The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the Reversecore MCP listing page.
AI-Powered Reverse Engineering & Security Analysis via Model Context Protocol
An MCP server that gives AI assistants like Claude and Cursor the ability to perform reverse engineering, malware analysis, vulnerability research, digital forensics, and source code auditing through natural language.
Reversecore MCP is a Model Context Protocol server that wraps 120 analysis tools into a single interface that AI assistants can call through natural language.
Instead of learning the command-line syntax for a dozen different tools, you describe what you want:
The AI assistant breaks this into tool calls:
Each tool returns a structured ToolResult (either ToolSuccess or ToolError) with typed data that the AI can reason about, chain into follow-up queries, or render for the user.
| Domain | What you can do |
|---|---|
| Static analysis | Disassembly, decompilation (r2ghidra), binary parsing (LIEF), packer detection (DIE), capability detection (CAPA), string extraction, firmware scanning (binwalk) |
| Dynamic & symbolic | ESIL emulation, angr symbolic execution, taint analysis, fuzzing harness generation |
| Malware analysis | IOC extraction, YARA scanning, dormant backdoor detection, adaptive vaccine generation, autonomous vulnerability hunting |
| Vulnerability research | Dangerous API detection, ROP gadget discovery, heap exploit analysis, crash triage, PoC generation |
| Digital forensics | Memory forensics (Volatility3), PCAP analysis (Scapy), disk forensics (Sleuth Kit), artifact correlation |
| Source code audit | Python AST scanning, C/C++ regex pattern scanning |
| Reporting | Session-based reports with MITRE ATT&CK mapping, SIGMA rule generation, VEX reports, email delivery |
The reversecore_mcp/core/ directory contains the shared infrastructure that all tools build on:
| Module | Purpose |
|---|---|
config.py | Pydantic BaseSettings with 34+ environment variables |
security.py | Input sanitization, command argument validation |
validators.py | File and binary path validation with TOCTOU mitigation, symlink resolution |
r2_pool.py | Thread-safe Radare2 connection pool with configurable size |
r2_helpers.py | Structured Radare2 output parsing |
metrics.py | Per-tool execution times, call counts, error rates, cache statistics |
memory.py | Async SQLite-backed AI memory store for persisting analysis findings across sessions |
mitre_mapper.py | MITRE ATT&CK technique ID mapping engine |
evidence.py | Evidence classification system: OBSERVED, INFERRED, POSSIBLE |
resilience.py | Retry, circuit-breaker, and timeout decorator patterns |
task_queue.py | Background task queue via Redis + arq |
extension_registry.py | Plugin registration and lifecycle management |
arch_registry.py | Multi-architecture mapping (x86, x86_64, ARM32, ARM64, MIPS, RISC-V, PPC → r2 arch/bits/registers) |
result_cache.py | SHA256-based tool result caching decorator (@cache_tool_result) |
analysis_cache.py | Multi-level decompilation cache (L1: Redis, L2: SQLite) |
result.py | ToolSuccess / ToolError Pydantic models |
exceptions.py | 17 exception classes with RCMCP-E* error codes |
decorators.py | @log_execution, @track_metrics |
error_handling.py | @handle_tool_errors decorator |
error_formatting.py | Structured error response formatting |
execution.py | Safe subprocess execution with timeout and output limits |
command_spec.py | Command specification for subprocess calls |
loader.py | Dynamic tool module loader |
plugin.py | Plugin base class |
extension.py | Extension base class |
container.py | Container/sandbox execution support |
audit.py | Audit logging |
binary_cache.py | Binary file caching |
json_utils.py | JSON serialization via orjson (3-5x faster than stdlib json) |
logging_config.py | Loguru-based structured logging |
report_generator.py | Report rendering engine (Markdown, PDF via xhtml2pdf) |
resource_manager.py | MCP resource lifecycle management |
sast/python_ast_scanner.py | Python AST-based vulnerability scanner |
sast/regex_scanner.py | C/C++ regex-based vulnerability scanner |
sast/rule_manager.py | SAST rule loading and management |
Every tool returns a structured ToolResult — either a ToolSuccess with typed data or a ToolError with an RCMCP-E* error code. Tools are organized into 8 plugins.
