Melra README

The full upstream README, mirrored for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals and our own overview live on the Melra listing page.

MELRA logo

MELRA

Modular Execution Layer for Reliable Autonomy

Your AI agent decides what to do. MELRA governs how tool calls are authorized, verified, and recovered.

An open-source local execution runtime for agent tool calls you route through MELRA. It checks each call against policy, requests approval when needed, verifies declared evidence, and keeps a redacted receipt of what runs to an outcome. For each task, MELRA dispatches mutations at most once; uncertain outcomes are parked for reconciliation instead of replay. Exactly-once external effects still depend on the provider. Calls made through other tools remain outside MELRA's control.


CI status CodeQL status Dependency audit status Container build status

Latest release @melra/cli on npm MELRA on the official MCP Registry Indexed on TensorBlock MCP Index Listed on mcpservers.org Listed on mcp.site MELRA on Smithery AGPL-3.0-only license, SDKs Apache-2.0 55 of 55 deterministic evaluation scenarios passing Telemetry off

macOS Linux Windows Node.js 22.13 or newer, or 23.4 or newer Python 3.11 to 3.14 Hardened Docker image



Works with   Claude Code Claude Desktop OpenAI Codex Cursor VS Code Gemini CLI Zed Windsurf OpenClaw Hermes Agent GitHub Copilot CLI and any MCP client



26-second demo  ·  Quick start  ·  How it works  ·  See what it is doing  ·  Docs  ·  Contribute  ·  Discussions  ·  Product Hunt launch


MELRA governed execution flow

26-second demo

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e5cf895d-7ea6-4797-a1ef-e69cc5860d3f


[!WARNING] MELRA is alpha software. The local runtime is tested end to end, but APIs may change before 1.0. Use an isolated workspace, keep domain and command allowlists narrow, and read every approval before you give it.


Quick start

You need Node.js 22.13 or newer, or 23.4 or newer. From the project the agent should work in, one command sets everything up:

bash
cd ~/project
npx @melra/cli@alpha setup

That directory becomes the agent's workspace, the boundary for its file and command operations. setup shows it, and asks before making your home directory, a directory holding it, or / the workspace; set MELRA_WORKSPACE to choose another.

In a terminal, setup is a short wizard. It writes a safe local policy, finds the agent apps on your machine, asks which one should use MELRA, and writes MELRA into that app's own config file, keeping everything else in it (and saving a .bak first):

text
Which MCP client should use MELRA?

  1)   Claude Code                      detected: 'claude' on PATH
  2)   Cursor                           detected: config file found
  3)   Gemini CLI                       detected: config folder found
  ...

Choose 1-26 [1]: 1
Write it into ~/project/.mcp.json? [Y/n]

  ✓  Workspace    ~/project
  ✓  Policy       ~/.melra/policy.json
  ✓  Claude Code  ~/project/.mcp.json

Next: Start claude in this workspace and approve the 'melra' server when it asks; 'claude mcp list' then shows it connected. Or start it with 'melra launch claude-code', so MELRA's are the only tools it has that change anything.

Then restart your agent app (Claude Code asks you to approve a project's server once) and ask it to do something, for example "use melra to show me the system info". That's it.

Prefer flags, a container, or building from source?
HowCommand
One client, no questionsnpx @melra/cli@alpha setup --client cursor --write
Print the config instead of writing itnpx @melra/cli@alpha setup --client codex
Install globallynpm install -g @melra/cli@alpha && melra setup
Container (no Node needed)docker run --rm ghcr.io/xagi-lab/melra:alpha doctor
Prebuilt releasedownload from releases, verify against SHA256SUMS, then node melra/dist/bin.js doctor
From sourcegit clone https://github.com/XAGI-Lab/melra.git && cd melra && corepack enable && pnpm install --frozen-lockfile && pnpm build && pnpm melra setup
One file, no Node needed (experimental)from a checkout: pnpm build:sea, then ./dist-sea/melra setup; see single executable
Check what you installednpm audit signatures verifies registry signatures; npm provenance links each package to its GitHub Actions build (see npm packages)

Every command prints readable output in a terminal and plain JSON when piped or with --json, so scripts keep working. MELRA creates <MELRA_HOME>/payload.key with private permissions on first start; back it up with the SQLite files, because losing it makes persisted payloads unreadable. See installation for every install path, environment variable, and the hardened Docker invocation.

