lazaretto-mcp
Know what a package or MCP server does before you install or connect it.
Lazaretto checks an npm package, an AI agent skill, or an MCP server for malicious behavior. This is the MCP server for it, so your agent can run the check itself.
Add it
In Claude, the fastest way is the Lazaretto connector in the Claude directory. Open it and add it. The connector needs no sign-in. It also works in ChatGPT, on some plans.
In Claude Code, one command:
claude mcp add --transport http lazaretto "https://lazaretto.dev/mcp?ref=npm"
For any other client, lazaretto.dev/add has the exact
steps, and Set it up below covers Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI and
Cline. If your client only runs local servers, use npx -y lazaretto-mcp as the
command, which needs Node 20 or newer.
ref=npm only tells us this page is where you found it. Leave it off and nothing
changes.
Try the free check
In a project with a lockfile, ask your agent:
Use the lazaretto
check_lockfiletool to check this project's dependencies.
Or run it in the browser at the free lockfile check, with no account.
What each check reads, and what it does not
The free lockfile check takes each exactly pinned package name and version. It matches them against the OSV and OpenSSF malicious-package advisories, which we sync daily. It does not read the code inside your packages. So it finds a release that has been reported, and it misses a bad release that no one has reported yet. A clean result means nothing matched. It does not prove a package is harmless.
A full scan goes further. A worker with no credentials fetches the package's files, never runs them, and reports what it finds with the file and line. A free key gets 10 scans a day.
This package is a thin front end for the Lazaretto API. It ships no detection logic and only makes HTTPS requests, so you can read it end to end.
Setting this up as an agent, with no other context? Read llms-install.md instead. It is the same information as a straight-line procedure.
Two ways to run it
| Hosted (recommended) | stdio package | |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint | https://lazaretto.dev/mcp?ref=npm | npx -y lazaretto-mcp |
| Install | nothing | Node 20 or newer |
| Key goes in | the X-API-Key header | the LAZARETTO_API_KEY env var |
| Get a free key in-session | yes, the get_free_key tool | no, curl the trial endpoint |
| Find a server for a job | yes, the find_mcp_servers tool | no |
| Reads your lockfile off disk | no, you pass the text | yes, from the working directory |
| Needs a client that speaks Streamable HTTP | yes | no |
Eight tools are on both. Their arguments match except for these:
| Tool | stdio package | Hosted |
|---|---|---|
check_lockfile, scan_lockfile_deep | also take path, a lockfile on disk | no path |
scan_artifact | target_type | type, plus name for inline content |
The stdio package refuses an argument a tool does not take, and says what it does take.
The hosted server adds two free tools:
find_mcp_servers, which finds a server for a job in the official MCP registry,
and get_free_key, which mints a free developer key in the session. Pick the hosted one
unless your client has no remote-server support, or you want check_lockfile to
read the lockfile off disk so a large tree never passes through the model
context.
Set it up
Claude Code
Hosted, one command:
claude mcp add --transport http lazaretto "https://lazaretto.dev/mcp?ref=npm"
With a key for the metered tools:
claude mcp add --transport http lazaretto "https://lazaretto.dev/mcp?ref=npm" \
--header "X-API-Key: YOUR_KEY"
stdio instead:
claude mcp add lazaretto --env LAZARETTO_API_KEY=YOUR_KEY -- npx -y lazaretto-mcp
Drop --env LAZARETTO_API_KEY=YOUR_KEY if you only want the free tools.
To check it in for the whole team, put this in .mcp.json at the repo root
instead of running the command:
{
"mcpServers": {
"lazaretto": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://lazaretto.dev/mcp?ref=npm"
}
}
}
One catch with .mcp.json: a project-scoped server needs a person to approve it
once. Until they do, claude mcp list says Pending approval (run claude to approve) and the tools are not there. The claude mcp add commands above take
effect immediately, with nothing to approve, so use those if you want it working
in this session.
Confirm with claude mcp list. The entry should say Connected.