| # | Tool | Backend | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | run_strings | strings CLI | ASCII/Unicode string extraction with configurable min-length |
| 2 | run_binwalk | Binwalk | Firmware deep-scan for embedded signatures and filesystems |
| 3 | run_binwalk_extract | Binwalk | Extract embedded files discovered by binwalk |
| 4 | parse_binary_with_lief | LIEF | Full PE/ELF/Mach-O header, section, import/export, TLS parsing |
| 5 | detect_packer | DIE | Quick packer/compiler detection |
| 6 | detect_packer_deep | DIE (diec) | Deep packer/protector analysis via Detect It Easy |
| 7 | run_capa | CAPA (Mandiant FLARE) | Capability detection — "encrypts data", "creates persistence", etc. |
| 8 | run_capa_quick | CAPA | Quick capability scan with a rule subset |
| 9 | generate_signature | Radare2 | Generate binary signatures for identification |
| 10 | generate_yara_rule | Radare2 + YARA | Generate YARA detection rules from binary patterns |
| 11 | generate_advanced_yara_rule | Radare2 + YARA | Advanced YARA rules with behavioral indicators |
| 12 | scan_for_versions | LIEF + strings | Scan binary for embedded version strings |
| 13 | extract_rtti_info | Radare2 | Extract C++ RTTI (Run-Time Type Information) |
| 14 | diff_binaries | Radare2 | Semantic binary diff between two file versions |
| 15 | analyze_variant_changes | Radare2 | Analyze changes between binary variants |
| 16 | match_libraries | Radare2 | Identify statically linked libraries by function fingerprint |
| 17 | patch_diff_1day | Radare2 + heuristics | Automated patch diff analysis for 1-day vulnerability research |
| 18 | analyze_patch_diff_auto | Radare2 + inference | Automated patch vulnerability inference |
| 19 | emulate_binary | Radare2 ESIL | Register/memory-traced code emulation |
| 20 | generate_fuzzing_harness | Qiling + AFL++ | Generate a fuzzing harness targeting a specific function |
| 21 | run_fuzzing_campaign | AFL++ | Run a full fuzzing campaign with crash collection |
| 22 | triage_crash | GDB | Crash parsing and exploitability assessment |
| 23 | verify_path_and_get_args | angr | Symbolic execution — prove path reachability and compute concrete inputs |
| 24 | taint_trace | Radare2 + angr | Data-flow taint analysis from sources to sinks |
| # | Tool | Backend | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 25 | audit_source_code | AST + Regex | Python AST scanning + C/C++ regex scanning for dangerous patterns |
File Operations (5 tools)
| # | Tool | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 26 | run_file | File type, architecture, and compiler fingerprinting |
| 27 | copy_to_workspace | Copy a file into the analysis workspace |
| 28 | create_directory | Create a directory in the workspace |
| 29 | list_workspace | List all files in the workspace |
| 30 | scan_workspace | Full workspace scan with file metadata |
Patch Explanation (1 tool)
| # | Tool | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 31 | explain_patch | Explain a binary patch in natural language |
Assembler (1 tool)
| # | Tool | Backend | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 32 | assemble_instructions | Keystone | Assemble instructions to machine code (x86, ARM, MIPS, etc.) |
AI Memory Management (11 tools)
These tools let the AI persist and recall findings across analysis sessions using an async SQLite database:
| # | Tool | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 33 | create_memory_session | Start a new memory session for an analysis |
| 34 | store_analysis_finding | Persist an analysis finding with tags |
| 35 | query_analysis_memories | Search past findings by query |
| 36 | get_binary_analysis_context | Retrieve all context for a specific binary |
| 37 | tag_analysis_session | Add tags to a session for organization |
| 38 | search_memories_by_tag | Find sessions/findings by tag |
| 39 | delete_analysis_session | Remove a session and its findings |
| 40 | cleanup_expired_sessions | Remove sessions older than a threshold |
| 41 | list_analysis_sessions | List all active sessions |
| 42 | export_memory_store | Export all memories to a portable format |
| 43 | import_memory_store | Import memories from an export file |
Server Monitoring (2 tools)
| # | Tool | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 44 | get_server_health | Uptime, memory usage, loaded tools, Python version |
| 45 | get_tool_metrics | Per-tool call counts, mean execution times, error rates, cache hit/miss |
All Radare2 tools use a thread-safe connection pool (r2_pool.py) that automatically manages r2pipe sessions.