[!CAUTION] This project publishes only under the @melra/ npm scope (@melra/cli is the CLI) and on its releases, where the Python SDK's wheel is. An unscoped npm package melra or a PyPI package melra is not this project's. Install from that scope, from this repository, or from the releases.

If MELRA helps, star the repository so other agent builders can find it. Trying it in Cursor or another client? Share the client and its version, your OS, and your MELRA version (npx @melra/cli@alpha version) in issue #184; partial test results are useful too.


What is MELRA?

AI agents no longer just talk. They edit files, run commands, click through websites and call APIs on your behalf. Four questions come with that, and most agents answer them differently, or not at all:

🛡️ Is it allowed?

Every action MELRA receives is checked against your policy, and checked again at the moment it runs. Risky changes wait for your exact approval.

✅ Did it really work?

"No error" is not success. An action counts only when the evidence you declared holds: the file exists, the exit code is 0, the page says what it should. For a file change or a memory delete MELRA also checks the end state itself: a written file holds exactly the bytes sent.

🔁 What if it crashes?

Every mutation MELRA dispatches is recorded before it runs and runs at most once. After a crash, MELRA settles it from its evidence or the provider; what it cannot settle waits in recovery_required and is never replayed.

🧾 What happened?

Every action MELRA runs to an outcome leaves a redacted, append-only receipt and a certificate that carries its own digest, so you can audit what ran, who asked, and why it was allowed.

MELRA answers those questions in one place for tool calls routed through it, across supported agents. It sits underneath your agent for those calls, the way an operating system sits underneath your apps:

Where MELRA sits: the model reasons, your agent runs the loop, MELRA governs tool calls routed through it, and effect adapters do the work on your systems. Other agent tools remain outside MELRA's control.

The LLM reasons. The harness manages the loop. MELRA governs the effect lifecycle for calls routed through it. Swap the model or the agent; MELRA's policies, approvals, credentials, history and receipts can stay in place.


Works with your agent

MELRA speaks the Model Context Protocol, so any MCP client can use it. For these, melra setup --client <name> writes the config in the client's own format and location, and melra doctor tells you whether each one is pointed at MELRA:

Agent--clientConfig it writesTested
Claude Codeclaude-code<project>/.mcp.jsonconnected by hand
Claude Desktopclaude-desktopclaude_desktop_config.jsonconfig checked against docs
OpenAI Codex CLIcodex~/.codex/config.tomlconfig checked against docs (its own CLI parsed it)
Cursorcursor~/.cursor/mcp.jsonconfig checked against docs
🟦 VS Code (Copilot agent mode)vscode<project>/.vscode/mcp.jsonconfig checked against docs
Gemini CLIgemini~/.gemini/settings.jsonconfig checked against docs
Windsurfwindsurf~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.jsonconfig checked against docs
ZedzedZed settings.json (comments kept)config checked against docs
🧩 ClineclineCline's cline_mcp_settings.jsonconfig checked against docs
⬛ OpenCodeopencode~/.config/opencode/opencode.jsonconnected by hand
👻 Kirokiro~/.kiro/settings/mcp.jsonconfig checked against docs
🪿 Goosegoose~/.config/goose/config.yamlconfig checked against docs
▶️ Continuecontinue<project>/.continue/mcpServers/melra.yamlconfig checked against docs
⚡ Ampamp~/.config/amp/settings.jsonconfig checked against docs
🦞 OpenClawopenclaw~/.openclaw/openclaw.json (mcp.servers)config checked against docs
⚕️ Hermes Agent (Nous Research)hermes~/.hermes/config.yaml (mcp_servers)connected by hand
GitHub Copilot CLIcopilot~/.copilot/mcp-config.jsonconfig checked against docs
🐉 Qwen Codeqwen~/.qwen/settings.jsonconfig checked against docs
🅰️ Auggie (Augment)auggie~/.augment/settings.jsonconfig checked against docs
Warpwarp~/.warp/.mcp.jsonconfig checked against docs
Junie (JetBrains)junie~/.junie/mcp/mcp.jsonconfig checked against docs
🤖 Factory Droiddroid~/.factory/mcp.jsonconfig checked against docs
🌙 Kimi Codekimi~/.kimi-code/mcp.jsonconfig checked against docs
🪁 Kilo Codekilo~/.config/kilo/kilo.jsonc (comments kept)config checked against docs
🧪 LM Studiolmstudio~/.lmstudio/mcp.jsonconfig checked against docs
🔌 Anything elsegenericprints the standard mcpServers blockdocumented only

Tested says how far each one has been taken: run in CI (an automated suite drives it), connected by hand (its own CLI connected to a packed release over MCP, but no task was run from inside it; see COMPATIBILITY.md), config checked against docs (the file and format come from its documentation or source, and the CLI tests write and read them back), or documented only.