Cursor
One click, free tools: Add to Cursor. To add a key, or to set it up by hand,
edit ~/.cursor/mcp.json for every project, or .cursor/mcp.json for one:
{
"mcpServers": {
"lazaretto": {
"url": "https://lazaretto.dev/mcp?ref=npm",
"headers": {
"X-API-Key": "YOUR_KEY"
}
}
}
}
Drop the headers block if you only want the free tools. For stdio, replace
url and headers with:
{
"mcpServers": {
"lazaretto": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "lazaretto-mcp"],
"env": { "LAZARETTO_API_KEY": "YOUR_KEY" }
}
}
}
Cursor reloads the file on save. Settings, MCP should list lazaretto with its
tools.
Gemini CLI
Install it as an extension. This adds the hosted server with its free tools and a short GEMINI.md telling the agent when to check:
gemini extensions install https://github.com/jamesdfinance-dev/lazaretto-mcp
The metered tools need a key, which the extension does not send. For those, add the server directly instead:
gemini mcp add -s user --transport http --header "X-API-Key: YOUR_KEY" lazaretto "https://lazaretto.dev/mcp?ref=npm"
Use the key itself, not $LAZARETTO_API_KEY: Gemini CLI redacts environment
variables whose names contain KEY or TOKEN.
Google moved individual accounts from Gemini CLI to Antigravity CLI on June 18, 2026. Gemini CLI still serves paid API keys and Code Assist Standard or Enterprise. We have not tested Antigravity CLI. lazaretto.dev/add has its steps.
Cline
Open the MCP Servers panel, then Configure MCP Servers, which opens
cline_mcp_settings.json. Add the block below, keeping "type": "streamableHttp":
without it Cline falls back to the legacy SSE transport, which this server does
not offer.
{
"mcpServers": {
"lazaretto": {
"type": "streamableHttp",
"url": "https://lazaretto.dev/mcp?ref=npm",
"headers": { "X-API-Key": "YOUR_KEY" },
"disabled": false,
"autoApprove": ["check_lockfile", "known_bad_lookup", "find_attestation", "verify_attestation"]
}
}
}
autoApprove lists only free tools on purpose, so nothing that spends
credits runs without you seeing it. The hosted server has two more free tools,
find_mcp_servers and get_free_key. They are left out so that a search or a new
key is something you see happen. Drop the headers block if you only want the free tools. For stdio, swap url and headers for command, args and
env exactly as in the Cursor example above.
Any other MCP client
Remote (Streamable HTTP):
{
"mcpServers": {
"lazaretto": {
"url": "https://lazaretto.dev/mcp?ref=npm",
"headers": { "X-API-Key": "YOUR_KEY" }
}
}
}
stdio:
{
"mcpServers": {
"lazaretto": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "lazaretto-mcp"],
"env": { "LAZARETTO_API_KEY": "YOUR_KEY" }
}
}
}
Both key fields are optional. Without one, the free tools work (four on the
stdio package, six on the hosted server, which adds get_free_key and
find_mcp_servers) and the
four metered ones return a message telling you how to get credits.
The first call to try
From a project that has a lockfile, ask your agent:
Use the lazaretto
check_lockfiletool to check this project's dependencies.
On the stdio server, call it with no arguments: it finds package-lock.json,
npm-shrinkwrap.json, yarn.lock or pnpm-lock.yaml in the working directory
by itself. The hosted server cannot read your disk, so pass the lockfile text as
lockfile. On either server, pass a list of "name@version" strings as
packages to ask about specific versions, or when a whole tree would not fit in
context. Give one or the other, never both.
A result with one known-malware version in the tree looks like this (the stdio
server adds source, naming the file it read; the hosted one has no source
because it never touched your disk):
{
"source": "package-lock.json",
"checked": 2,
"format": "package-lock",
"malicious": [
{ "name": "debug", "version": "4.4.2", "ids": ["MAL-2025-46974"], "advisory_url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2025-46974" }
],
"unverified": [],
"truncated": false,
"skipped": { "count": 0, "reason": "..." },
"note": "1 pinned package version is listed as malware. Remove or upgrade before installing.",
"disclaimer": "..."
