Open-source read-only AWS security scanner detecting attack chains with remediation via CLI and Terraform.
Copy the AI prompt to install this server into Claude Code, Cursor, or another agent โ or use 1-click editor setup below.
We haven't yet run this listing's install command through our automated sandbox check. This isn't a red flag โ we're steadily working through the catalog.
๐ก Paste the JSON block into your client's configuration file under mcpServers, then restart the application.
Inspect callable tools, capabilities, and parameters exposed to AI agents by Cloud Audit.
What can a hijacked AI agent reach in your AWS account, and can you prove it?
Open-source, read-only AWS security scanner. 110 checks, 64 IAM privilege-escalation methods, 31 attack-chain
rules, blast radius for any resource, and agent-blast for Bedrock Agents and AgentCore:
what a prompt-injected or credential-stolen agent can reach, with the IAM policy simulator as the witness.
Every finding ships an AWS CLI + Terraform fix. Nothing is written to your account.
30-second demo - agent-blast - Full scan - What's inside - Proof Mode - Installation - Documentation
The sample account is invented. Everything derived from it (attack chains, root causes, breach cost, security graph, agent reach) is produced by the same engines a real scan uses.
With credentials, the real thing is one command and read-only. The AWS-managed SecurityAudit
policy covers every check (permissions):
An AI agent in AWS is a bundle of IAM identities: the role the agent runs as, the execution roles of
the Lambda functions behind its tools, the roles of its knowledge bases, gateways and sandboxes.
When the agent is hijacked, the attacker acts with those identities. agent-blast answers what
that means, per agent, under two threat models:
| Threat model | What the attacker has | What is in reach |
|---|---|---|
| Identity takeover | the credentials of a role the agent runs as (sandbox escape, metadata-service read, leaked session) | the full role: privilege-escalation methods, AssumeRole hops, data |
| Behaviour takeover | nothing but a prompt (indirect prompt injection through a document, a ticket, a web page) | what the agent's tools can do, bounded by the tools' own execution roles |
Real output for the sample agent (cloud-audit agent-blast --demo -a support-bot):
The story the output tells: the support bot itself is harmless, but a document that tricks it into
calling create-ticket runs code under a role that can pass an admin role to a new Lambda. The
search-docs tool, meant to read product docs, can also read the production database secret and
write into the backups bucket. Every line names the identity, the action and the resource, so the
fix is a policy statement, not a debate.
The same engine covers AgentCore. For the sample gateway (--demo -a tools-gw) the headline is a
cross-agent one:
What agent-blast reads (all list/get, no charge):
DRAFT version resolved to
its Lambda and the Lambda's execution role, knowledge bases resolved to their S3 data-source buckets.Condition is present. Conditions are flagged, never guessed. The simulator
decides.Then, per identity: the 64 privilege-escalation methods, AssumeRole hops through the trust graph,
and every data, secret, lateral, code-execution and model-invocation grant matched against concrete
resources. A knowledge-base bucket is always a concrete target, even behind s3:* on *, and
write access to it is reported as RAG poisoning. Anything the scanner could not read (a denied
region, a tool without an IAM identity) is a coverage note, never a silent pass.
--verify asks iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy about every concrete pair, with the context an attacker
really has (no MFA on the session, TLS transport), and marks each reach PROVEN, DENIED (with the
policy layer that denied: SCP, permissions boundary) or not asserted. Output formats: tree,
json, markdown. The MCP server exposes the same report as get_agent_blast.
cloud-audit scan runs 110 read-only checks across 25 AWS services, correlates the findings into
attack chains, ranks the fixes by how many chains they break and prices the exposure. This is the
sample account (cloud-audit demo), rendered by the same code as a real scan and trimmed for length:
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