The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the MCP Mac Control listing page.
A Model Context Protocol server that gives an AI agent full control of a Mac — like a person sitting at it. Shell, AppleScript, files, processes, and human-like GUI control: move, click, double/right-click, drag, scroll, type, and press key combos — with a screenshot + window/screen-size perception loop.
⚠️ This server is full-control by default. It starts in
adminmode with command execution, deletes, and GUI input all enabled. That is powerful and dangerous: anything the agent reads (a web page, an email, a file) could contain a prompt injection that then runs arbitrary code on your Mac. Only connect it to an agent and content you trust. SetMACCTL_SAFE_MODE=trueto flip the whole thing to safe-by-default. If you want safe-by-default as the baseline, use the sibling@dockndevai/mcp-macosinstead.
Part of the dockndevai MCP server suite.
Perceive — screenshot, get_screen_size, list_windows, get_frontmost_app, list_apps, system_info, list_directory, read_file, list_processes, get_clipboard
Operate the desktop like a human — move_mouse, click (left/right/double), drag, scroll, type_text, key_press (with ⌘/⌥/⌃/⇧), activate_app, quit_app, open, set_clipboard, notify, write_file
Full power — run_command (any program, no shell unless you ask for one), run_applescript (AppleScript/JXA — drive any scriptable app), delete_path (→ Trash), kill_process
The classic loop: screenshot → decide → click/type/drag/scroll → screenshot again.
macOS only. You'll need to grant the host app (Terminal, your IDE, Claude Desktop, …) macOS permissions the first time each capability is used:
screenshotclick, type_text, drag, scroll, key_press) and list_windowsbrew install cliclickThat's it — it's full-control by default. To scope it down, add env flags (see below). See docs/CLIENTS.md for Claude Desktop / Cursor / Codex / VS Code / Windsurf, and .env.example for every variable.
Full control needs no configuration. Everything below is about restricting it:
| Variable | Default | Effect |
|---|---|---|
MACCTL_SAFE_MODE | false | true → read-only, every power gated, confirmations on (safe-by-default) |
MACCTL_MODE | admin | read-only / read-write / admin — caps which tools are registered |
MACCTL_ALLOW_EXEC | true | shell / AppleScript / kill |
MACCTL_ALLOW_DELETE | true | delete to Trash |
MACCTL_ALLOW_INPUT | true | GUI input (mouse/keyboard) |
MACCTL_CONFIRM | false | true → destructive ops pause for human approval via MCP elicitation |
MACCTL_PATH_ALLOWLIST | (empty = anywhere) | confine file ops to these roots |
MACCTL_PROTECTED_PATHS | (empty) | roots readable but never modified/deleted |
MACCTL_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST | (empty = any) | restrict run_command to these programs |
MACCTL_DRY_RUN | false | validate + log writes without executing |
MACCTL_AUDIT_LOG | true | JSON audit line per guarded op, to stderr |
The policy engine (src/security.ts) is the same graduated model as the rest of the suite — this server just ships it wide open by default. See SECURITY.md.
For an extra layer on top of the static rules, this server can consult a local
laya-guard daemon before running a high-risk tool
(run_command, run_applescript, delete_path). The guard classifies the actual command —
deterministic patterns plus a local decision model — as allow / confirm / block. It runs after
the deterministic policy and can only tighten (add a confirm or block), never grant.
| Variable | Default | Effect |
|---|---|---|
MACCTL_GUARD_MODE | off | monitor (log what it would do) / enforce (block or require confirm) |
MACCTL_GUARD_URL | http://127.0.0.1:8799 | the local laya-guard daemon |
MACCTL_GUARD_TIMEOUT_MS | 2000 | per-check timeout |
MACCTL_GUARD_FAIL_CLOSED | confirm | when the daemon is unreachable in enforce mode: confirm or allow |
Run the daemon with pipx install laya-guard && laya-guard. Start in monitor to see what it catches,
then switch to enforce.
MIT