the one-time receipt to the agent. sysknife_execute rejects missing,
expired, mismatched, or replayed receipts. The MCP server cannot mint approval
receipts itself.
Use the setup wizard (above) to wire it into Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI.
All config files that may contain API keys are created with chmod 0600.
Roadmap
See ROADMAP.md for the full milestone breakdown.
- โ
Ubuntu 22.04 โ 49/50 stories on a live VM (recorded in
tests/evidence/story-runs/) - โ Ubuntu 22.04 / 26.04 โ VM tooling complete; smoke tests pass on all three LTSes
- ๐ Telegram inline-button approvals
- ๐
sysknife audit export(CEF / NDJSON for SIEM ingest) - ๐ Fleet plan/execute (one plan, N targets, parallel approval)
Protocol
SysKnife is the reference implementation of the LACS (Linux Agent Control Standard) protocol โ typed actions, risk classification, approval gates, audit requirements. The spec is CC0 (public domain):
โ lacs-project/specification
Other implementations for other distros and languages are explicitly encouraged.
Contributing
We want help. Multi-distro is the highest-impact area to plug into right
now โ see docs/distro-support.md for the
roadmap matrix and CONTRIBUTING.md for the workflow.
Issues labelled
good first issue
are scoped with clear acceptance criteria.
Documentation
- Typed actions โ why never a shell string
- Action reference โ every action, generated from the code
- The audit chain โ Ed25519, public-key verifiable
- Automatic rollback
- SysKnife vs. alternatives
- Architecture overview
- Distro support matrix
- Configuration
- Audit storage and recovery
- Developer guide
- Testing guide
- VM daemon setup
- Security policy
- Release readiness checklist
- Roadmap
- ADR 0001 โ System boundaries
- ADR 0002 โ Brain provider layer
- ADR 0003 โ IPC wire protocol
Where to find SysKnife
| Channel | Install | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| npm | npx sysknife-setup | npmjs.com/package/sysknife-setup โ setup wizard; needs Node 18+, no compile |
| crates.io | cargo install sysknife-cli / cargo install sysknife-daemon | Needs build-essential; ~7-12 min build. Published by reviewed version tags; see docs/release.md |
| MCP Registry | io.github.lacs-project/sysknife | registry.modelcontextprotocol.io โ resolves to the crates.io install above. Directory pages that sandbox a server list every tool but cannot call the ones needing the daemon; docs/mcp-registry.md explains the split |
| GitHub Releases | Download from Releases | Prebuilt x86_64 + aarch64 binaries with SHA-256 checksums on every tag |
License
MIT. Free to use, modify, distribute, and embed in proprietary products without restriction.
The LACS specification is CC0 1.0 โ public domain.
Built by Vladimir Rotariu. ยท Issues, ideas, war stories โ come say hi.
Related MCP Servers
View all alternativesFrequently Asked Questions about Sysknife
How do I install the lacs-project/sysknife MCP server?
Add the following block to your claude_desktop_config.json under mcpServers: "mcpServers": { "sysknife": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "lacs-project/sysknife"] } }
What does lacs-project/sysknife do?
Security-hardened MCP server for Linux system administration via 189 typed actions instead of shell strings, with an Ed25519-signed hash-chain audit log, one-time TTL approval receipts, and automatic rollback. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex CLI.
Is the lacs-project/sysknife MCP server free to use?
Yes. lacs-project/sysknife is listed on AllMCPs as a free, open Model Context Protocol server you can install into Claude Desktop, Cursor, or any MCP-compatible client.