MissingMCP

The MCP servers exist. Connecting them shouldn't be complicated.

A multi-user, OAuth 2.1–protected gateway that hosts the connectors Claude is missing, so a small trusted circle can connect their own accounts from any Claude client (iOS, Android, Web, Desktop). The flagship connector is Garmin Connect: the gateway wraps the unmodified garmin_mcp worker and adds OAuth, per-user token isolation, and a reverse proxy. WHOOP is served the same way but in-process, on WHOOP's own official OAuth v2 API. The core is adapter-based and supports three forward strategies — worker (garmin), local (whoop, in-process, no subprocess), and remote (MCP + header injection, for services with a hosted MCP that lacks its own OAuth) — see Connectors. The reference deployment runs at missingmcp.com.

Claude → POST /garmin/mcp (Bearer) → Gateway → 127.0.0.1:<port>/mcp (per-user garmin_mcp) → connect.garmin.com

Why

garmin_mcp is a great MCP server, but it's single-user and stdio-only: each person has to run it locally with their own Garmin tokens. This gateway makes it a remote MCP server any Claude client can connect to over HTTP, with a proper OAuth sign-in flow — so non-technical users just click "connect" and log in with their Garmin credentials, and never touch a terminal or a token file.

Features

• OAuth 2.1 — Authorization Code + PKCE (S256) with Dynamic Client Registration. Connect from any Claude client; no manual token wrangling.
• Garmin password is never stored — used once to sign in (MFA supported); only the resulting session tokens are persisted.
• Encrypted at rest — tokens sealed with AES-256-GCM; the DB is useless without GATEWAY_SECRET. Bearer tokens are stored only as SHA-256 hashes.
• Per-user isolation — each account gets its own garmin_mcp worker bound to 127.0.0.1, started on demand and reaped when idle.
• Hardened — one-time 10-min auth codes, CSRF on forms, per-IP/-token rate limits, the garmin_mcp worker pinned to a reviewed commit.
• Off-box backups — periodic encrypted SQLite snapshots to an S3-compatible bucket (see Backups).
• Instructional landing page served on / and as a friendly fallback for unknown paths.

Deploy

Railway (how missingmcp.com runs): one service built from the Dockerfile, a volume mounted at /data, a single replica (the gateway keeps process-local state by design), and TLS terminated at the Railway edge. Set the env vars from Configuration on the service; pushes to main deploy automatically once the service is connected to the GitHub repo. An optional Railway bucket enables Backups (railway bucket create backups, then wire its credentials as the BACKUP_S3_* variables).

Self-hosted (plain Docker):

cp .env.example .env          # set GATEWAY_SECRET, PUBLIC_URL, pin GARMIN_MCP_REF
docker build -t missingmcp .
docker run -d --name missingmcp --restart unless-stopped --env-file .env \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 -v missingmcp-data:/data missingmcp

Put any TLS-terminating proxy in front (Caddy, nginx, Traefik). One non-obvious requirement: /​<adapter>/mcp streams SSE, so disable response buffering and raise the read timeout (nginx: proxy_buffering off; proxy_read_timeout 3600s;). Then add https://<your-domain>/garmin/mcp as a remote MCP server in Claude.

Local development

uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
uv run --extra dev pytest -q                 # run the test suite

# Run the gateway locally (no Garmin account needed to exercise the OAuth surface).
# garmin-mcp isn't on PATH locally, so point GARMIN_MCP_CMD at uvx.
GATEWAY_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 48)" \
PUBLIC_URL=http://localhost:8088 PORT=8088 DATA_DIR=./.localdata \
GARMIN_MCP_CMD="uvx --python 3.12 --from git+https://github.com/Taxuspt/garmin_mcp garmin-mcp" \
  uv run missingmcp

A .env file in the working directory is loaded automatically (real environment variables take precedence), so you can drop the same values there instead.

Connectors

Each connector is mounted under its own path prefix with its own OAuth flow and its own Bearer tokens (there is no bare /mcp). The landing page on / lists the available connectors.

Garmin — /garmin/mcp

Sign in with your Garmin Connect email + password (MFA supported). The password is used once for the Garmin login and discarded; only the resulting Garmin session tokens are stored (AES-256-GCM encrypted). Each account gets its own garmin_mcp worker process, bound to 127.0.0.1, started on demand and reaped when idle.