Building your own agent? Use the TypeScript SDK or the Python SDK. Both can spawn MELRA or connect to one that is already running over loopback HTTP or a private Unix socket. For agent frameworks, see the framework examples: the official MCP SDKs' snippets run in CI with no model; the LangChain / LangGraph, OpenAI Agents SDK and Vercel AI SDK ones are documented only.

[!NOTE] A named client is marked verified only after the released package, not a source checkout, passes discovery, planning, approval, execution, cancellation and receipt retrieval in that client. Per-client status lives in COMPATIBILITY.md.


How it works

An effect is one bounded operation an agent routes through MELRA: file.write, terminal.run, browser.click, http.request, and so on. MELRA handles each routed effect in nine stages, split between a plan step and an execute step (for a single task, melra_plan then melra_execute) so that nothing runs at planning time:

The nine stages: melra_plan types, classifies, authorises, issues an approval challenge and records the task; melra_execute checks policy again, deduplicates, runs under a budget, verifies evidence and writes a receipt.

Here is one change from start to finish, in developer mode. In enforced mode the challenge carries no phrase: you approve with melra approve <task-id> outside the conversation, and the agent's melra_execute sends no approval at all.

mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant A as Your agent
    participant M as MELRA
    participant You
    participant W as Your system
    A->>M: melra_plan: write notes.md, evidence "file contains 'done'"
    M->>M: type, classify, check policy, record
    M-->>A: awaiting_approval + challenge "APPROVE 3f9c…"
    A->>You: May I write notes.md?
    You-->>A: yes
    A->>M: melra_execute with the exact phrase
    M->>M: policy again, not already done?
    M->>W: write the file (under a budget)
    M->>W: read it back, independently
    M-->>A: verified_success + receipt

What the final status means, and what an agent should do next:

StatusMeaningNext step
🟢 verified_successIt ran and every declared check passed, and so did MELRA's own for a file change or memory deleteDone
🟡 partialIt ran, but the evidence, declared or MELRA's own, did not hold, or a semantic question was answered noLook at the evidence, then decide; a change answered no stays in place, so fixing it takes a new plan
🔴 policy_blockedRefused before anything ranRead the reason; the same request will be refused again
🔵 awaiting_approvalA change is waiting for your approvalDeveloper mode: approve it from the agent that planned it. Enforced mode: melra approve <task-id>
⏳ waiting_userIt ran and every check MELRA can make passed; a semantic question waits for an answer from outsideA principal other than the one that planned it answers with melra_task_judge; in enforced mode, an operator with melra judge <task-id>. Unanswered, it settles closed at expiry
🟣 recovery_requiredA change may or may not have happened, or happened and its semantic question went unanswered or was answered cannot_tellCheck the world first; never re-run blindly
⚪ failed · cancelled · budget_exhaustedIt did not completeSafe to plan again
Show the request an agent actually sends

The agent resolves "run the checks" into one bounded operation, plus the evidence that would prove it worked:

config.json
{
  "goal": "Run the repository checks",
  "operation": { "kind": "terminal", "action": "run", "command": "pnpm", "args": ["check"] },
  "requiredEvidence": [{ "type": "exit_code", "value": 0 }]
}

The task reaches verified_success only if the process exits 0. A process that runs and exits 1 completed the action but failed the evidence, so it is reported as partial. MELRA never receives a goal like "fix the production server": that needs judgement, which belongs to the model. A kernel that interpreted sentences would be a kernel whose guarantees depended on a model.

When an agent connects, MELRA also sends it a short guide to this loop (the MCP server's instructions), so a model knows to declare evidence, read the status, and never blindly retry an unknown outcome, without anyone prompt-engineering it.


See what it is doing

You can see each action MELRA handled and its policy decision, and, for each that ran to an outcome, its evidence and receipt, from the terminal or the browser. Nothing here can approve or start work, and approval phrases are never displayed.