| # | Tool | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 46 | Radare2_open_file | Open a binary file in Radare2 |
| 47 | Radare2_close_file | Close a Radare2 session |
| 48 | Radare2_list_open_files | List currently open files |
| 49 | Radare2_analyze_binary | Run full auto-analysis (aaa) |
| 50 | Radare2_list_functions | List all detected functions |
| 51 | Radare2_disassemble_function | Disassemble a specific function |
| 52 | Radare2_disassemble_address | Disassemble at a specific address |
| 53 | Radare2_decompile_function | Decompile via r2ghidra (Ghidra engine embedded in r2, no JVM needed) |
| 54 | Radare2_list_exports | List exported symbols |
| 55 | Radare2_list_imports | List imported functions |
| 56 | Radare2_list_sections | List binary sections with entropy |
| 57 | Radare2_list_strings | List strings found in the binary |
| 58 | Radare2_find_cross_references | Track function calls and data references |
| 59 | Radare2_search_bytes | Search for byte patterns in the binary |
| 60 | Radare2_get_binary_info | Get binary metadata (arch, format, endianness) |
| 61 | Radare2_execute_command | Execute a raw Radare2 command |
| 62 | Radare2_esil_emulate | ESIL emulation at a specific address |
| 63 | Radare2_get_hexdump | Hex dump at a virtual address |
| 64 | Radare2_get_cfg_data | Extract control flow graph data |
| 65 | Radare2_generate_cfg_png | Generate CFG as PNG image |
| 66 | Radare2_generate_callgraph | Generate function call graph |
| 67 | Radare2_recover_structures | Auto-recover C structs and persist to annotation database |
| 68 | Radare2_decompile_with_r2ghidra | High-quality C decompilation with caching |
| 69 | Radare2_annotate_binary | Add annotations to the binary |
| 70 | Radare2_get_annotations | Retrieve annotations |
| 71 | Radare2_export_annotations | Export annotations to file |
| 72 | Radare2_import_annotations | Import annotations from file |
| 73 | Radare2_detect_crypto_constants | Detect cryptographic constants (AES S-box, etc.) |
| 74 | Radare2_find_gadgets | Find ROP/JOP gadgets |
| 75 | Radare2_calculate_entropy | Calculate per-section entropy |
| # | Tool | Backend | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 76 | dormant_detector | Radare2 + heuristics | Find hidden backdoors, orphan functions, time-bombs, logic bombs |
| 77 | adaptive_vaccine | YARA + Radare2 | Generate detection YARA rules + binary patches to neutralize threats |
| 78 | vulnerability_hunter | Radare2 + analysis | Detect dangerous API patterns (strcpy, sprintf) and ROP gadget chains |
| 79 | extract_iocs | Regex + LIEF | Extract IPs, URLs, domains, hashes, registry keys, crypto addresses |
| 80 | run_yara | YARA | Scan with custom rule files and built-in rulesets |
| 81 | generate_poc_exploit | pwntools | Generate proof-of-concept exploit code |
| 82 | build_rop_chain | ROPgadget + pwntools | Automated ROP chain construction |
| 83 | autonomous_vuln_hunt | Radare2 + angr | Autonomous vulnerability hunting pipeline |
| 84 | analyze_heap_exploit | Radare2 + heuristics | Heap exploitation analysis (UAF, double-free, overflow) |
Memory Forensics (6 tools)
| # | Tool | Backend | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 85 | memory_analyze | Volatility3 | Full memory dump analysis |
| 86 | memory_list_processes | Volatility3 | List running processes from memory dump |
| 87 | memory_detect_injections | Volatility3 | Detect code injection in process memory |
| 88 | memory_extract_strings | Volatility3 | Extract strings from process memory |
| 89 | memory_dump_module | Volatility3 | Dump a loaded module from memory |
| 90 | memory_list_symbols | Volatility3 | List symbols from memory |
Disk Forensics (6 tools)
| # | Tool | Backend | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 91 | disk_list_partition | Sleuth Kit | List disk partitions |
| 92 | disk_list_files | Sleuth Kit | List files in a disk image |
| 93 | disk_recover_deleted | Sleuth Kit | Recover deleted files |
| 94 | disk_analyze_mft | Sleuth Kit | Analyze NTFS Master File Table |
| 95 | disk_extract_file | Sleuth Kit | Extract a file from disk image |
| 96 | disk_hash_verify | Sleuth Kit | Verify file integrity via hash |
Network Forensics (5 tools)
| # | Tool | Backend | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 97 | pcap_analyze | Scapy | PCAP analysis: protocol breakdown, anomalies |
| 98 | pcap_list_connections | Scapy | List all network connections |
| 99 | pcap_extract_dns | Scapy | Extract DNS queries and responses |
| 100 | pcap_extract_c2 | Scapy | Identify potential C2 communication |
| 101 | pcap_reconstruct_stream | Scapy | Reconstruct TCP streams |
Artifact Analysis (5 tools)
| # | Tool | Backend | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 102 | artifact_collect | Custom parsers | Collect browser history, registry hives, event logs, prefetch |
| 103 | artifact_correlate_ioc | Custom parsers | Correlate artifacts with known IOCs |
| 104 | artifact_generate_yara | YARA | Generate YARA rules from artifact patterns |
| 105 | artifact_timeline | Custom parsers | Build timeline from multiple artifact sources |
