entra-scim-mcp

Model Context Protocol server for the Microsoft Entra SCIM 2.0 Provisioning API (GA April 2026). Exposes user and group lifecycle operations against https://graph.microsoft.com/rp/scim as MCP tools for agents like Claude.

What you can do with it

• Discover the tenant's SCIM capabilities (get_service_provider_config, list_resource_types, list_schemas)
• Provision, read, update, and deprovision users — including Custom Security Attributes and lifecycle attrs
• Create, update, and delete groups, and manage membership with the API's strict PATCH rules respected automatically

Prerequisites

Before this server can talk to your tenant, complete the one-time setup in the Microsoft docs:

1. Entra ID P1 (or any SKU containing P1) and an Azure subscription to link for billing.
2. Enable the SCIM Provisioning API in ID Governance → Dashboard and link a billing resource group.
3. Register an application with the Microsoft Graph application permissions you need:
   • User.ReadWrite.All, Group.ReadWrite.All (core lifecycle)
   • CustomSecAttributeAssignment.ReadWrite.All, CustomSecAttributeDefinition.Read.All (CSA tools)
   • User-LifeCycleInfo.ReadWrite.All (lifecycle tools)
   • User-Mail.ReadWrite.All, User-Phone.ReadWrite.All, User.EnableDisableAccount.All (least-privilege alternatives) Grant admin consent.
4. Create either a client secret or upload a PEM client certificate.

Every SCIM API call is billed — this server does not batch beyond what the API requires.

Try it without an Entra tenant

The package ships a local mock of the Entra SCIM API (entra-scim-mock-server) so you can drive every tool with zero Azure setup and zero API billing:

# shell 1 — start the mock (seeds a small demo tenant)
npx -y --package entra-scim-mcp entra-scim-mock-server

Then point the MCP server at it:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "entra-scim-mock": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "entra-scim-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "ENTRA_SCIM_BASE_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:8990",
        "ENTRA_SCIM_STATIC_TOKEN": "dev-token"
      }
    }
  }
}

Mock flags: --port, --token, --seed <file.json>, --no-seed, --capture <file.jsonl> (log every request/response), --validator-compat (RFC-standard behavior for the Microsoft SCIM Validator — see docs/scim-validator.md).

Install / run

The server is a stdio MCP server, designed to be launched by your MCP client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, etc.).

npx -y entra-scim-mcp

Required environment:

Set exactly one of ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET or ENTRA_CLIENT_CERT_PATH.

Development / testing environment variables

Dry-run results come back as a successful payload:

{
  "dryRun": true,
  "request": {
    "method": "DELETE",
    "url": "https://graph.microsoft.com/rp/scim/users/u-1",
    "headers": {}
  }
}

(DELETE carries no Accept header — the API rejects a specific JSON media type there. Every other method sends Accept: application/json.)

Multi-request tools (e.g. add_group_members beyond 20 ids) surface only their first chunked request in dry-run.

Claude Desktop config

~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "entra-scim": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "entra-scim-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "ENTRA_TENANT_ID": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
        "ENTRA_CLIENT_ID": "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111",
        "ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET": "..."
      }
    }
  }
}

For production, swap the secret for a certificate:

{
  "env": {
    "ENTRA_TENANT_ID": "...",
    "ENTRA_CLIENT_ID": "...",
    "ENTRA_CLIENT_CERT_PATH": "/secure/path/entra-scim-mcp.pem"
  }
}

Tools

The Kind column is the tool's MCP annotations, which is what a client reads when it decides whether a call needs your approval: read is readOnlyHint, add is a write that only creates (destructiveHint: false), overwrite is a write that discards or replaces state with no undo through this API (destructiveHint: true).

