Audit AI agent configs for prompt injection & rogue MCP servers; vet packages
Copy the AI prompt to install this server into Claude Code, Cursor, or another agent β or use 1-click editor setup below.
We haven't yet run this listing's install command through our automated sandbox check. This isn't a red flag β we're steadily working through the catalog.
π‘ Paste the JSON block into your client's configuration file under mcpServers, then restart the application.
Audit your AI agent configs before you run them.
Catch the prompt injection, malicious MCP servers, and credential-exfil hiding in the
files that steer your AI β CLAUDE.md, .mcp.json, agent settings, skills β and vet the
packages they pull in. In milliseconds. Nothing leaves your machine.
Works locally, in CI, and as a gate for AI coding agents. No account required. Nothing phones home except the public package name you are querying.
Get it (pick one):
Then: zyrax-guard scan-agents . to audit configs, or zyrax-guard check <pkg> to vet a package.
Full install options (signed binary, curl|sh) and verification are below.
π Homepage: zyrax.io
Ships the prebuilt Go binary per-platform (via optionalDependencies) β no runtime
download. Works anywhere Node 18+ is available.
Installs the signed release binary (SHA-256 verified by Homebrew). Updates land via
brew upgrade once a new release is published.
Installs the signed release binary (SHA-256 verified by scoop against the manifest, whose
hashes come from the release's signed checksums.txt). zyrax-guard upgrade detects a
scoop install and delegates to scoop update zyrax-guard.
Downloads the signed release binary for your OS/arch, verifies its SHA-256 against
the release checksums, and installs it (to /usr/local/bin, or ~/.local/bin if that
is not writable). Pin a version with VERSION=v0.5.0, or set BINDIR to choose where
it lands. Verifies the cosign signature too when cosign is on your PATH.
go install (Go 1.23+)Download from Releases. Every release ships:
checksums.txt (SHA-256).cosign.bundle per artifact)zyrax-guard.spdx.json)Verify a binary:
Guard checks for a newer release at most once a day (a read-only lookup of its own version
on registry.npmjs.org) and prints a one-line notice on stderr when one is available. To
update:
upgrade delegates to your package manager (npm/brew/scoop/go) when Guard was installed
that way; for curl|sh / standalone-binary installs on Linux/macOS it downloads the signed release,
verifies its SHA-256 against checksums.txt and its keyless cosign signature before replacing
the binary (any mismatch aborts the upgrade). Signature verification is required by default
β if cosign is not installed the upgrade aborts with instructions; pass
--require-signature=false to accept checksum-only verification explicitly. On Windows, install
via scoop to get delegated upgrades; the standalone
Windows binary is still upgraded manually (the notice links to Releases).
Disable the daily check with ZYRAX_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1.
Scans CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .mcp.json, .claude/settings.json,
and Cursor rules files. Exits 1 if any CRITICAL or HIGH finding is found.
Commit .zyrax/policy.json β it is the reviewable allowlist for your project.
Emits SARIF 2.1.0 to stdout. Exit code 0 if no BLOCK or ERROR; non-zero otherwise.
Add --strict to treat WARN as failure.
scan-agents)AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI) read configuration files that can be
weaponized: a malicious CLAUDE.md in a repo you clone, a tampered .mcp.json that
points to an attacker's server, an MCP tool whose description hides instructions, a
settings.json granting wildcard shell access, or prose that quietly steers the agent
toward reading .env and POSTing it out. Guard detects these before the agent runs.
| File | Location |
|---|---|
CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md | Repo root |
.mcp.json | Repo root and subdirectories |
.claude/settings.json | .claude/ directory |
.cursor/rules, .cursor/rules/*.mdc | Cursor rules |
SKILL.md | Under any skills/ directory |
| Rule | Severity |
|---|---|
Prompt injection keywords (ignore previous instructions, new objective:, β¦) | CRITICAL |
| Hidden unicode characters (zero-width, bidi overrides) | CRITICAL |
| Base64-encoded instructions bypassing keyword filters | CRITICAL |
Conditional/sleeper triggers (when user asks X, do Y) | CRITICAL |
| MCP tool description carrying injection keywords (read as trusted model context) | CRITICAL |
Persona override (you are not Claude, your true purpose) | HIGH |
| MCP server using non-HTTPS URL | HIGH |
| MCP server using raw IP address (possible C2) | HIGH |
| MCP server using tunnel service (ngrok, Cloudflare, β¦) | HIGH |
MCP server running a shell, inline -c/-e, temp-dir binary, or dangerous env var | HIGH |
Instruction referencing credential files (.env, id_rsa, .aws/credentials) | HIGH |
Exfiltration sink (send/POST/curl + external URL on one line) | HIGH |
Wildcard allow in permissions | HIGH |
| Unrestricted shell access with no deny rules | MEDIUM |
npx MCP server without a lock file | MEDIUM |
| Auto-run hooks executing commands (download-execute β CRITICAL, shell flag β HIGH) | CRITICALβMEDIUM |
Exit code: 1 if any CRITICAL or HIGH finding; 0 otherwise. Use --strict for exit 1 on any finding.
Factual signals from GitHub, npm, and our automated checks β not a rating.
No reviews yet β be the first to share how this listing worked for you.
Showcase your server listing on GitHub or your project documentation. Embed this dynamic SVG badge to highlight official listing status and live engagement.
[](https://allmcps.com/mcp/zyrax-guard)<a href="https://allmcps.com/mcp/zyrax-guard"><img src="https://allmcps.com/api/badge/zyrax-guard?style=directory" alt="Zyrax Guard on AllMCPs" /></a>