| 106 | artifact_report | Custom parsers | Generate artifact analysis report |
| # | Tool | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 107 | get_system_time | Get server timestamp (prevents AI from hallucinating dates) |
| 108 | set_timezone | Set the reporting timezone |
| 109 | get_timezone_info | Get current timezone information |
| 110 | start_report_session | Start a timed analysis session with unique ID |
| 111 | end_report_session | Finalize session: compute duration, lock IOC/ATT&CK lists |
| 112 | get_report_session_status | Check session status |
| 113 | list_report_sessions | List all active/completed sessions |
| 114 | add_ioc | Collect and tag IOCs during a live session |
| 115 | add_analysis_note | Add categorized notes (finding, warning, behavior) |
| 116 | add_mitre_technique | Document MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs |
| 117 | set_severity | Set session severity (low/medium/high/critical) |
| 118 | create_analysis_report | Render report in 4 modes: full_analysis, quick_triage, ioc_summary, executive_brief |
| 119 | generate_vex_report | Generate a VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) report |
| 120 | generate_sigma_rule | Generate SIGMA detection rules |
Prompts are pre-built analysis workflows that prime the AI with a structured persona, step-by-step tool usage sequences, and evidence classification rules. You activate them by referencing the prompt name in your AI client.
| Prompt | Use Case |
|---|---|
full_analysis_mode | 6-phase comprehensive analysis: triage → disassembly → behavior → network → persistence → report |
malware_analysis_mode | Focused malware analysis with threat classification |
basic_analysis_mode | Rapid triage for initial assessment and quick verdicts |
apt_hunting_mode | APT-specific hunting: lateral movement, persistence, data exfiltration |
malware_defense_mode | Defense-oriented: generate detection rules and mitigations |
unpacking_mode | Analyze and bypass packing/obfuscation (Themida, VMProtect, UPX) |
c2_extraction_mode | Extract and analyze C2 communication infrastructure |
ransomware_triage_mode | Ransomware-specific triage: encryption analysis, key recovery assessment |
code_similarity_mode | Compare binaries for code similarity and shared lineage |
| Prompt | Use Case |
|---|---|
vulnerability_research_mode | Bug hunting: buffer overflows, UAF, command injection |
crypto_analysis_mode | Cryptographic implementation analysis and weakness detection |
firmware_analysis_mode | IoT/embedded firmware: binwalk extraction, UART strings, hardcoded credentials |
patch_analysis_mode | Security patch analysis and regression testing |
source_code_audit_mode | Source code security audit (Python, C, C++) |
autonomous_vuln_hunt_mode | Autonomous vulnerability hunting pipeline |
| Prompt | Use Case |
|---|---|
taint_analysis_mode | Data-flow taint analysis: automated source→sink path discovery |
heap_exploit_mode | Heap exploitation analysis and PoC generation |
fuzzing_mode | Fuzzing campaign setup and crash triage |
patch_diff_auto_mode | Automated patch diff for 1-day vulnerability research |
cve_discovery_pipeline_mode | Full CVE discovery pipeline: from patch diff to working exploit |
| Prompt | Use Case |
|---|---|
game_analysis_mode | Game client analysis: anti-cheat detection, protocol RE, memory inspection |
report_generation_mode | Structured session workflow with MITRE ATT&CK technique mapping |
How prompts work: Each prompt primes the AI with a structured analysis persona. It includes Chain-of-Thought reasoning checkpoints (where the AI must stop and evaluate before proceeding) and evidence classification rules that prevent the AI from stating speculation as fact. Every finding must be labeled as
OBSERVED(directly verified),INFERRED(logically derived from static analysis), orPOSSIBLE(requires further verification).
Resources are read-only data endpoints that AI clients can access through URI templates. They complement tools by providing structured data without requiring explicit tool calls.
| URI | Description |
|---|---|
reversecore://guide | Tool usage guide with file path rules and best practices |
reversecore://guide/structures | Structure recovery and cross-reference analysis technical guide |
reversecore://tools | Complete documentation for all 120 registered tools |
reversecore://logs | Application logs (last 100 lines) |
These URIs resolve per-binary and invoke the corresponding analysis tools on demand:
| URI Template | Description |
|---|---|
reversecore://{filename}/strings | Extract all strings from a binary |
reversecore://{filename}/iocs | Extract IOCs (IPs, URLs, emails, hashes) |
reversecore://{filename}/func/{address}/code | Decompiled pseudo-C code for a function |
reversecore://{filename}/func/{address}/asm | Disassembly for a function |
reversecore://{filename}/func/{address}/cfg | Control flow graph in Mermaid format |
reversecore://{filename}/functions | List of all functions in the binary |
reversecore://{filename}/dormant_detector | Dormant detector analysis results |
Prerequisites: Radare2 must be installed on your system (
r2 --version). YARA is installed automatically viayara-python.