WHOOP — /whoop/mcp

Sign in on WHOOP's own OAuth page — the gateway never sees your WHOOP password, only the resulting (encrypted, read-only) tokens. Covers recovery, sleep, strain & daily cycles, workouts, and body measurements. Served in-process on WHOOP's official v2 API (no worker subprocess, no shared upstream). Requires the operator to register a WHOOP developer app — see WHOOP connector setup in Configuration.

Rohlík — no longer missing

The gateway briefly served a Rohlík connector (remote strategy: credential headers injected into the hosted Rohlík MCP). It was retired in 2026-07 when Rohlík shipped its own OAuth-protected MCP — add https://mcp.rohlik.cz/mcp directly as a custom connector in Claude and sign in in the browser (Rohlík's guide). The remote-forward strategy remains a first-class, tested part of the core (tests/test_remote_forward.py) for the next service that needs it.

Connecting from Claude

1. In any Claude client: Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector, or in the CLI: claude mcp add --transport http garmin https://<your-domain>/garmin/mcp (whoop: claude mcp add --transport http whoop https://<your-domain>/whoop/mcp).
2. Claude opens the gateway's sign-in page — enter the service's email + password (Garmin also prompts for an MFA code when needed), or for WHOOP, sign in on WHOOP's own OAuth page.
3. Done — the service's tools are now available in Claude.

Configuration

Set via environment (or .env). See .env.example.

WHOOP connector setup

1. Create an app at https://developer-dashboard.whoop.com (instant self-service).
2. Redirect URI: https://<your-domain>/whoop/oauth/callback — exact match required.
3. Scopes: read:recovery read:cycles read:workout read:sleep read:profile read:body_measurement offline (offline is required — without it WHOOP issues no refresh token and sessions die after an hour).
4. Put the app's Client ID/Secret into WHOOP_CLIENT_ID / WHOOP_CLIENT_SECRET.

Note: an unapproved WHOOP app is limited to 10 WHOOP members. To lift the limit, submit the app for approval: https://developer.whoop.com/docs/developing/app-approval/ (requirements: API Terms of Use compliance, tested with ≥1 member, accurate app name / contact email / privacy-policy URL in the dashboard, brand-guidelines compliance, and their Typeform submission).

Operating obligations under the WHOOP API Terms of Use (the gateway's design already covers the technical ones — no WHOOP data stored, encrypted tokens, auto-purge of revoked accounts):

• Report any security incident involving WHOOP member data to apisupport@whoop.com without undue delay, and to affected users.
• No press release or public announcement that references WHOOP without WHOOP's prior written approval.
• Keep the app's Client ID/Secret out of the repo (env vars only) and never reuse them for another application.
• When a member revokes the app at WHOOP, the gateway detects it on the next refresh (invalid_grant), deletes the stored tokens, and revokes the member's gateway access tokens (log event whoop-account-revoked).

Backups

When the BACKUP_S3_* variables are set, the gateway uploads a consistent SQLite snapshot (via the SQLite backup API, WAL-safe) to the bucket right after startup and then every BACKUP_INTERVAL_HOURS. Keys rotate by weekday (db/gateway-mon.db … db/gateway-sun.db), giving seven days of retention with no cleanup logic. Watch the backup-ok / backup-failed log events.

Only the DB is backed up — per-user token dirs under DATA_DIR/users/ are re-materialized from the DB on demand.

The backup is useless without GATEWAY_SECRET (account blobs stay AES-256-GCM encrypted inside it) — and that is the point. Keep a copy of GATEWAY_SECRET somewhere that is not the bucket and not Railway (e.g. your password manager). Losing the secret = losing every account.

Restore: download the newest object, put it at $DATA_DIR/gateway.db (delete any stale gateway.db-wal/-shm next to it), set the same GATEWAY_SECRET, start the gateway. Bearer tokens and logins survive; workers respawn lazily.

Monitoring

Three helper scripts work directly on the gateway's DB (safe to run while the gateway is live):

python scripts/status.py          # summary counts only (safe to paste/share)
python scripts/status.py --detail # + per-account devices (token prefixes),
                                  #   usage summary, OAuth clients, running workers
python scripts/revoke.py --list                       # accounts + token counts
python scripts/revoke.py --account [<adapter>:]<key>  # kill-switch: revoke ALL the
                                                      #   account's tokens (bare key = garmin)
python scripts/revoke.py --account <key> --purge      # + delete stored account & usage
python scripts/revoke.py --device <hash-prefix>       # revoke ONE device (prefix from status.py)
python scripts/usage.py                               # per-account tool usage + leaderboard
python scripts/usage.py --account [<adapter>:]<key>   # one account's per-tool breakdown
python scripts/subscribers.py                         # newsletter signups + suggestions
python scripts/subscribers.py --emails                # subscriber emails, one per line
python scripts/daily_report.py                        # yesterday's new/active/total users (print)
python scripts/daily_report.py --post                 # + POST it to Slack ($SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL)
python scripts/add_beer.py --email <supporter>        # record a "buy me a beer" donation (1 beer, 5 EUR)
python scripts/add_beer.py --email <supporter> --beers 3 --at 2026-07-20  # 3 beers, backdated