From the terminal

text
$ melra status
MELRA 0.4.0-alpha.2  developer mode
  Tasks       3 total: 1 awaiting_approval,
              1 policy_blocked, 1 verified_success
  Waiting     1 waiting for approval
  HTTP        127.0.0.1:7457 not running

$ melra tasks
ID        STATUS             OPERATION     UPDATED
64199678  awaiting_approval  file.write    0s ago
ca4aec7a  policy_blocked     terminal.run  1s ago
a1285e0f  verified_success   system.info   1s ago

$ melra watch          # live, until Ctrl-C
6:07:21 PM  task 882cf55c  verified_success
6:07:22 PM  task f813364c  awaiting_approval

melra doctor checks Node, SQLite, the browser and policy, and reports which of your agent apps point at MELRA, with the one command that fixes anything wrong.

In the browser: melra serve --http --open

The MELRA console's Tasks view: a filterable list of tasks with status badges, and one task's policy decision, evidence and certificate.

An overview, a searchable task list, and durable workflows with a live event stream. It works at phone width and in light and dark, and it is served with a strict Content-Security-Policy.


Safe by default

Default
🏠Local only. stdio, loopback HTTP behind a token, or a mode-0600 Unix socket only your OS user can open. No account and no hosted service.
📴Telemetry is off.
✍️Changes need two things: declared evidence and an exact, expiring, task-scoped approval: a phrase in developer mode, an operator's melra approve in enforced mode.
📁Paths stay inside your workspace, including terminal working directories; symlink escapes are refused.
🚫Shells, sudo/su and arbitrary desktop key names are denied. Terminal commands must be on the allowlist by name.
🌐Private, link-local and cloud-metadata addresses are blocked by the browser and HTTP adapters themselves, after DNS resolution, before any allowlist is consulted; loopback too in enforced mode, unless the policy opens it.
⚠️Web page content is marked untrusted and can never change policy.
🔑Secrets are redacted before anything is stored, and agents get capabilities, never your raw credentials.
⏱️Every call is bounded by a budget and a cancel signal; a stalled browser fails with a clear error instead of hanging.

What actually guards an effect depends on the mode:

developer (default)enforced
Approving a changeThe agent can, with the phrase its own plan response carries: a record, not a boundaryOnly an operator, out of band (melra approve, melra console, melra run's prompt)
An approved commandRuns in an OS sandbox where one works (Seatbelt on macOS, bubblewrap on Linux): it writes only the workspace and temp, cannot read MELRA's files or the login files MELRA lists (see INSTALLATION; the rest of home stays readable), and has no network without the network trait (under bubblewrap, Unix sockets on the filesystem stay reachable). Where none works (Windows, Linux where bubblewrap cannot run) it has your rights, and every receipt says sandbox: noneThe same sandbox (in the container pair, another account), and MELRA will not start without one unless the policy file records the opt-out
The agent's own toolsUntouched: a native shell or editor goes around MELRAYours to remove; MELRA's server cannot see them, melra doctor reads Claude Code's settings and OpenClaw's and Hermes's configs, and melra probe checks from inside the agent's box

melra doctor says which of these hold on its protection line, and melra_capabilities reports approvals and sandbox beside mode.

Unsafe-local mode and the two deployment modes

Every row above can be switched off at once with melra serve --unsafe-local (or MELRA_UNHINGED=1): no policy, no approvals, no evidence requirement, no workspace confinement, no destination checks. The agent gets the reach your OS user has, apart from a few fixed file checks that hold in every mode. The mode announces itself on stderr, in melra doctor and in melra_capabilities, and receipts still record what ran. See unsafe-local mode.

The honest gap in a default install is that MELRA governs the effects it is asked for. An agent holding both a MELRA terminal and a native one makes the kernel optional. MELRA_MODE is where you say which situation you are in:

ModeMeaning
developer (default)MELRA governs what it is asked for; the agent may have another path, and you accept that. This is why MELRA can be tried in thirty seconds.
enforcedYou assert the alternative is gone: the agent is sandboxed, holds no privileged secrets, and reaches these systems only through here.