All analysis engines (Radare2, r2ghidra, YARA, Binwalk, Sleuth Kit, GDB, etc.) come pre-installed:
Or manually:
Prerequisites for local mode: Radare2 must be installed on your system (
r2 --version). Individual tool backends (YARA, LIEF, Capstone, etc.) are installed via pip. For full forensics support, you'll also need Volatility3, Scapy, and Sleuth Kit.
Add the server configuration to your IDE client settings (e.g., ~/.cursor/mcp.json or claude_desktop_config.json).
If you have the container running via Docker Compose, this mode channels stdio directly into the running container. Zero startup latency, persistent memory, and full tool availability.
Replace
reversecore-mcp-arm64withreversecore-mcpif you are on Intel/AMD.
For network-based streaming (Server-Sent Events):
Runs a fresh, isolated container for every session:
⚠️ Important — File Paths Inside Docker
Your local folder is mounted to
/app/workspaceinside the container. Always reference files by filename only, not by your local full path.
❌ Wrong ✅ Correct r2_decompile("/Users/john/samples/mal.exe")r2_decompile("mal.exe")
All settings can be provided via environment variables or a .env file (see .env.example). Settings are managed via Pydantic BaseSettings with the REVERSECORE_ prefix.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
MCP_TRANSPORT | stdio | Transport mode: stdio or http |
REVERSECORE_WORKSPACE | ./ (cwd) | Analysis workspace directory |
REVERSECORE_READ_DIRS | "" | Comma-separated list of additional read-only directories |
REVERSECORE_STRICT_PATHS | false | Raise errors for missing paths instead of warnings |
REVERSECORE_STRUCTURED_ERRORS | false | Enable structured error responses with error codes |
REVERSECORE_DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUT | 120 | Default tool execution timeout in seconds |
REVERSECORE_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE | 10000000 | Maximum output size for tools (bytes) |
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
MCP_HOST | 0.0.0.0 | Host interface to bind (auto-overrides to 127.0.0.1 if no API key) |
MCP_PORT | 8000 | Port for HTTP server |
MCP_API_KEY | (unset) | API key for HTTP authentication (X-API-Key or Authorization: Bearer) |
REVERSECORE_RATE_LIMIT | 60 | Max requests per minute (HTTP mode only, via slowapi) |
MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE | 100000000 | Maximum upload size (100 MB default) |
FILE_RETENTION_MINUTES | 1440 | Retention period for uploaded files (24h default) |
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
REVERSECORE_R2_POOL_SIZE | 3 | Number of Radare2 connections in the pool |
REVERSECORE_R2_POOL_TIMEOUT | 30 | Timeout for acquiring a connection from the pool |
REVERSECORE_R2_EXTENSIONS | "" | Comma-separated list of r2 extension classes (module:ClassName) |
REVERSECORE_GHIDRA_MAX_PROJECTS | 3 | Max cached r2ghidra decompiler projects |
REVERSECORE_GHIDRA_EXTENSIONS | "" | Comma-separated list of Ghidra extension classes |
MAX_EMULATION_INSTRUCTIONS | 1000 | Maximum ESIL emulation instructions |
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
REVERSECORE_SANDBOX_ENABLED | false | Enable sandbox execution for dynamic analysis tools |
REVERSECORE_SANDBOX_MODE | auto | Sandbox mode: auto, host, container, disabled |
REVERSECORE_SANDBOX_DOCKER_IMAGE | reversecore-sandbox:latest | Docker image for sandbox execution |
REVERSECORE_SANDBOX_CPU_LIMIT | 1.0 | CPU core limit for sandbox containers |
REVERSECORE_SANDBOX_MEMORY_LIMIT | 512m | Memory limit for sandbox containers |
REVERSECORE_SANDBOX_PIDS_LIMIT | 100 | PID limit for sandbox containers |
REVERSECORE_SANDBOX_USER | nobody | Non-root user for sandbox execution |
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
REDIS_URL | redis://localhost:6379/0 | Redis URL for task queue and result caching |
MEMORY_DB_PATH | ~/.reversecore_mcp/memory.db | Path to AI memory SQLite database |
REVERSECORE_LIEF_MAX_FILE_SIZE | 1000000000 | Maximum file size for LIEF parsing (1 GB) |
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