The gateway also posts this daily user-stats report to Slack on its own each morning (DAILY_REPORT_HOUR, default 08:00 DAILY_REPORT_TZ) when SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL is set; scripts/daily_report.py runs the same report on demand for testing.

Daily triage — a GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/daily-triage.yml) runs scripts/daily_triage.py every morning (~07:45 Prague): it pulls the last 24 h of error/warn rows from the gateway's Railway logs, classifies the known error signatures deterministically, and — only when something actionable remains — has Claude write the operator's triage (what happened → what it means → proposed action, per class) and posts it to Slack. Healthy days post a one-line "all quiet" (the daily heartbeat); if the analysis fails, the deterministic aggregate table posts instead — never silence. The analysis runs on the operator's Claude subscription via headless Claude Code (repo secret CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, minted with claude setup-token); an ANTHROPIC_API_KEY secret works as the fallback backend. Also needs RAILWAY_API_TOKEN + SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL (already present for the hourly pager). Run by hand with python scripts/daily_triage.py --dry-run (needs the RAILWAY_* env; the analysis step degrades gracefully without a token).

Hourly hard-signal pager — a GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/hourly-digest.yml) runs scripts/hourly_digest.py every hour: it reads the last 60 min of the gateway's Railway logs via the Railway API, does a liveness probe, and pages (<!here>) only on a hard signal — a failed probe (site down), worker-start-failed across ≥2 distinct accounts in the hour (the broken-image signature), any 5xx, or any critical. It is otherwise fully silent — plain error volume belongs to the daily triage. Requires repo secrets RAILWAY_API_TOKEN + SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL (service/environment ids are set as workflow env). RAILWAY_API_TOKEN may be a Railway project token (narrowest scope — reaches only this project; sent via the Project-Access-Token header) or an account/workspace token (sent as Authorization: Bearer); the script tries both. Run it by hand with python scripts/hourly_digest.py --dry-run (needs RAILWAY_API_TOKEN, RAILWAY_SERVICE_ID, RAILWAY_ENVIRONMENT_ID in the environment).

PostHog telemetry — with POSTHOG_API_KEY set (see the env table), the gateway also ships analytics to PostHog (EU cloud; design: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-20-posthog-telemetry-design.md): per-request $mcp_* events (PostHog's built-in MCP analytics), a lean connect-funnel/conversion event set, an OTLP tee of the structured log stream (PostHog Logs, beta — Railway stays the durable archive), and posthog-js on the site (UTM campaign attribution; autocapture disabled on OAuth pages). Egress rule: identity + metadata only — never MCP bodies, credentials, or form contents; the account email travels only as distinct_id. Everything is fire-and-forget: a PostHog outage never blocks a request. The Slack reports above keep running unchanged — PostHog complements them. When off-boarding a user (revoke.py --purge), also delete the person in PostHog (People → delete) to complete the GDPR path.

Beer supporters — scripts/add_beer.py records a "buy me a beer" donation (buymeacoffee.com/venik) into a local beers audit table and emits a beer_purchased PostHog event, best-effort attributed to the supporter's gateway account (matched when the email is a known login). The event is meant to feed the operator's connect→paying funnel and "beers this month" metric on the Growth dashboard — those PostHog insights are set up manually and don't exist until built. Ingestion is manual for now (BMC automation deferred; design: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-24-beer-supporters.md). Same egress rule as above — the email travels only as distinct_id, never the supporter name or note.

