The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the GitHub Actions Audit listing page.
MCP server that audits
.github/workflows/*.ymlfiles for supply-chain risks. Catches script injection, leaked tokens, unpinned actions, broad permissions, andpull_request_targetfoot-guns — the patterns behind several 2024–2025 supply-chain incidents.
Built by Unbearable Labs. Pay-per-event — only billed when a tool is actually called.
Newsletter: Unbearable TechTips Weekly · All Actors: github.com/UnbearableDev
Point any MCP-capable client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, n8n, Make, Zapier, custom agents) at this server, hand it a workflow YAML, and get back structured findings with:
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
audit_workflow(workflow_yaml? | workflow_url?, min_severity='low') | Run all checks |
check_secrets(...) | Secret-leakage paths only |
check_permissions(...) | GITHUB_TOKEN scope issues only |
check_action_pinning(...) | Action version-pinning only |
check_runner_security(...) | Self-hosted runner + script injection |
check_workflow_config(...) | Timeout / config hygiene |
check_supply_chain_advanced(...) | TeamPCP-class supply-chain patterns (GHA-201..208) |
list_checks(category?) | Browse the catalog |
Provide exactly one of workflow_yaml (paste the content) or workflow_url (HTTPS URL — typically a GitHub raw URL to a specific workflow file).
| ID | Category | Severity | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| GHA-001 | secrets | high | Secret interpolated directly into run: script |
| GHA-002 | secrets | high | Secret printed via echo / set-output |
| GHA-003 | secrets | medium | Secret used in if: condition |
| GHA-004 | secrets | high | Hardcoded credential pattern in env: |
| GHA-010 | permissions | high | permissions: write-all granted |
| GHA-011 | permissions | medium | No top-level permissions: (inherits broad default) |
| GHA-013 | permissions | high | pull_request_target + checkout PR head = PWNing pattern |
| GHA-020 | action_pinning | high | Third-party action pinned to mutable tag |
| GHA-021 | action_pinning | high | Third-party action pinned to mutable branch |
| GHA-022 | action_pinning | medium | First-party action not SHA-pinned |
| GHA-030 | runner_security | medium | Self-hosted runner used on pull_request from forks |
| GHA-032 | runner_security | high | Script injection via untrusted github.event.* interpolation |
| GHA-040 | workflow_config | low | No timeout-minutes on job |
| GHA-201 | supply_chain_advanced | high | Action pinned to unpinned branch ref (TeamPCP-class: @main/@master) |
| GHA-202 | supply_chain_advanced | high | Action pinned to mutable tag — SHA pin recommended |
| GHA-203 | supply_chain_advanced | critical | pull_request_target + checkout of PR head SHA/ref (codecov/tj-actions exploitation path) |
| GHA-204 | supply_chain_advanced | high | Script injection via github.event.* user-controlled field in run: |
| GHA-205 | supply_chain_advanced | medium | Action from non-allowlisted owner (untrusted 3rd-party) |
| GHA-206 | supply_chain_advanced | high | Top-level permissions: write-all or contents: write without per-job scoping |
| GHA-207 | supply_chain_advanced | medium | Secret logged via echo / cat in run: block |
| GHA-208 | supply_chain_advanced | low | Action uses a known-retired tag |
| Event | USD |
|---|---|
| Any audit / check_* tool call | $0.02 |
list_checks discovery | $0.005 |
docker-compose-audit — docker-compose.yml security auditdockerfile-audit — Dockerfile security & qualityhu-postcode-validator — Hungarian postcode lookupSource: github.com/UnbearableDev/github-actions-audit.
Issues + ideas: unbearabledev@gmail.com.
📬 Built by Noel @ Unbearable Labs. More MCP servers + audit tips in the newsletter: https://unbearabletechtips.beehiiv.com