MELRA cannot verify that assertion from inside its own process, and it does not pretend to; the isolation is the operating system's job. What enforced mode does is close every door MELRA owns: --unsafe-local is refused outright, nothing binds outside loopback (a 0600 Unix socket is allowed), no client can register itself, every command MELRA runs gets an OS sandbox of its own that keeps it out of MELRA's data and your logins (MELRA will not start where none works, unless the policy file records the opt-out), and mode is stamped on every receipt. For the operating-system side, examples/deploy has a hardened Docker run, a systemd unit and a Compose pair that puts the agent in a container of its own, each checked in CI, melra doctor reports which restrictions are actually in effect, and melra probe, run inside the agent's box, checks that it stops a workspace write, a read of MELRA's data, outbound and local connections, and starting a shell. See deployment modes, the threat model and the security policy.

For Claude Code, melra launch claude-code takes the other path away for the session it starts: Read, Glob and Grep are its only built-in tools and melra its only MCP server, so the only tools it has that change anything are MELRA's. In developer mode the agent approves its own changes, and a command MELRA runs for it has your rights wherever no sandbox works, so --mode enforced is how you decide each one. The server it starts leaves node, npm, npx and pnpm out of the default allowlist, unless the policy file lists them, as one melra setup wrote does: remove the ones the agent does not need. A claude started any other way is unchanged. See launching an agent.

For OpenClaw and Hermes Agent, melra setup --client openclaw --exclusive --write (or --client hermes) turns the agent's own shell, web and file-changing tools off (Hermes's file reads too) in its own config, through the switch each one documents, and melra doctor says whether its exec or terminal is still enabled. That is a default the agent's OS user can edit, not a boundary. See OpenClaw's and Hermes Agent's tools.


Why MELRA

An LLM decides what to do. A harness runs the loop that gets it there. Something still has to decide whether the resulting effect is allowed, avoid replaying uncertain mutations, prove what happened, and survive a crash in the middle. Today that machinery is rebuilt inside every agent harness, and it dies with the harness. MELRA is that machinery, factored out and made agent-independent.

🚫 Typical tool server✅ MELRA
  • Tool call executes immediately
  • Success = no exception thrown
  • Policy, if any, checked once
  • Changes look the same as reads
  • Output is trusted
  • No durable record
  • Rules live inside one agent
  • Plan and execute are separate calls
  • Success = declared evidence and MELRA's own checks passed
  • Policy checked again at execution time
  • Changes need evidence and an exact approval
  • Page content is explicitly untrusted
  • Redacted receipt + SHA-256 execution certificate
  • Rules outlive the agent that used them

Next to the two layers it is most often mistaken for:

Agent harnessMCP serverMELRA
Model loop and reasoning✓✗✗
Tools✓✓via adapters
Agent-independent policyusually ✗possiblecore
Durable effect statesometimesrarelycore
Idempotency across restartsvariesrarecore
Crash recovery without replayvariesrarecore
Independent verificationuncommonpossiblecore
Evidence receiptsuncommonpossiblecore
Works across agents✗✓✓
Credential isolationvariesvariescore
Hard capability boundaryvariesusually ✗partly shipped

Plenty of MCP servers can do these things; this is not a claim that none of them do. The difference is that in MELRA they are the execution contract rather than a per-tool option. The boundary is partly shipped: MELRA_MODE=enforced closes every door MELRA owns, but the OS isolation that stops a harness reaching the filesystem around the kernel is the operator's to build; runnable hardened deployment recipes are still to come (#52).

The feature test. Anything that would still make sense if the request came from ordinary deterministic software belongs in MELRA: authorisation, idempotency, credential isolation, recovery, verification, effect history. Prompt optimisation, LLM memory, model selection, a planner and agent personality belong to the harness above. That is why nothing in MELRA's execution path ever calls a model.


What it can do

Effect adapters

The kernel is the contract; these are its shipped implementations. Every one passes through the same policy, approval, budget, verification, receipt and certificate pipeline; an adapter that skipped it would not be an adapter.