}
An empty malicious list is a real all-clear only when unverified is also
empty and truncated is false. Anything under unverified was not checked
and must not be reported as clean.
truncated: true is the case with no list to read. A lockfile longer than the
per-request package limit is clipped, and the packages past the limit land in
neither malicious nor unverified: they were never looked at, and checked
counts only the ones that were. Check it once per workspace, or pass the rest of
the tree, before calling the dependencies clean.
skipped is an object, not a list: it counts entries with no published registry
identity and says why they have none.
No lockfile handy? known_bad_lookup needs nothing but a hash:
known_bad_lookup with sha256 = e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
That is the hash of the empty file, so a miss is the expected answer. It proves the connection works.
You can also check the service without an MCP client at all:
curl -s https://lazaretto.dev/check --data-binary @package-lock.json
We keep no copy of your lockfile.
Free and metered
Free, no key, no account:
check_lockfileknown_bad_lookupfind_attestationverify_attestation
Free, hosted server only:
find_mcp_servers, which finds remote servers in the official MCP registry for a job ("postgres", "send slack messages"), each with its endpoint, tools, the command to add it, and our latest read (we re-read each server about every two weeks). Servers we flagged or could not reach are left out.get_free_key, which mints a developer key with a small daily allowance that refills each day. No payment, no account, no card. It is shown once, so store it. Throttled to one key per source per window.
Metered, needs credits on a key:
scan_artifact(one credit per artifact)scan_lockfile_deep(one credit per package that returns a verdict)scan_mcp_server(one credit)check_mcp_tools(one credit)
One credit is consumed per verdict and nothing on an error. Three ways to get credits:
- Free developer key: call
get_free_keyon the hosted server, orcurl -sX POST https://lazaretto.dev/v1/trialfor the stdio package. - Buy a pack at https://lazaretto.dev/buy.
- An agent holding a wallet can buy credits itself over x402 at
POST https://lazaretto.dev/v1/credits/topup.
Without credits a metered tool changes nothing and spends nothing. It returns a message saying how to get a key.
How payment works, exactly
The stdio package pays one way only: prepaid credits on LAZARETTO_API_KEY. It
has no x402 client inside it. A paywalled result from this package therefore
carries no x402 payment challenge for your agent to answer, and there is no way
to make it pay per call. If you want per-call x402 payment, your own HTTP
client has to make it against https://lazaretto.dev/v1/scan directly, not
through this package.
The hosted endpoint is the same: the X-API-Key header spends prepaid credits.
Tools
check_lockfile (free)
Checks every exactly pinned dependency in your lockfile against published
malicious-package advisories. One call covers the whole tree. Only exact
versions can be answered: a range like ^5.0.0 has no definitive answer,
because a compromised release usually sits between clean ones. Entries with no
published registry identity (file:, link:, workspace:, git) are counted
under skipped rather than dropped.
Give packages, a list of name@version strings, to ask about specific versions
instead. A result with anything under malicious comes back marked as an error, so
an agent acts on it rather than summarising it.
An empty malicious list is an all-clear only when unverified is also empty
and truncated is false. A truncated result dropped everything past the
per-request package limit into neither list, so those packages are unchecked
rather than clean: split the tree and check the rest.
known_bad_lookup (free)
Is a sha256 content hash a known-bad artifact? Exact-hash match against an indicator store refreshed daily.
find_attestation (free)
Has anyone already attested this artifact? Give a package identity like
chalk@5.6.1, an MCP server URL, or a sha256 content hash, and get the signed
verdict if one exists, with its age, whether it was made under an older rules
version, and contradicted if the subject is now known-bad. A miss means no
attestation is on record for this subject. It is not a verdict either way.
