The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the Cork listing page.
MCP server for Cork's cyber-insurance API for MSPs - clients and their warranty/coverage status, Cork Cyber Score history, risk & compliance events, software vulnerabilities (CVE/CVSS/EPSS/KEV), connected integrations, invoices, distributor partners, and software-installer metadata - for AI assistants and the WYRE Conduit gateway.
Cork authenticates with a static Bearer API key, generated in Cork's Admin UI (Settings -> API). Cork's OpenAPI spec also documents an OAuth2 flow for their own remote MCP server, but the underlying credential is the same API key - this connector never performs an OAuth dance, it only ever holds a live bearer key, sent as Authorization: Bearer <key> to Cork's API. In gateway mode the key arrives per-request via the X-Cork-Api-Key header; in local/stdio mode it's read once from CORK_API_KEY.
| Env var | Description |
|---|---|
CORK_API_KEY | Bearer API key issued by Cork's Admin UI. |
MCP_TRANSPORT | stdio (default) or http. |
AUTH_MODE | env (default, reads the var above) or gateway (credential arrives per-request via the X-Cork-Api-Key header, injected by the Conduit gateway). |
CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET | When set, the HTTP transport requires a valid X-Gateway-S2S header (Conduit sidecar auth) on every /mcp request. |
LOG_LEVEL | debug | info (default) | warn | error. |
cork_get_clients - list clients with warranty status, integration tenants, and recent Cork Cyber Scores.cork_get_client_devices - list devices observed for a client across all connected integrations.cork_get_client_domains - list email domains observed for a client.cork_get_client_inboxes - list email inboxes observed for a client.cork_get_client_score_history - list a client's full Cork Cyber Score history, newest first.cork_get_compliance_events - list policy violations and risk events detected for a client's assets.cork_get_compliance_notification_settings - list notification/alerting rules for compliance events.cork_get_compliance_event_types - list all compliance event types with descriptions and cure periods.cork_get_software_vulnerabilities - list individual CVEs with CVSS/EPSS/KEV details.cork_get_software_vulnerability_summary - get a rollup of CVEs grouped by software product.cork_get_available_integrations - list integration types that can be connected to Cork.cork_get_connected_integrations - list integrations connected to Cork.cork_get_integration_devices - list devices observed from an integration.cork_get_integration_tenants - list customer tenants observed from an integration.cork_get_integration_users - list users observed from an integration.cork_get_warranties - list active cyber warranty packages.cork_get_invoices - list billing invoices.cork_get_invoice_line_items - list billed line items for an invoice.cork_get_partners - list partner sub-accounts managed by this distributor.cork_get_installer_history - list past software install attempts.cork_get_software_packages - list software packages available to install.cork_get_installer_setup - get one-time RMM setup instructions for software installs.cork_who_am_i - get information on the authenticated user.This is a deliberately narrow, read-only, non-credential-exposing v1 surface, hard-scoped to exactly 23 of Cork's 31 operations (29 documented paths). Every tool is classified isAdmin: true in the Conduit gateway given the sensitivity of insurance/risk/compliance data. Roughly a third of Cork's full API is write- or secret-exposing; none of it is implemented here, by design, not by oversight:
Hard-excluded (credential-exposing) - never implemented:
GET /integrations/{uuid}/credentials (get-integration-credentials) - returns the integration's raw stored third-party secrets (credentials: {...}).Hard-excluded (bulk raw-data exfiltration, excluded out of caution alongside credentials):
GET /integrations/{uuid}/raw-data (get-integration-raw-data) - returns a presigned download URL (10-minute expiry) to a client's full raw synced integration data. Not a credential return, but a bulk-data-exfiltration vector gated by "requires distributor privileges" in Cork's own spec. Flagged explicitly for review in the wiring PR rather than silently included.Hard-excluded (provisioning/mutation) - never implemented:
POST /distributor/partners (provision-partner) - provisions a new Partner account.POST /integrations (connect-integration) - connects a new integration and immediately begins syncing data.PATCH /integrations/{uuid} (update-integration) - updates an integration's name and/or credentials.DELETE /integrations/{uuid} (delete-integration) - deletes an integration.POST /integrations/{uuid}/resync (resync-integration) - manually triggers a data refresh.POST /software/installer/install (install-software) - dispatches a real software install to a real managed endpoint through the client's RMM. A genuine remote-software-provisioning action.They can be added as a follow-up if there's demand, after a deliberate scope decision - not by default.
This connector's own code is read-only by construction — the underlying API key is not. Cork's own documentation states API key permissions are linked to the user who creates them; no read-only or restricted-scope key type is documented. Two separate claims, kept at different confidence levels:
client.ts calls one of the 23 documented read operations above — no wildcard/passthrough call anywhere in src/.Do not read this connector, or this README, as having established the underlying API key is itself restricted — only that this connector's own code never attempts anything beyond its 23 read operations.