AdapterWhat is implemented
🗂️FilesRoot-confined read, hash, atomic write, move, mkdir and delete, with symlink-escape defenses
💻TerminalShell-free foreground and supervised background processes with allowlists, traits, timeouts, interactive input, cancellation and redaction
🌐BrowserIsolated Playwright sessions, semantic DOM targets, bounded artifacts, network and popup policy, opt-in profiles, condition-based settling, and every browser call bounded so a stalled page fails clearly
🖥️ComputerCapability discovery, accessibility-tree and OCR inspection, and governed screenshot, pointer, drag, keyboard and scroll on macOS, Windows and supported Linux/X11 setups
📡HTTPGET/HEAD without a body as reads and every other method as an approval-gated at-most-once mutation, pinned to the address the destination check resolved, with credentials injected by the kernel rather than handed to the caller
🧠Operational memoryA kernel service, not an adapter: scoped SQLite storage of what MELRA knows about its own effects, with hybrid ranking, freshness, expiry, supersession, provenance and redaction

Database, cloud and SaaS adapters are designed and on the roadmap, not shipped today. Semantic memory about the user (preferences, conversation history) belongs to the harness, not here.

A deliberately small tool surface

Twelve tools in front of the adapters and one durable workflow controller. The CLI, both SDKs, loopback HTTP and the Unix socket reach the same twelve operations; this list is the kernel contract, not an MCP-specific API.

ToolPurpose
melra_capabilitiesDiscover operations, platform support, limits and policy posture
melra_planValidate, persist and policy-check one bounded operation
melra_executeExecute an approved plan and verify the declared outcome
melra_task_statusRead durable task state
melra_task_cancelCooperatively cancel pending or running work
melra_receiptRetrieve redacted evidence and the execution certificate
melra_task_judgeAnswer a waiting task's semantic question: yes, no or cannot_tell, never as the principal that planned it
melra_workflow_planValidate, preflight, encrypt and persist a bounded workflow
melra_workflow_advanceExecute one ready scheduling wave
melra_workflow_statusRead the durable workflow projection
melra_workflow_cancelCooperatively cancel nonterminal workflow work
melra_workflow_controlPause, resume or suspend a run without losing its place

A verdict records its judge as declared, and the certificate carries it beside executedBy, the receipt's declared principal. Over MCP even a human: judge is the harness's claim; only a cli: judge, from melra judge, came through an operator surface.

Prefer tool names your model already knows? Set MELRA_HARNESS_TOOLS=1 and thirteen more appear alongside these (read_file, write_file, run_command, browser_click, approve, …). They are not a second path: each one builds an ordinary task and runs the same pipeline. See ordinary tool names.

Durable, restart-safe workflows

Workflows compose operation, approval, condition, parallel, bounded_loop, checkpoint, compensation, human_input and delegation nodes, and every effect still travels through the task pipeline. Each CLI call below is a new process, so this exercises restart persistence with no daemon:

bash
melra workflow plan --definition examples/workflows/restart-safe.json   # save the id
melra workflow advance <workflow-id>
melra workflow advance <workflow-id>          # exits 3 with the write's approval challenge
# developer mode echoes the phrase; enforced mode runs `melra approve <task-id>` instead
melra workflow advance <workflow-id> --approval '<approval-id>:<exact phrase>'
melra workflow advance <workflow-id>
text
planned            stateVersion=2
running            stateVersion=4   inspect=verified_complete
awaiting_approval  stateVersion=6   phrase="APPROVE <digest prefix>"   (developer mode)
running            stateVersion=8   write=verified_complete
verified_complete  stateVersion=11  checkpoint=verified_complete

Stop the process after any line and the next command resumes from the same MELRA_HOME. Interrupted reads may retry; interrupted changes are never silently repeated. They are settled by re-observation, or they park in recovery_required.

workflow advance and resume exit 0 while the run is fine, 3 while it waits on an approval, 4 while it waits on an --input, and 2 once it has failed, ended partially_complete or cancelled, or needs recovery. workflow plan, pause and suspend exit 0 when they plan or halt the run; pausing or suspending a run that is complete, cancelled or failed is refused. workflow inspect exits 0 in any state. workflow cancel exits 0 when it leaves the run cancelled and 1 when it does not, as for a run already complete. Errors exit 1.