What the agent is told, and where

A model never reads this file, so everything it needs has to travel in the protocol. Three places carry it, and the split is deliberate:

• Server instructions, sent once in the handshake, hold what is true of every tool: ids rather than names, membership being readable in one direction only, CSAs being invisible to ordinary reads, the narrow filter grammar, and that every call is a billed Graph request. Repeating that in eighteen descriptions would cost more context than it bought.
• Tool descriptions hold what is specific to one tool, including the failure modes worth pre-empting — the 404 that names the group when the user simply is not a member, the mailNickname that cannot be removed once set, the second provision_user that conflicts rather than merges.
• Input descriptions hold per-argument syntax. The three PATCH tools each carry their own path example, because path syntax is the one thing here that cannot be guessed: the API accepts a narrow subset of RFC 7644, and the subset differs between ordinary attributes and CSAs.

With ENTRA_SCIM_DRY_RUN=1 the instructions gain a paragraph saying so, since a dry-run result is shaped like a success and would otherwise be reported as a change that landed.

test/tool-metadata.test.ts enforces all of this: every tool carries annotations, read-only and write sets are pinned by name, every input has a description, and the PATCH tools must show a URN. A new tool that defaults to looking read-only fails the suite.

What this server enforces for you

The Entra SCIM API has constraints that are easy to miss. The tool layer rejects bad input before a request is sent:

• Filter allow-list: only the documented attributes and operators per resource; or is rejected; externalId cannot be combined with another clause.
• Query strings: no whitespace around = (the API returns 400 for any).
• User PATCH: remove of mailNickname is blocked; addresses path filter must be exactly [type eq "work"].
• Group PATCH: membership ops go through dedicated tools so the 20-member add cap and the single-remove rule are guaranteed.
• Idempotent member add: the API treats re-adds as success; add_group_members dedupes input.

Errors come back to the agent as a structured payload with status, scimType, and detail.

API behaviours worth knowing

Things the live API does that the docs either state ambiguously or not at all. Each was found by running against a real tenant or the Microsoft SCIM Validator, and each is handled for you — they are listed because they change how you read a response.

DELETE must not carry an Accept header. The API answers 400 Accept header application/json is invalid. All four variants were probed live: no header → 204, */* → 204, application/json → 400, application/scim+json → 400. Only DELETE inverts the rule — every other method requires a JSON Accept, and omitting it is a documented 400. This one silently broke deprovision_user and delete_group until the first live run.

Custom Security Attributes never come back from a plain read. In /Schemas the attribute-set-level attribute is returned: "request", so get_user will not include CSAs no matter what you ask for. They only appear when named explicitly, and projection is set-granular: urn:...:CustomSecurityAttributes:<Set>. The bare extension URN is rejected outright (400 ... not supported in the "attributes" or "excludedAttributes" query parameter), which is why attributeSets is a required input rather than an optional one.

CSA values are typed, and the type is enforced. Boolean, Integer, String and multi-valued String all round-trip intact when sent as the matching JSON type, and one PATCH may carry several attributes at once. Two removal behaviours, neither documented by Microsoft:

• op: "remove" on a CSA path clears that one assignment and leaves the others intact.
• replace with [] on a multi-valued attribute removes the assignment — a later read omits the attribute entirely rather than returning an empty array.

password is required on create but never readable. It is writeOnly / returned: never, and no response ever echoes it. The full required create set is userName, password, displayName, name.givenName, name.familyName and mailNickname — considerably stricter than RFC 7643, which requires only userName.

Group displayName is not unique. Entra accepts a duplicate group name and returns 201. RFC-oriented tooling often assumes 409 here, so do not rely on create failing to detect an existing group — filter first.

Removing a group member is about membership, not the user. A remove on members[value eq "<id>"] that matches nothing is a 404, whoever the id belongs to — a live user who was simply never in the group is refused exactly like a GUID that was never a user. Probed against a real tenant with a ballast member present throughout, so none of it is an artefact of emptying the group:

Two consequences worth knowing. Deleting a user strips their memberships, so the delete-then-remove-membership ordering lands in the same place as any other non-member — confirmed by querying list_groups with a members.value filter either side of the delete. And the error message names the group, not the member (Resource '<groupId>' does not exist or one of its queried reference-property objects are not present), which reads oddly since the group plainly exists; a probe with a deliberately bogus group id returned the same sentence naming that id, so the text simply echoes the PATCH target. The mock reproduces all of this rather than improving on it. Re-run it with npx tsx scripts/probe-member-removal.ts --confirm (~17 billed calls).