When nobody has attested an npm package identity, the answer falls back to a
free identity check against published advisories: answer: "identity_check"
with an identity_check object, and found still false, because an identity
check is unsigned, looks at the identity rather than the code, and absence from
the corpus is not a verdict. Both transports mark
identity_check.listed_as_malware: true as an error result, so a known-malware
version cannot be summarised as "nothing found".
verify_attestation (free)
A scan verdict ships with a signed attestation (compact JWS). Hand this tool one
that another agent, a README, or a lockfile gave you: it confirms the signature
is Lazaretto's, returns the attested claims, and flags contradicted if a
once-clear subject is now known-bad, so a verdict can be used without
re-scanning or paying again. Still confirm the artifact you will run matches
claims.sub.
get_free_key (free, hosted server only)
Mints a developer key for the metered tools without leaving the session. No
payment, no account, no card. The key holds a small daily allowance that refills
every day. Present it as the X-API-Key header on the connection, or hand it to
whoever configures the client. It is shown once and cannot be recovered, so store
it before doing anything else. Calling again shortly after is refused rather than
minting a second key. The stdio package has no such tool: use
curl -sX POST https://lazaretto.dev/v1/trial instead.
scan_artifact (metered)
Fetches a target (npm or PyPI package, GitHub repo, ClawHub skill, raw URL, or
inline text) without running it and returns a deterministic verdict
(malicious, flagged, clear, error) with the file, line and evidence
behind each finding.
scan_lockfile_deep (metered)
The behavioral counterpart to check_lockfile: reads the code of every exactly
pinned dependency, up to 25 per call, instead of matching names and versions
only. Trust complete_coverage. false means something was capped, errored or
was only partly read, so the run is not a clean bill of health for the tree.
Calling again with the same lockfile rescans, and bills again, the same first
packages. The result lists what it left in not_scanned.packages, as
name@version strings. To continue a run, pass those as packages instead of
the lockfile:
- Hosted server: pass the whole
not_scanned.packageslist back aspackages. It scans the first 25 and lists the rest innot_scanned.packagesagain. - stdio package:
packagestakes up to 25 per call, so work throughnot_scanned.packages25 at a time. The tool addsnext_callto the result, andnext_call.packagesholds the first 25 of that list.
check_mcp_tools (metered)
For a server that runs over stdio, which is most of them, nothing can connect to it from outside, so there is no endpoint to check. Your client already read its tool list at startup though: paste that JSON and we analyze the same text with the same rules, contacting no server at all.
scan_mcp_server (metered)
Point it at an MCP endpoint before you connect to it. It asks the server to
introduce itself and list its tools, then analyzes the text that server hands an
agent: tool names, descriptions, parameter schemas, and its instructions. That
text is documentation a model obeys, so it is an instruction channel the server
controls. Catches tool poisoning (hidden directives to read ~/.ssh/id_rsa or
an agent config file), parameters whose purpose is to carry secrets or your
conversation out, and standing orders about another server's tools. Evidence
names the exact tool. It calls only initialize and tools/list, never the
server's own tools.
Reading a result
Reports are signals with evidence, not a warranty. clear means no known-bad
match and no rule fired. It is not a statement about risk.
Environment variables (stdio only)
| Variable | Required | What it does |
|---|---|---|
LAZARETTO_API_KEY | no | A key holding prepaid credits, sent as X-API-Key. Only the metered tools use it. |
LAZARETTO_BASE_URL | no | Overrides the API host. Default https://lazaretto.dev. |
When it does not work
- The client shows no tools. For stdio, run
npx -y lazaretto-mcpin a terminal. It should print a short note saying it is an MCP server, then wait. If npx cannot find it, checknode --versionis 20 or newer. - Every metered tool says it needs credits. The key is missing or was not
accepted. Check the env var name is exactly
LAZARETTO_API_KEY, or the header is exactlyX-API-Key. check_lockfilesays it could not read a lockfile. It only readspackage-lock.json,npm-shrinkwrap.json,yarn.lockandpnpm-lock.yaml, relative to the working directory. Passpathexplicitly for a monorepo, for exampleapps/web/pnpm-lock.yaml.- A rate-limit message. The free check allows a small number per minute per IP. Wait and call it again. Do not read the failure as an all-clear.
Run it from a clone (optional)
git clone https://github.com/jamesdfinance-dev/lazaretto-mcp
cd lazaretto-mcp && npm ci
read -rs LAZARETTO_API_KEY && export LAZARETTO_API_KEY
node index.mjs
License
MIT. The Lazaretto service and its detection engine are separate and proprietary.