Everything shipped in this release
Shipped in 0.3.0-alpha.11 and 0.3.0-alpha.12Evidence
Restart-safe bounded workflows across nine node kindsA real MCP process is stopped, replaced and resumed in E2E
Encrypted exact task, workflow and result payloadsAES-256-GCM storage plus plaintext-leak checks across SQLite/WAL and public projections
Recovery without silent mutation replay8/8 deterministic recovery scenarios, zero duplicates, zero false success
Loopback HTTP, a 0600 Unix socket, an event stream and a read-only consoleSame runtime as stdio, token on every route, 405 on any non-GET to the JSON API
A client authenticates itself and is named on every receiptOAuth 2.1 registration through approval to a token
Two deployment modes--unsafe-local and a non-loopback bind are refused under MELRA_MODE=enforced
HTTP and API calls as a first-class effectA mutation whose reply never arrived is reported unknown, not failed
Agents receive capabilities, not credentialsThe kernel holds the secret and scopes it by host and capability; grants carry a size and an expiry
Evidence says how it is knownexecution / state / independent / semantic strength on every evidence item
Independent-channel verificationhttp_resource_matches executes through POST and verifies through a separate GET
Your own evidence typesA registered verifier answers { "type": "custom" } evidence; planning refuses an unregistered one, and custom evidence is always the weakest strength
Setup for 26 agent appsmelra setup writes each app's own format; Claude Code, OpenCode, and Hermes Agent connected to a packed release on a real Mac
OS isolation you can checkmelra doctor reports capabilities, no_new_privs, seccomp, and a read-only root; CI runs it under the hardened Docker and systemd recipes
A self-authored governance benchmarkGovBench: 362 cases through the real runtime, safety 312/312, utility 50/50

See the full CHANGELOG.


Evidence and benchmarks

Numbers come from committed scripts and JSON artifacts, with dataset hashes and claim boundaries. They are component measurements, not a claim that MELRA is "the best" or that unlike benchmarks are comparable.

WhatResultWhat it means
✅Safety and execution evals55/55Deterministic policy, capability-grant, credential-scope, traversal, terminal, memory, computer, HTTP, cancellation and verification scenarios
🔁Durable Core eval8/8100% expected recovery, 0 duplicate execution, 0 false success, 100% event consistency
🛡️GovBench (self-authored)312/312 safety, 50/50 utility362 model-free cases through the real runtime: containment, approval integrity, verification honesty, exactly-once, redaction, and false positives on legitimate work. Its first run found two real bugs (293/307), both fixed; governance adds about 0.5–1.4 ms per action
🧠LoCoMo retrieval0.7597 coverage@201,982 evidence-bearing questions with zero model, embedding or network calls; re-run on 2026-10-14 and identical on every metric
🧠Synthetic recall100/100 Recall@1Planted-fact regression over 1,000 records
🌐Static-page settle183.7 ms p50 vs 301.3 ms39% less waiting with identical 10/10 correct reads
🌐Slow-render settle10/10 vs 0/10 correctCondition-based waiting sees the final DOM; a fixed 300 ms wait reads too early
💻Terminal30/30 verifiedShell-free process launch, 48.1 ms p50 on the measured machine
🖥️Computer control plane30/30 probes0.032 ms p50 adapter discovery; this is not a desktop task-success score

Raw artifacts: core microbenchmarks, LoCoMo and GovBench.

The repository also contains a pre-registered browser-agent harness (MiniWoB-125 and the WebArena-Verified Hard-30 registered subset) whose task IDs, upstream revisions and dataset hashes are frozen. Its score is not yet claimed: it will be published only after a full fixed-denominator run passes the publication gate. MELRA has not run an official OSWorld, WebArena or LongMemEval submission.

Reproduce the scores
bash
# the full validation gate
pnpm check && pnpm evals && pnpm e2e && pnpm pack:check && pnpm security:audit
pnpm --filter @melra/evals evaluate:durable-core -- --publishable

# memory, browser, terminal and computer microbenchmarks
pnpm benchmark:core

# governance benchmark: 363 model-free cases, loopback fixtures only
pnpm benchmark:govbench

# LoCoMo (dataset not vendored: CC BY-NC 4.0)
git clone https://github.com/snap-research/locomo.git /tmp/locomo
pnpm benchmark:locomo -- --dataset /tmp/locomo/data/locomo10.json \
  --output docs/research/results/locomo-retrieval.json

# browser-agent harness contract checks (no model, no network)
pnpm benchmark:browser:check
pnpm benchmark:browser:verify-upstream

# hardened container and a real MCP smoke test
docker build -t melra:local . && docker run --rm melra:local doctor && pnpm docker:smoke

The MiniWoB suite also needs the pinned MiniWoB++ assets and an agent configuration; see the research index and the methodology. Run outputs (HAR, screenshots, video, transcripts) are git-ignored and must never be committed.


