base-transaction-decoder

One MCP tool: explain_transaction(tx_hash) → strict JSON explanation of any Base mainnet transaction.

Feed it a transaction hash. Get back what happened, in plain English, plus the structured facts: what moved, who was involved, what to be careful about, what it cost. Deterministic onchain decode — no LLM anywhere in the response path, so the same input always produces the same output, there is nothing to hallucinate, and the JSON contract is stable enough to parse blind.

Base mainnet (chain id 8453) only.

Links: Live endpoint · Docs · OpenAPI · MCP registry: io.github.0200project/base-transaction-decoder · Site

Formerly base-tx-explain. The tool, the endpoint and the schema are unchanged — only the name moved, so that a search for "transaction" or "decoder" can find it. The repository keeps its original name, so existing clones, forks and links still work.

For agents

// tools/call → explain_transaction
{ "tx_hash": "0x0c84b951051f779903b57af9225ca570c77cd5531195968dd78106a69d6c4d8c" }

returns (as both structuredContent and stringified JSON in content[0].text):

{
  "summary": "0x401d...f2c5 swapped 0.03 ETH for 12,899,422 WNL via Uniswap V4 PoolManager.",
  "action_type": "swap",
  "status": "success",
  "assets_moved": [
    { "token": "ETH", "amount": "0.03", "from": "0x401d...", "to": "0xd0a4...", "token_address": null, "standard": "native" },
    { "token": "WNL", "amount": "12899422.144134853458613801", "from": "0x4985...", "to": "0x401d...", "token_address": "0xb200...9a01", "standard": "erc20" }
  ],
  "counterparties": [
    { "address": "0xd0a4...", "label": null },
    { "address": "0x4985...", "label": "Uniswap V4 PoolManager" }
  ],
  "risk_flags": [
    { "flag": "unverified_contract", "detail": "The target contract 0xd0a4...e4bf has no verified source code on Sourcify." }
  ],
  "checks": {
    "contract_verification": "ok",
    "first_interaction": "ok",
    "drainer_blacklist": "ok",
    "unchecked_addresses": [],
    "note": null
  },
  "gas_paid_usd": 0.020562,
  "timestamp": "2026-08-20T03:54:19.000Z",
  "block_number": 50204356,
  "tx_hash": "0x0c84...4c8c",
  "basescan_url": "https://basescan.org/tx/0x0c84...4c8c",
  "partial": false
}

Field contract

• action_type — one of: eth_transfer, erc20_transfer, erc20_approval, approval_revoked, approval_for_all, swap, add_liquidity, remove_liquidity, wrap, unwrap, nft_mint, nft_transfer, nft_sale, token_mint, bridge_in, bridge_out, lending_supply, lending_withdraw, lending_borrow, lending_repay, stake, unstake, claim, batch_transfer, account_abstraction_bundle, attestation, name_registration, contract_deployment, contract_interaction, unknown.
• risk_flags[].flag — one of: unverified_contract, first_time_counterparty, approval_for_all, unlimited_approval, known_drainer, nonstandard_token_symbol, impersonated_token, transaction_reverted. A flag always means evidence was found; a failed lookup never produces a flag.
• checks — read this before drawing any conclusion from an empty risk_flags. Because a failed lookup never produces a flag, an empty risk_flags means either "nothing was found" or "nothing was looked at", and those are opposite. Each of contract_verification, first_interaction and drainer_blacklist reports ok (ran against every address that warranted it), partial (ran against some), unavailable (the upstream sources were unreachable, so it could not run — a retry may get an answer), inconclusive (it ran and nothing failed, but the method cannot answer for this input and a retry will not change that — today, first_interaction for a sender with more transaction history than the lookup reads), or not_applicable (nothing to look at). unchecked_addresses names addresses that warranted a lookup but did not get one, because the transaction involved more of them than the per-transaction cap — so the address described in risk_flags is not necessarily the one that went unexamined. note says in plain language what did not run, and is null when everything did. An empty risk_flags alongside any status other than ok means not checked, not clean, and summary says so too. Absence of a flag is never a safety guarantee: these are observations about a transaction that has already been mined, not a verdict on it and not advice. The same statuses are counted across all responses and published as check_health on /healthz, so you can see whether a check was unavailable for a stretch of time rather than having to infer it from your own responses one at a time.
• status — success or reverted. Reverted transactions are classified by intent (what was attempted) and carry a transaction_reverted risk flag.
• partial: true — the transaction's full meaning could not be established; summary states exactly what is and is not known. On errors the tool returns isError: true with { "error": "...", "code": "invalid_hash" | "not_found" | "pending" | "upstream_error" }.
• Amounts are decimal strings (not floats). Addresses are as emitted onchain; compare case-insensitively.
• provenance.untrusted_fields — lists the fields whose string contents come from attacker-controllable sources (token symbols, contract/collection names, event/function names): today summary, assets_moved[].token, and counterparties[].label. If you feed this output to an LLM, treat those fields as data, never as instructions. A token that names itself with instruction-like or promotional text is a scam signal, not a command. Symbols are normalized (control characters, line separators, emoji, and homoglyphs are stripped) and a token whose self-reported symbol is not a plausible ticker is shown as its contract address rather than its chosen name — so a hostile name cannot impersonate a real one or smuggle text into an agent's context.