LOG_LEVEL | INFO | Logging verbosity: DEBUG, INFO, WARNING, ERROR |
LOG_FILE | <tempdir>/reversecore/app.log | Path to log file |
LOG_FORMAT | human | Log format: human (readable) or json (structured) |
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
REVERSECORE_PLUGIN_DIRS | "" | Comma-separated directories to scan for extension plugins |
REVERSECORE_SAST_RULES_PATH | "" | Path to custom YAML SAST rules file |
Security is implemented as defense-in-depth, with protections at multiple layers:
| Control | Implementation |
|---|---|
| No shell injection | All subprocess calls use list arguments, never shell strings (execution.py) |
| Path traversal prevention | validate_file_path() and validate_binary_path() resolve symlinks and confine access to the workspace (validators.py) |
| TOCTOU mitigation | bypass_cache=True flag re-validates paths to prevent race conditions |
| Input sanitization | All parameters sanitized before execution (security.py) |
| CSRF protection | Dashboard forms require token-based CSRF validation (dashboard/__init__.py) |
| Control | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Timing-attack-safe auth | secrets.compare_digest() for API key comparison (web/auth.py) |
| Restricted auth vectors | Only X-API-Key and Authorization: Bearer headers accepted; no query params or cookies |
| Loopback-only fallback | Without MCP_API_KEY, HTTP access restricted to 127.0.0.1 (web/middleware.py) |
| Rate limiting | Configurable per-minute limits via slowapi |
| Security headers | HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP on all HTTP responses (web/middleware.py) |
Minimized /health | Public endpoint returns only {"status": "alive"}; details behind authentication (web/endpoints.py) |
| Control | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Non-root execution | Runs as appuser (UID 1000) with minimal capabilities |
| Resource limits | Docker Compose enforces CPU (2.0) and memory (4 GB) limits |
| Sandbox isolation | Optional container-based sandboxing for dynamic analysis tools |
| Control | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Secrets scanning | Gitleaks runs on every commit (pre-commit hook + CI) |
| SAST | Bandit scans all Python code on every commit |
| CodeQL | GitHub CodeQL static analysis on every push to main |
| Dependency auditing | pip-audit on every push — no unreviewed CVEs |
| Container scanning | Trivy scans Docker images for vulnerabilities (LOW through CRITICAL) |
| Exploit safety gate | POC templates scanned with Bandit; Hypothesis DAST fuzzing; container isolation verified |
All 17 exception classes carry RCMCP-E* error codes for programmatic handling. See Error Handling for the full hierarchy.
Test status:
pytest-asyncioTest markers:
| Marker | Purpose |
|---|---|
@pytest.mark.unit | Fast unit tests |
@pytest.mark.integration | Tests requiring Docker or external tools |
@pytest.mark.slow | Long-running tests |
@pytest.mark.benchmark | Performance benchmarks |
@pytest.mark.security | Security boundary validation tests |
The following hooks run automatically on every commit:
Every push to main triggers 11 pipeline jobs. All must pass before deployment.
Zero-bypass policy: CI/CD failures are never resolved by modifying pipeline configuration. Root causes are always fixed directly in source code or dependencies.
The Docker build uses a two-layer approach to keep build times manageable:
Dockerfile.base)A multi-stage build that compiles all slow-to-build, rarely-changing dependencies from source:
This image is rebuilt only when tool versions change. Build time: ~12 minutes.
Dockerfile)Inherits from the base image and copies application code:
Build time: ~60 seconds.
Three services with architecture-specific profiles:
| Service | Profile | Description |
|---|---|---|
reversecore-mcp | default, x86 | Intel/AMD x86_64 |
reversecore-mcp-arm64 | arm64, macos | Apple Silicon ARM64 |
redis | all profiles | Redis 7 Alpine for task queue and caching |
Resource limits: 2.0 CPU cores, 4 GB memory per container.
