Compliance evidence from AIops audit trails: HIPAA/PCI/SOC2/GDPR, hash-chain-sealed, 15 tools.
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Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by any framework body or GRC vendor. HIPAA, PCI-DSS, SOC 2, GDPR and OSCAL are referenced descriptively; the frameworks and trademarks belong to their owners. MIT licensed.
Governed compliance-evidence tooling for AI-agent infrastructure ops. It
reads the audit trails your governed AIops agents already write โ the local
~/.<tool>-aiops/audit.db SQLite trails, all sharing one audit_log schema โ
and turns that activity into framework-mapped, hash-chain-sealed compliance
evidence. It never scans your infrastructure and never replaces a GRC
platform: it converts the trails you already produce into auditor-ready,
tamper-evident evidence bundles.
Unlike the other tools in the AIops-tools line it is not a platform wrapper: no external API, no network, no platform credentials. Its only inputs are those on-disk audit databases, read read-only. That also makes it the easiest-to-self-test tool in the line โ fully offline and deterministic.
Evidence, not certification. Fully offline; the source
audit.dbfiles remain the system of record. OSCAL export is a documented v0.2 roadmap item (v0.1 emits JSON + Markdown + CSV shaped to ease a future OSCAL Assessment-Results adapter).
strong or partial.
gap_analysis says so per control, with the caveat and a remediation hint.hash = SHA-256(prev_hash โ canonical_json(record)), genesis prev = 64
zeros). The chainHead is reproducible for the same (framework, period,
sources). verify_bundle catches tampering; verify_source_chain detects
row-id gaps / deletions in a source trail. An optional HMAC signature seals a
bundle under a stored signing key.~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/.AuditEngine, a golden reproducible chainHead is
asserted, and tamper tests confirm detection. No live infrastructure needed.It reads your audit trails and writes evidence bundles โ and records every
operation. It does not decide whether producing or signing a bundle is
allowed: that is the agent's judgement, or the filesystem permissions of the
account it runs as. The source audit.db files are opened strictly read-only
regardless, and the only thing ever written is a bundle under
~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/.
So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure.
The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over
MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in
~/.compliance-aiops/audit.db.
Each tool declares a
risk_level, kept in agreement with its[READ]/[WRITE]documentation tag by a test, and carried into the audit row as a descriptive tier โ so a reviewer can see at a glance what a row was. It is a label, not a gate.
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
list_audit_sources | Discovered sibling audit DBs (path, tool, readable, row count) |
query_audit_events | Cross-tool event query โ filter by tool/skill/status/risk/approved/selector/since/until |
activity_timeline | Event counts bucketed by hour or day |
list_frameworks | Supported frameworks + control counts |
coverage_summary | Per-control covered/weak/uncovered for ONE framework |
control_evidence | Evidence rows + population + a reproducible query for ONE control |
gap_analysis | Controls with no/weak evidence + honest caveat + remediation |
approval_report | High-risk write ops + who approved + rationale (the CC8.1 / PCI 7-8 / HIPAA ยง312(a) artifact) |
exceptions_report | Denied / error / budget_exceeded ops โ enforcement + anomaly evidence |
verify_source_chain | Chain head + row-id gap detection for one source |
verify_bundle | Verify a sealed bundle: chain + seal head + optional signature |
list_bundles | Bundles under ~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/ |
oscal_assessment_results | A sealed bundle as a NIST OSCAL 1.2.3 Assessment Results document, inline, with its limitations named |
bundle_schedule_hint | Ready-to-paste cron line + non-interactive command for periodic sealing (writes nothing) |
| Tool | Risk | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
generate_evidence_bundle | low | One call: coverage + approval trail + exceptions + sealed records โ a bundle .json |
export_bundle | low | Render a bundle to markdown / csv / json / oscal |
sign_bundle | medium | HMAC over the seal using the stored signing key |
The CLI exposes a convenience subset; the full 19-tool surface is available over MCP.
| Framework | Sample controls (strength) |
|---|---|
| HIPAA (ยง164.312) | 164.312(b) Audit controls (strong), 164.312(a)(1) Access control (strong), 164.312(c)(1) Integrity (strong) |
| PCI-DSS v4.0 | 10.2 Audit log content (strong), 10.3 Protect audit logs (strong), 7-8 Least privilege / authn (partial) |
| SOC 2 TSC | CC6.1 Logical access (strong), CC7.2 Monitoring (strong), CC8.1 Change management (strong) |
| GDPR | Art.30 Records of processing (partial), Art.32 Security of processing (strong) |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (Annex A) | A.5.15 Access control (strong), A.5.16 Identity mgmt (strong), A.5.18 Access rights (partial), A.8.2 Privileged access (partial), A.8.15 Logging (strong), A.8.16 Monitoring (strong), A.8.32 Change management (strong) |
| ็ญไฟ2.0 (DJCP L3) (GB/T 22239-2019 ไธ็บง) | 8.1.5.4 ๅฎๅ จๅฎก่ฎก (strong), 8.1.4.2 ่ฎฟ้ฎๆงๅถ (partial), 8.1.5 ๅฎๅ จ็ฎก็ไธญๅฟ/้ไธญๅฎก่ฎก (strong) |
Run as an MCP server (stdio):
Evidence bundles are most useful when sealed on a cadence (e.g. weekly), so
each period has a tamper-evident anchor. This tool ships no daemon โ instead
bundle schedule prints a ready-to-paste cron line plus the exact non-interactive
command, and writes nothing:
It returns a cronLine you paste into crontab -e, for example:
--period (also available on bundle generate) is a convenience relative
window โ 7d, 24h, 2w, or last-7-days โ resolved to a since/until pair
ending "now", so each scheduled run seals the trailing window.COMPLIANCE_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD in the cron job's environment so a
stored signing key unlocks non-interactively. Do not inline the real
password in the crontab file โ reference it from a protected env file.audit.db files remain the system of record โ record the chainHead
out-of-band if you need an independent anchor.strong / partial label and
gap_analysis surfaces the caveat rather than overclaiming.audit_log trails written by
governed AIops tools discovered via ~/.*-aiops/audit.db.docs/VERIFICATION.md for the reproducible run.Want another framework, control mapping, export format (OSCAL, CSV shape), or a verification you don't see here? Open an issue or a PR โ contributions welcome.
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