Group reads never include members. get_group returns no members array at any page size. To find a user's groups, filter the other way: list_groups with members.value eq "<userId>".

Errors are structured, and worth surfacing verbatim. Failures carry status, scimType and detail, and the detail text is unusually specific (it will name the offending operation index and constraint). The tools pass it through unchanged rather than flattening it to a message.

Every call is billed. There is no batching beyond what the API itself requires, so a chatty agent costs real money. add_group_members chunks at the API's 20-member cap, which is the one place batching happens.

Testing against a real tenant

The test suite never touches a real tenant. To verify the tools against live Entra, put credentials in a gitignored .env and run the smoke script.

cd node
cp .env.example .env      # then fill in tenant id, client id, and the secret VALUE

.env is read only by the scripts in scripts/. The published server always reads process.env, so it can never pick up a stray .env from whatever directory an MCP client launches it in. A variable already set in the environment always wins over the file.

The smoke script

ENTRA_SCIM_LIVE=1 npm run smoke:live              # bash
$env:ENTRA_SCIM_LIVE=1; npm run smoke:live        # PowerShell

To pass flags, call the script directly - npm run x -- --flag does not forward reliably on Windows:

npx tsx scripts/live-smoke.ts --confirm

One ordered pass over all 18 tools in roughly 21 billed calls. It creates two users and a group, exercises every read, PATCH and delete against them, then deletes them again. Highlights:

• It refuses to run by accident. Without ENTRA_SCIM_LIVE=1 or --confirm it prints the tenant, endpoint and cost, then exits. With ENTRA_SCIM_DRY_RUN or ENTRA_SCIM_STATIC_TOKEN set it refuses outright unless you pass --rehearse, because such a run proves nothing about the live API.
• It does not stop at the first failure. A failed step marks its dependents skip and everything independent still runs, so one run tells you which tools the live API accepts. Exit code is non-zero if anything failed.
• Test identities are obvious. scim-smoke-<runId>-1@<domain> and a SCIM Smoke <runId> group.
• Cleanup is guaranteed. Everything created is deleted in a finally block, and any leftovers are printed with their ids. Recover from a crashed run with npx tsx scripts/live-smoke.ts --sweep to list stranded scim-smoke-* users, then add --confirm to delete them. The sweep will never touch an account that lacks the scim-smoke- prefix.

The two Custom Security Attribute tools report skip until an attribute set exists in the tenant (Entra portal -> Protection -> Custom security attributes) and ENTRA_SCIM_SMOKE_CSA_SET / ENTRA_SCIM_SMOKE_CSA_ATTR name it. Everything else runs unattended.

Once a set exists, validate just those two tools for about 9 calls instead of 21 — this reads every value back (a PATCH the API accepts but stores nothing would otherwise look like a pass), covers each declared data type, and exercises removal:

npx tsx scripts/live-smoke.ts --csa-only --confirm

Declare the set's shape once and the run derives a test value per type:

ENTRA_SCIM_SMOKE_CSA_ATTRS=isManaged:bool,accountType:string,trustLevel:int,locations:string[]

Confirmed live against all four types: values round-trip intact, op: "remove" clears one assignment and leaves the rest, and replacing a multi-valued attribute with [] removes it — a later read omits the attribute entirely rather than returning an empty array.

Rehearse at zero cost before spending anything - this validates the script, not the API:

# no network at all
ENTRA_SCIM_DRY_RUN=1 npx tsx scripts/live-smoke.ts --rehearse

# or against the local mock: start it in one shell...
npm run mock
# ...and in another, aim the script at it
export ENTRA_SCIM_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8990
export ENTRA_SCIM_STATIC_TOKEN=dev-token
npx tsx scripts/live-smoke.ts --rehearse

The mock rehearsal is the one worth doing: it exercises real HTTP, real ids and the full create/patch/delete ordering, so it catches sequencing and cleanup bugs before you spend anything. It is not a substitute for the live run — the first live pass found two bugs no mock run had caught (see What the test legs actually caught).

