proxykey MCP server

Issue, rotate and revoke API-key passes from your AI agent — without the agent ever seeing a real key.

proxykey is a credential vault and proxy: your real API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Telegram, Stripe, 25+ providers) are encrypted with AES-256-GCM and never leave the server. Apps and agents use revocable virtual keys — passes (vlt_…) — with per-pass IP binding, rate limits and full request logs. This MCP server lets an agent manage those passes.

Website: https://proxykey.org/en/
Panel: https://app.proxykey.org
Docs: https://app.proxykey.org/docs.html
MCP endpoint (Streamable HTTP): https://mcp.proxykey.org/mcp

Why give an agent this instead of a key

Anything that enters a model's context can leak — through logs, traces or prompt injection. With proxykey the agent gets a tool, not a secret:

the agent can create / rotate / revoke / inspect passes;
a "read the real key" operation does not exist in the toolset;
only a human can enter the original key, in the panel;
a leaked pass is a non-event: wrong IP → 403, over limit → 429, revocation is one click and doesn't touch the original.

Quick start

Sign in at https://app.proxykey.org (GitHub OAuth or email magic link, free).
Open MCP → create a token (mcp_…).
Connect your client:

Claude Code

Terminal

claude mcp add --transport http proxykey https://mcp.proxykey.org/mcp \
  --header "Authorization: Bearer mcp_YOUR_TOKEN"

Claude Desktop / Cursor (mcp.json)

config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "proxykey": {
      "url": "https://mcp.proxykey.org/mcp",
      "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer mcp_YOUR_TOKEN" }
    }
  }
}

Tools (13)

Tool	What it does
`list_providers`	Provider catalogue (slugs, auth models)
`list_secrets`	Stored keys (metadata only — never values)
`get_manual_secret_setup`	Link for a human to enter a key
`list_passes`	All passes with status, limits, binding
`create_pass`	Issue a pass for an existing secret
`create_pending_pass`	Issue a pass before the key exists; a human fills the key in later, the pass activates automatically
`update_pass`	Change limits, IP mode, expiry
`revoke_pass` / `delete_pass`	Kill a pass instantly / remove a revoked one
`rotate_pass`	Reissue the token, same settings
`rebind_pass_ip`	Reset IP learning
`get_pass_logs` / `get_pass_stats`	Per-pass request log and usage stats

The proxy itself

Point your client at the proxy and use the pass as the API key — only the host and the key change:

bash

# before
curl https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-..."
# after
curl https://api.proxykey.org/p/openai/v1/chat/completions -H "Authorization: Bearer vlt_openai_..."

Streaming (SSE), request bodies and headers pass through unchanged. Telegram bots keep their URL shape (/p/telegram-bot/<pass>/getMe). Full reference: https://app.proxykey.org/docs.html

Security model (short version)

Secrets: AES-256-GCM envelope encryption, decrypted in memory per request, never logged, never returned by any API after creation.
Pass tokens and MCP tokens are stored hashed (SHA-256).
MCP surface cannot create or read secret values, or toggle body logging — those stay human-only in the panel.
Request logs contain metadata only — no auth headers, no key material.