The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the Entraadm MCP listing page.
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MCP server for Microsoft Entra ID sign-in and audit-log triage. Read-only.
Microsoft ships an official MCP Server for Enterprise for Entra ID data. It is a good fit for an interactive admin at a keyboard, and is not a fit for an unattended triage bot:
az login) fallback for local development.GET/schema-discovery calls against Microsoft Graph. That is flexible for
a human, and awkward to put behind an allow-list for an automated triage
profile. entraadm-mcp exposes seven fixed, read-only tools instead.status/errorCode server-side, and has no built-in
password-spray view. signin_failure_stats aggregates client-side and
flags IPs with failed sign-ins against many distinct users — the pattern
Entra's per-account smart lockout does not catch on its own.| Tool | What it answers |
|---|---|
health_check | Is Graph reachable, and can this credential read sign-in logs? |
get_user | Is this account enabled, synced from on-prem, and what are its licenses? |
signin_logs | Why did this user's sign-in fail (or succeed), with the AADSTS code translated? |
signin_failure_stats | Tenant-wide failure aggregation: top error codes, users, apps, source IPs, and password-spray suspects |
directory_audits | Who changed what in the directory (block/unblock, attribute edits), and when? |
get_user_auth_methods | Is MFA actually registered for this account? |
daily_brief | One-call summary combining signin_failure_stats and directory_audits |
Every tool is read-only. Write operations (unblocking an account, resetting a password, revoking a session) are out of scope for this server.
Two auth modes, selected by which environment variables are set:
| Mode | When | Env vars |
|---|---|---|
| app-only | All three set | ENTRAADM_TENANT_ID, ENTRAADM_CLIENT_ID, ENTRAADM_CLIENT_SECRET |
| azure-cli | None set | (uses the current az login session) |
Setting one or two of the three app-only variables is a configuration error and the server refuses to start, rather than silently falling back to a different auth mode than intended.
| Tool(s) | Permission | Notes |
|---|---|---|
get_user (base fields) | User.Read.All | |
signin_logs, signin_failure_stats, directory_audits, get_user's sign_in_activity field | AuditLog.Read.All (app-only) or the Reports Reader directory role (delegated) | |
get_user_auth_methods | UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All | App-only only; not available under delegated (az login) auth in a typical tenant role assignment |
A missing permission never crashes a tool. It degrades that tool (or that
one field) to {"error": "...", "missing_permission": "..."} with a
human-readable explanation of what role or permission is needed, so
health_check and every other tool stay usable even before full permissions
are granted.
Set the three app-only variables for production/unattended use:
Or leave all three unset and run az login first for local development.
Optional:
Add to .mcp.json:
| Option | Effect |
|---|---|
--version | Print the version and exit |
--check | Resolve auth, probe Graph reachability and sign-in log access, print a report, exit 0 (or 1 on config error) |
capped boolean when its window was not fully scanned — a
partial scan is never reported as if it were exhaustive.found: false is not an error. get_user and get_user_auth_methods
answer a nonexistent account with {"found": false, ...}, not an error
key — a typo'd userPrincipalName should never look like this server being
broken.Read-only, no payloads printed (tool names/statuses/row counts only), and bounded (small explicit windows/page caps) — nothing here writes to the tenant or scans more than a day of logs.
This repository uses release-please
driven by Conventional Commits. Merge
a feat:/fix: PR to main, and release-please opens (or updates) a
release PR; merging that PR tags a release and triggers the publish pipeline
(PyPI, MCP Registry).
MIT