What the test legs actually caught

Three independent legs, each of which found things the others could not — the reason all three exist:

The pattern worth taking away: mock leniency hides real API behaviour. Every defect the live run found had passed a full mock suite first, because the mock had been written from the same reading of the docs as the client. A third-party client (the validator) and a real tenant were the only things that could break that circularity.

Driving the live tenant conversationally

The repo-root .mcp.json registers the server with Claude Code using scripts/dev-server.mjs, which loads node/.env and starts the built server — so no secret goes into a committed config file.

It runs the built server, so node/dist has to exist before your MCP client can launch it. A fresh clone gets there with:

cd node && npm install     # the "prepare" script builds as part of install

After any source change, rebuild and restart your client so it relaunches the command:

cd node && npm run build

Development

cd node
npm install             # installs, then builds via "prepare"
npm test
npm run lint            # ESLint, type-aware
npm run format:check    # Prettier
npm run typecheck       # strict tsc over src, test and scripts
npm run test:coverage   # vitest with the coverage gate
npm run build           # rebuild after a source change
npm run mock            # run the local mock server (tsx, no build needed)
npm run mock:capture    # mock in validator-compat mode, capturing traffic to captures/

npm run lint, format:check, typecheck and test are the four gates CI runs on every push and pull request, alongside npm audit --audit-level=high.

The server has no test dependency on a real tenant. Unit tests cover the filter, patch, query, and client layers; integration tests boot the in-process mock server and drive every MCP tool end-to-end over real HTTP (node/test/integration/). Captured SCIM Validator sessions convert into replay fixtures with npm run fixtures:convert. For the one thing none of that can prove — that the live API accepts these payloads — see Testing against a real tenant.

Releasing

The version lives in four places — node/package.json, node/package-lock.json (twice), and server.json (twice, once for the registry record and once for the npm package it points at). One command writes all of them:

cd node
npm version minor          # or patch / major — writes all four, stages three
cd ..
VERSION=$(node -p "require('./node/package.json').version")
git commit -m "v$VERSION"
git tag -a "v$VERSION" -m "v$VERSION"
git push --follow-tags

VERSION is read back from package.json rather than typed, so the commit and tag can never name a version other than the one npm just wrote.

The -a matters: --follow-tags pushes annotated tags only, so a lightweight git tag "v$VERSION" stays on your machine and the push reports success having sent no tag at all — the release simply never runs.

npm version bumps package.json and the lockfile, then the version lifecycle script propagates it to server.json and stages the result. It does not commit or tag, even though npm version normally does both: npm looks for .git beside the package it is versioning, this package lives in node/, and the repository's .git is a level up — so npm decides it is not in a git repository and skips those steps without saying so. Hence the explicit commit and tag above. Get this wrong and git push --follow-tags silently pushes nothing, because the tag it would follow was never created.

npm run check:version verifies all four agree, CI runs it on every push, and the release workflow runs it again against the tag itself — so a tag that disagrees with package.json fails before anything is published. The version the server reports in its MCP handshake is read from package.json at runtime, so it follows automatically.

Pushing a v* tag runs .github/workflows/release.yml:

1. verify — lint, format, typecheck, tests with coverage, the version/tag check, and mcp-publisher validate against the live registry.
2. verify on Windows — the same tests again on windows-latest, because the mock binds real sockets and the capture sink writes real paths. Without it the release gate would be weaker than the gate on an ordinary commit, which CI runs on Windows too.
3. publish — npm publish, then waits for the new version to become visible on npm, then publishes server.json to the MCP Registry.

Nothing is published until every one of those passes.

Both publishes authenticate by GitHub OIDC, so the repository holds no secrets at all — there is no publish token to leak, rotate, or find expired at the worst moment.

Both are the reason the publish jobs request id-token: write.

The MCP Registry proves you own the npm package by fetching package.json and comparing its mcpName to the name in server.json — both are io.github.darrenjrobinson/entra-scim-mcp, and check:version asserts they still match.

Changing the workflow's filename, or adding an environment: to the publish job, breaks the npm trusted publisher until the configuration on npmjs.com is updated to match — the OIDC claims are compared exactly.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.