How it decodes

Raw transaction + receipt from Base RPC → builtin decoders for ~40 event formats (ERC-20/721/1155, Uniswap V2/V3/V4, Aerodrome/Solidly, Seaport, Aave V3, Compound V3, OP-stack bridges, ERC-4337 EntryPoint, EAS, Basenames, WETH, LP position managers) → deterministic rule-ordered classification → labels from a verified table of major Base contracts. App-specific events are named via the contract's verified ABI on Sourcify when available. Risk flags come from Sourcify/Basescan verification status, the ScamSniffer and MyEtherWallet public blocklists, and approval semantics. gas_paid_usd includes the OP-stack L1 data fee and prices ETH from the Chainlink ETH/USD feed at the transaction's block.

Pricing

• 50 free calls per network, every 24 hours, no signup. Metered per IP (IPv6 collapses to the /64), so everyone behind one address — a household, an office, a VPN exit, a mobile carrier's NAT — draws from the same allowance, and it resets the next day.
• After that: $0.02 per call in USDC on Base via x402 — the payment-required response contains everything an x402-capable agent needs to pay and retry autonomously. No account, no API key.
• Also available marketplace-hosted (marketplace billing applies there instead).

Connect

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "base-transaction-decoder": {
      "type": "streamable-http",
      "url": "https://api.0200project.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Self-host

git clone https://github.com/0200project/base-tx-explain.git && cd base-tx-explain
npm install
cp .env.example .env   # defaults work: free mode, public Base RPCs
npm run dev            # or: npm run build && npm start

Environment (see .env.example): PAYMENT_MODE (none | x402), X402_PAY_TO (your receiving address — use a fresh wallet), X402_PRICE_USD, X402_FACILITATOR_URL (defaults to the keyless PayAI facilitator; Coinbase CDP facilitator also works and its API keys carry no spend exposure), FREE_CALLS_PER_IP, BASE_RPC_URLS, optional ETHERSCAN_API_KEY.

The server is stateless (fresh MCP server per request), so it scales horizontally and runs on anything that runs Docker — a Dockerfile and an Apify .actor/ config are included.

npm test          # unit tests
npm run validate  # decode 100 recent live Base txs, print grades (ship gate: >=90% clean, 0 crashes)

Guarantees and limits

• Deterministic: same tx hash → same decode. No model calls, ever.
• Internal ETH transfers (contract → contract value moves) are not visible without trace APIs; WETH events cover the common cases. When something can't be decoded, the output says so instead of guessing.
• Blocklists are consumed at runtime from their public sources and refresh twice daily; absence of a known_drainer flag is not a safety guarantee.
• Not financial advice; this tool reports what a transaction did, not whether anything is a good idea.