For developers

SDKs

Package
TypeScript@melra/sdk
Pythonmelra (typed, 3.11–3.14)
📜 JSON contracts@melra/protocol, @melra/receipt-schema

Both SDKs spawn a local server or connect to a running one over HTTP or a Unix socket. The token is always passed explicitly, and plain HTTP to a remote host is refused unless you opt in.

CLI at a glance

GoalCommand
Guided setupmelra setup
Check this machinemelra doctor
Serve (stdio / HTTP / socket)melra serve · --http --open · --socket <path>
See activitymelra tasks · watch · status
Run one taskmelra run --request task.json
Approve a task an agent plannedmelra approve <task-id> · in a browser: melra console
Answer a task's semantic questionmelra judge <task-id> --judgement <id> --verdict yes|no|cannot_tell
Inspect a receiptmelra inspect <task-id>
Test a policymelra policy test --request task.json
Check conformancemelra conformance
Repository map
text
apps/cli/                   CLI and stdio entrypoint

kernel services
packages/protocol/          strict task, workflow, event and operation schemas
packages/runtime-core/      task/workflow lifecycle, events, recovery
packages/policy-core/       local policy and scoped approvals
packages/storage-sqlite/    transactional tasks, workflows, events, evidence
packages/verifier-core/     deterministic evidence predicates
packages/receipt-schema/    receipts and execution certificates
packages/memory/            operational memory: scoped retrieval and lifecycle
packages/server/            runtime composition, MCP, loopback HTTP and Unix socket

reference effect adapters
packages/file-runtime/      confined filesystem operations
packages/terminal-runtime/  shell-free process supervision
packages/browser-runtime/   isolated browser automation and stable-DOM wait
packages/computer-runtime/  governed local computer-use adapters
packages/http-runtime/      governed HTTP and API calls

clients and evidence
packages/sdk-ts/            TypeScript client SDK
sdk-py/                     Python client SDK
benchmarks/browser-agent/   pre-registered browser-agent evaluation harness
evals/                      safety and durable crash-recovery evaluations
scripts/                    benchmark and release checks
docs/research/              methods, findings and raw results
examples/                   runnable task examples

MELRA is capability-driven, not language-restricted: Rust, Go, Swift, C# or another language can be added when measurement shows a real benefit and the same conformance suite passes.

Runnable examples cover a read-only system task, a verified file write, a terminal check, browser inspection, scoped memory, computer capability discovery, a governed API call, independent verification, and a restart-safe workflow.


Documentation

📦 Installation & client setup🧭 Capabilities & limits🏛️ Architecture
🔬 Research & benchmarks🔗 Compatibility✅ Validation evidence
🛡️ Threat model🎖️ Conformance levels🗺️ Roadmap
📝 Changelog🤝 Contributing guide🔐 Security policy

Contributing

Code, adapters, client integrations, benchmark harnesses, verifier predicates, documentation and threat analysis are all welcome.

Start hereWhat it is
good first issueScoped, with the files to touch named in the issue
help wantedLarger, still well defined
Open design proposalsComment on open questions before implementation; see semantic verification #54
Contributing guideHow the pipeline fits together and which files one change touches
  1. Read CONTRIBUTING.md and the Code of Conduct.
  2. Sign your commits under the DCO (git commit -s), and sign the CLA once, on your first pull request.
  3. Run pnpm check before opening a pull request; it also checks links, the environment-variable table and the CHANGELOG shape.
  4. Report vulnerabilities through private vulnerability reporting, never in a public issue.

License

The MELRA kernel, CLI and documentation are licensed under the GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 only, and XAGI Labs Private Limited also offers the kernel under a commercial license. The SDKs (@melra/sdk, @melra/protocol and the melra Python package), the examples and the code samples in the documentation stay under the Apache License 2.0, so code that only calls MELRA can use any license. Releases up to and including 0.3.0-alpha.22 were Apache-2.0 and stay so. LICENSING.md maps each path to its license and explains what the AGPL asks of a modified MELRA run as a network service.

The MELRA name and logo are covered by TRADEMARKS.md; the official logo and hero artwork are all rights reserved. Third-party benchmark datasets keep their own licenses and are not included in this repository.


Built in the open by XAGI Labs.

MELRA brand assets © XAGI Labs Private Limited, all rights reserved.