| Component | Minimum | Recommended |
|---|---|---|
| CPU | 4 cores | 8+ cores |
| RAM | 8 GB | 16 GB |
| Storage | 20 GB | 50 GB SSD |
| OS | Linux / macOS | Docker environment (any OS) |
| Docker | 20.10+ | 24.0+ |
| Python (local mode) | 3.10 | 3.11 or 3.12 |
Other directories:
All custom exceptions inherit from ReversecoreError and carry structured error codes:
| Exception | Code | Type | When |
|---|---|---|---|
ReversecoreError | RCMCP-E000 | UNKNOWN_ERROR | Base class for all errors |
ValidationError | RCMCP-E001 | VALIDATION_ERROR | Invalid input, bad parameters |
ExecutionTimeoutError | RCMCP-E002 | TIMEOUT_ERROR | Tool exceeded timeout |
ToolNotFoundError | RCMCP-E003 | TOOL_ERROR | Required CLI tool not installed |
OutputLimitExceededError | RCMCP-E004 | OUTPUT_ERROR | Output exceeded max size |
ToolExecutionError | RCMCP-E005 | EXECUTION_ERROR | Subprocess returned non-zero |
BinaryAnalysisError | RCMCP-E100 | BINARY_ANALYSIS_ERROR | General binary analysis failure |
DecompilationError | RCMCP-E101 | DECOMPILATION_ERROR | r2ghidra decompilation failed |
DisassemblyError | RCMCP-E102 | DISASSEMBLY_ERROR | Radare2 disassembly failed |
StructureRecoveryError | RCMCP-E103 | STRUCTURE_RECOVERY_ERROR | C struct recovery failed |
SignatureGenerationError | RCMCP-E104 | SIGNATURE_GENERATION_ERROR | YARA/signature generation failed |
EmulationError | RCMCP-E105 | EMULATION_ERROR | ESIL emulation failed |
ToolTimeoutError | RCMCP-E200 | TOOL_TIMEOUT_ERROR | External tool timed out |
GhidraConnectionError | RCMCP-E201 | GHIDRA_CONNECTION_ERROR | r2ghidra connection issue |
Radare2Error | RCMCP-E202 | RADARE2_ERROR | Radare2 command failed |
WorkspaceError | RCMCP-E300 | WORKSPACE_ERROR | Workspace file access error |
SecurityViolationError | RCMCP-E301 | SECURITY_VIOLATION | Security policy violation |
PathTraversalError | RCMCP-E302 | PATH_TRAVERSAL | Path traversal attempt detected |
AI clients can use the error_code field to programmatically handle failures and decide whether to retry, try an alternative tool, or report the error to the user.
Follow this pattern to add a new MCP tool:
Then register it in the appropriate plugin's __init__.py and add tests in tests/unit/.
git checkout -b feat/my-featurepytest, ruff check, mypy, banditPlease read the Contributing Guide for code standards, docstring conventions (Google-style), and the pull request checklist.
| Document | Description |
|---|---|
| Installation Guide | Detailed setup for all environments |
| Architecture Guide | System design & component details |
| Contributing Guide | Code standards, docstrings, PR workflow |
| Testing Guide | Test patterns, fixtures, and coverage |
| API Reference | Tool and module reference |
| User Guide | Analysis workflows |
The arch_registry.py module maps architecture names to Radare2 configuration parameters, enabling tools to work across different CPU architectures without manual configuration:
| Architecture | Key | r2 Arch | Bit Widths | PC Register | SP Register |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intel 32-bit | x86 | x86 | 32 | eip | esp |
| Intel/AMD 64-bit | x86_64 | x86 | 64 | rip | rsp |
| ARM 32-bit / Thumb | arm32 | arm | 16, 32 | r15 | r13 |
| ARM 64-bit (AArch64) | arm64 | arm | 64 | pc | sp |
| MIPS | mips | mips | 32, 64 | pc | sp |
| RISC-V | riscv | riscv | 32, 64 | pc | sp |
| PowerPC | ppc | ppc | 32, 64 | pc | r1 |
Alias resolution is handled automatically:
amd64 → x86_64aarch64 → arm64arm with bits=64 → arm64arm with bits=16 or bits=32 → arm32Tools like Radare2_esil_emulate, assemble_instructions, and r2_simulate_patch use this registry to configure the analysis environment correctly for any target binary.
Two caching layers minimize redundant computation:
result_cache.py)The @cache_tool_result decorator caches any tool's output based on a SHA256 hash of the binary file and the tool's keyword arguments:
Storage backend: SQLite database via r2_db.py, accessible through get_cached_result() and set_cached_result() tools.
Metrics: Cache hits and misses are tracked via metrics_collector.record_cache_hit() and record_cache_miss(), visible through the get_tool_metrics tool.
analysis_cache.py)A multi-level cache specifically for decompilation results (which are expensive to compute):
| Level | Backend | Key Format | TTL | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| L1 | Redis | ghidra:decompile:{file_hash}:{function_address}:{decompiler} | 1 hour (3600s) | Fast, shared across sessions |
| L2 | SQLite | Table decompilation_cache | Persistent | Survives Redis restarts |
Import/Export: The export_analysis_cache and import_analysis_cache tools allow saving cache state to/from rcpack files for sharing between environments.