With Docker the scripts are baked into the image at /app/scripts; run them inside the container. status.py finds the DB under /data automatically:

docker exec missingmcp python /app/scripts/status.py
docker logs -f missingmcp                   # live structured-JSON events

On Railway run them over railway ssh; logs live in the Railway dashboard (railway logs --service gateway for a live tail):

railway ssh --service gateway "python3 /app/scripts/status.py"
railway ssh --service gateway "python3 /app/scripts/revoke.py --account <email>"

All logging is structured JSON on stdout (one event per line) with a proper level attribute — including uvicorn/stdlib records (event stdlib-log) and each worker's own output (event worker-log, with an account attribute; lines matching ERROR/Traceback are elevated to error severity). On Railway that makes everything searchable in the log explorer — filter e.g. @event:worker-log @account:<email> to trace one user's worker, or @level:error for problems. Request latency is recorded per call in the mcp-response event (ttfb_ms, total_ms, bytes, tool, account); login/verify and worker-spawn events carry ms durations. The gateway also logs a stats event (accounts / tokens / people-with-token / clients / active-workers) on startup and whenever those counts change, and status.py lists the running workers.

Automatic data hygiene

The gateway keeps its own DB tidy — no manual grooming needed. Alongside expiring old auth codes and access tokens, the background loop (roughly once a minute):

• sweeps abandoned OAuth clients — Claude registers a fresh client (DCR) on every connection attempt, and one that never completes the flow leaves a token-less client behind. Any client with zero access tokens older than one hour (comfortably above the 10-min code lifetime, so an in-progress sign-in is never touched) is removed. This is why status.py's OAuth-client count tracks the number of connected devices rather than growing with every failed attempt. Revoking a device also leaves its client token-less, so it's swept the same way.
• purges retired-adapter data — if a connector is ever dropped, all its rows (accounts, tokens, clients, codes, usage) are deleted across the board. The retired set is an explicit list in the code, never inferred from configuration, so a missing env var can't accidentally wipe a live connector.

Both are logged only when they actually delete something — cleanup-orphan-clients (count) and cleanup-dead-adapter (adapter + per-table counts) — so a quiet log means there was nothing to clean. The one-hour threshold is a fixed constant, not an env var, by design.

How it works

1. Claude registers a client (DCR) and starts OAuth 2.1 (Authorization Code + PKCE).
2. On the authorize page the user signs in with Garmin (email + password, + MFA if prompted). The gateway logs in via garminconnect, stores only the resulting tokens (encrypted), and discards the password.
3. Claude exchanges the code for a Bearer token.
4. On each /garmin/mcp call the gateway ensures the user's garmin_mcp worker is running (its own tokens, bound to 127.0.0.1) and reverse-proxies to it.

Adapters using the remote strategy replace steps 2 and 4 with a probe-verify against the upstream MCP and a direct header-injected forward — no worker.

Adapters using an upstream-OAuth login (whoop) replace step 2 with a redirect to the provider's own OAuth page; the provider calls back with tokens, which the gateway verifies and persists the same way (verify-then-persist is unchanged). Adapters using the local strategy (whoop) replace step 4: the request is handled in-process — no worker, no shared upstream — and the gateway refreshes the account's rotating WHOOP tokens itself as needed.

Security

• Garmin password is never persisted; WHOOP passwords are never even seen (sign-in happens on WHOOP's own OAuth page, read-only scopes).
• Tokens encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM); the DB is useless without GATEWAY_SECRET.
• A member revoking the app at WHOOP is detected on the next refresh and their stored tokens are purged automatically.
• Bearer tokens stored only as SHA-256 hashes.
• OAuth 2.1 PKCE (S256), one-time 10-min codes, CSRF on forms, per-IP/-token rate limits.
• Workers bind 127.0.0.1 only; garmin_mcp is pinned to a reviewed commit.

Deploy only on infrastructure you control and trust. Back up DATA_DIR; keep GATEWAY_SECRET separately.

Before you deploy

• Set a real random GATEWAY_SECRET (openssl rand -base64 48) — the app refuses to start with the placeholder from .env.example.
• Pin GARMIN_MCP_REF to a reviewed commit SHA — main is a floating ref that can change without notice (supply-chain).
• Revoking access — access tokens expire after ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS (default 90; the user just re-authenticates in Claude). To revoke sooner — a leaked token or a removed user — run python scripts/revoke.py --account [<adapter>:]<email> (kill-switch for all of that account's tokens). A single device can be revoked with --device <hash-prefix> (prefixes are shown by status.py).
• Run a manual end-to-end smoke test with a real Garmin account (including the MFA path) before connecting real users — the upstream is mocked in the automated tests.

Support

If this gateway is useful to you, you can buy me a beer 🍺.

License

MIT © 2026 Vaclav Slajs

Acknowledgements

Wraps the excellent garmin_mcp by Taxuspt, unmodified. Garmin and Garmin Connect are trademarks of Garmin Ltd.; this project is not affiliated with or endorsed by Garmin.