The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the MCP Shield listing page.
Open-source security scanner for MCP servers. 20 rules across 6 categories. Scan any server in seconds. Get a grade from A to F.
36.7% of MCP servers are SSRF-vulnerable (BlueRock, 2026). 82% have path traversal flaws. Only 17% are production-ready. MCP Shield finds the vulnerabilities before attackers do.
| Rule | Severity | What It Detects |
|---|---|---|
| SSRF-01 | Critical | User input in HTTP request URLs |
| SSRF-02 | Medium | Dynamic URLs without validation |
| SSRF-03 | Medium | DNS rebinding (URL validated but no IP pinning) |
| PATH-01 | High | User input in file paths |
| PATH-02 | Medium | No path traversal protection |
| PATH-03 | Medium | Symlink following without check |
| INJ-01 | Critical | eval/exec on user input |
| INJ-02 | Critical | SQL string interpolation |
| INJ-03 | High | subprocess with shell=True |
| INJ-04 | High | Template injection via .format() |
| INJ-05 | Critical | Unsafe deserialization (pickle/yaml) |
| AUTH-01 | Medium | No auth on tool handlers |
| AUTH-02 | Critical | Hardcoded secrets/API keys (OpenAI, Stripe, GitHub, AWS) |
| AUTH-03 | Low | No rate limiting on tool endpoints |
| SEC-01 | High | SSL verification disabled |
| SEC-02 | Medium | Wildcard CORS |
| SEC-03 | Medium | Stack traces/error details exposed to client |
| SEC-04 | Low | No input length validation (DoS risk) |
| LOG-01 | Low | No logging/audit trail on tool invocations |
Add to ~/.claude/mcp.json:
Claude Code tools: shield_scan_file, shield_scan_directory, shield_scan_code
The MCP ecosystem has 9,400+ servers and 97M monthly SDK downloads. Security tooling hasn't kept up. We built MCP Shield because every MCP server deployed without a security scan is a liability.
Built by Like One, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit. Security tooling should be free.
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