The AI memory system (memory_tools.py + core/memory.py) provides persistent, queryable storage for analysis findings across sessions. This allows the AI to:
Storage: Async SQLite database at the path configured by MEMORY_DB_PATH (default: ~/.reversecore_mcp/memory.db).
Portability: Use export_memory_store and import_memory_store to transfer the entire memory database between environments.
When running in HTTP mode (MCP_TRANSPORT=http), a web dashboard is available at http://localhost:8000/dashboard. It provides:
Tech stack: FastAPI + Jinja2 templates + HTMX (loaded locally from dashboard/static/, no CDN dependency for CSP compliance).
Security features:
html.escape() before displayvalidate_file_path()Before deploying to production:
| Item | How |
|---|---|
| Set API key | MCP_API_KEY=<strong-random-key> |
| Use non-root user | Built-in: container runs as appuser (UID 1000) |
| Set resource limits | Default: 2 CPU / 4 GB RAM in docker-compose.yml |
| Enable structured logging | LOG_FORMAT=json for log aggregation |
| Configure Redis | REDIS_URL=redis://<host>:6379/0 for task queue and caching |
| Set workspace path | REVERSECORE_WORKSPACE=/path/to/isolated/directory |
| Review rate limits | REVERSECORE_RATE_LIMIT=60 (requests/min, adjust as needed) |
| Enable sandbox | REVERSECORE_SANDBOX_ENABLED=true for dynamic analysis isolation |
The server provides HTTP health check endpoints for orchestration:
These endpoints are exempted from API key authentication so load balancers and container orchestrators can probe them.
The Docker image includes a built-in HEALTHCHECK instruction that verifies TCP connectivity to port 8000 every 30 seconds. Docker and Kubernetes will automatically restart unhealthy containers.
The required CLI tool is not installed in the environment.
Solution: If using Docker, verify the tool is in the base image:
If using local Python installation, install the missing tool:
Analysis exceeded the configured timeout.
Solution: Increase the timeout:
For large binaries (>100 MB), consider using quick-scan variants:
run_capa_quick instead of run_capadetect_packer instead of detect_packer_deepYou referenced a file outside the workspace directory.
Solution: Copy the file into the workspace first:
Or mount additional directories as read-only:
Make sure you're using the ARM64 profile:
Or use the auto-detection script:
The task queue requires a running Redis instance.
Solution: Start Redis alongside the main service:
Or disable Redis-dependent features by not setting REDIS_URL.
This usually means the function wasn't analyzed first.
Solution: Run analysis before decompilation:
No. This project is a complement, not a replacement. It uses r2ghidra (the Ghidra decompiler engine embedded in Radare2) for decompilation. It does not provide a GUI, and it does not have the interactive analysis workflow of a full disassembler. Its purpose is to let AI assistants perform analysis tasks programmatically.
No. The r2ghidra plugin embeds the Ghidra decompiler engine directly inside Radare2. No JDK, no Ghidra installation, no Ghidra project files. Just r2 with the r2ghidra plugin compiled in.
Any client that implements the Model Context Protocol specification. Tested with: Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, and Google Antigravity. The server supports both stdio and HTTP/SSE transports.
Yes. Static analysis (disassembly, decompilation, string extraction, IOC extraction, YARA scanning) works on any file format regardless of host OS. Dynamic analysis (emulation, fuzzing) may have limitations depending on the target architecture.
The Docker container provides isolation: non-root user, no network by default in CI, resource limits. For live malware analysis, we recommend running in a dedicated VM or using the sandbox feature (REVERSECORE_SANDBOX_ENABLED=true). Static analysis tools (r2, YARA, strings) never execute the target binary.
Default limits:
MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE)REVERSECORE_LIEF_MAX_FILE_SIZE)REVERSECORE_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE)All limits are configurable via environment variables.
This project is built on the work of many open-source projects:
| Project | Role in Reversecore MCP |
|---|---|
| Radare2 | Disassembly, emulation, binary analysis |
| r2ghidra | Ghidra decompiler engine for Radare2 |
| FastMCP | MCP server framework |
| YARA | Pattern matching for malware detection |
| LIEF | Binary format parsing (PE, ELF, Mach-O) |
| CAPA | Mandiant FLARE capability detection |
| angr | Symbolic execution engine |
| Capstone | Disassembly framework |
| Keystone | Assembly framework |
| pwntools | Exploit development toolkit |
| ROPgadget | ROP gadget finder |
| Volatility3 | Memory forensics framework |
| Scapy | Network packet analysis |
| Sleuth Kit | Disk forensics toolkit |
| Binwalk | Firmware analysis |
| Detect It Easy | Packer/compiler detection |
MIT — see LICENSE for details.