Scans MCP servers for prompt injection, data exfiltration, and privilege escalation.
Copy the AI prompt to install this server into Claude Code, Cursor, or another agent β or use 1-click editor setup below.
π‘ Paste into ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows)
Static security scanner for MCP tool definitions
Trust grades (AβF) before your agent calls a tool β run as an MCP server, CLI, or CI check.
Every MCP tool your agent calls is an attack surface β prompt injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply-chain backdoors. ToolTrust scans tool definitions before your agent trusts them and assigns a trust grade (AβF) so you know the risk. ToolTrust is an MCP Server and a CLI/CI tool β not a host, gateway, or runtime proxy. Coverage is expanding beyond todayβs MCP-focused workflows; skills and additional agent tool formats are on the roadmap.
Browse the live ToolTrust Directory β trust grades and scan-backed reports before you install.
MCP demo: run a full config scan from your agent.

Add ToolTrust as an MCP server and let your agent audit its own tools (stdio transport β no network listener; your host launches it as a subprocess):
Then ask your agent: "Run tooltrust_scan_config"
It reads your MCP config, connects to each server in parallel, scans every tool, and returns a risk report with grades and enforcement decisions β all in seconds.
Or use the CLI:
The public ToolTrust Directory holds current grades and aggregates as scanning scales. One published research pass illustrates the shape of the problem β 207 MCP servers, 3,235 tools β not an exhaustive count of everything we scan today:
| Metric | Count |
|---|---|
| MCP servers in cohort | 207 |
| Individual tools analyzed | 3,235 |
| Total security findings | 3,613 |
| Servers with at least one finding | 145 (70%) |
| Servers with a clean Grade A | 22 (10%) |
| Servers with arbitrary code execution | 16 |
Only 10% of servers in that cohort had a clean Grade A. See tooltrust.dev for up-to-date directory-wide results (and use this table only as a labeled snapshot).
ToolTrust runs 16 static tool-definition rules in this repo (AS-001βAS-011, AS-013βAS-017) plus 2 source-scan rules for embedded MCP implementations (AS-018, AS-019). AS-012 (tool drift) is evaluated in the ToolTrust Directory when new scan results are compared to previous runs.
| ID | Severity | Detects |
|---|---|---|
| π‘οΈΒ ASβ001 | Critical | Tool Poisoning β Adversarial prompts hidden in tool descriptions (ignore previous instructions, <INST>) |
| πΒ ASβ002 | High/Low | Permission Surface β exec, network, db, fs beyond stated purpose; over-broad input schema |
| πΒ ASβ003 | High | Scope Mismatch β Tool name contradicts its permissions (e.g. read_config with exec) |
| π¦Β ASβ004 | High/Critical | Supply Chain CVEs β Known CVEs in bundled dependencies via OSV |
| πΒ ASβ005 | High | Privilege Escalation β admin/:write OAuth scopes; sudo/impersonate in descriptions |
| β‘Β ASβ006 | Critical | Arbitrary Code Execution β evaluate_script, _evaluate suffix, execute javascript, page.evaluate() patterns |
| βΉοΈΒ ASβ007 | Info | Insufficient Tool Data β Tool lacks a valid description or schema |
| π¨Β ASβ008 | Critical | Known Compromised Package β Offline embedded blacklist of confirmed supply-chain attacks (LiteLLM 1.82.7/1.82.8, Trivy v0.69.4-v0.69.6, Langflow <1.9.0, Axios 1.14.1/0.30.4). Zero-latency, no network required. |
| π€Β ASβ009 | Medium | Typosquatting β Tool name within edit-distance 2 of a well-known MCP tool, suggesting impersonation |
| ποΈΒ ASβ010 | Medium | Secret Handling β Input params accepting API keys/passwords; credentials logged insecurely |
| β‘Β ASβ011 | Low | DoS Resilience β No rate-limit, timeout, or retry config on network/exec tools |
| πΒ ASβ012 | High | Rug-Pull β Tool set changed between scans of the same version without a version bump (directory pipeline only) |
| π₯Β ASβ013 | High/Medium | Tool Shadowing β Duplicate or near-duplicate tool name hijacks calls intended for a trusted tool |
| βΉοΈΒ ASβ014 | Info | Dependency Inventory Unavailable β MCP server exposed neither metadata.dependencies nor a repo_url, so supply-chain coverage is limited and must be treated as incomplete |
| β οΈΒ ASβ015 | Medium/High | Suspicious NPM Lifecycle Script β npm dependency publishes preinstall / postinstall / similar install-time scripts; severity rises for remote-fetch or inline-execution patterns |
| π¨Β ASβ016 | Critical | Suspicious NPM IOC Dependency β published npm metadata or install-time scripts reference a known malicious IOC package, domain, URL, or reviewed script pattern such as plain-crypto-js, even if the top-level package name is new |
| β οΈΒ ASβ017 | Medium | Suspicious Data Exfiltration Description β tool description explicitly suggests sending user data, content, or conversation history to external / remote endpoints, without classifying it as prompt injection |
| βΉοΈΒ ASβ018 | Info | Embedded MCP Server Detected β source-level MCP SDK usage was found, but tools could not be enumerated from a manifest or live handshake, so manual review is still required |
| πΒ ASβ019 | High | Unauthenticated MCP Route Exposure β embedded MCP HTTP routes expose the same handler without equivalent authentication middleware |
Full rule details: docs/RULES.md
ALLOW, REQUIRE_APPROVAL, or BLOCKPure static analysis. No LLM calls. No data leaves your machine (except optional CVE lookups). Runs in milliseconds. Deterministic and reproducible.
When running as an MCP server, ToolTrust exposes these tools to your agent:
| Tool | What it does | Data access |
|---|---|---|
tooltrust_scan_config | Scan all MCP servers in your .mcp.json or ~/.claude.json | Reads local config; spawns each server as subprocess |
tooltrust_scan_server | Launch and scan a specific MCP server by command | Runs user-supplied command as subprocess (stdio) |
tooltrust_scanner_scan | Scan a raw JSON blob of tool definitions | In-memory only; no subprocess or network |
tooltrust_lookup | Look up a server's trust grade from the ToolTrust Directory | Network request to ToolTrust Directory API |
tooltrust_list_rules | List all built-in security rules | Local catalog only |
Block risky MCP servers in your pipeline:
For deployment, use the install paths in Install or the workflow example in CI / GitHub Actions. For vulnerability reporting and disclosure policy, see docs/SECURITY.md.
Never add an untrusted MCP server to your config again:
Full gate options and pre-commit hook setup: docs/USAGE.md
If your MCP server passes ToolTrust, let people know:
Supply-chain alert: ToolTrust detects and blocks confirmed compromised packages including LiteLLM v1.82.7/8 (TeamPCP backdoor), Trivy v0.69.4βv0.69.6, and Langflow < 1.9.0. If you encounter a Grade F with rule AS-008, remove the package immediately and rotate all credentials.
Usage guide Β· Developer guide Β· Contributing Β· Deployment & security Β· Changelog Β· Security Β· License: MIT
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