A side-by-side look at the AtlaSent MCP Server and Emilia Protocol MCP servers: transport, auth, tools, quality signals, and the config to install either one in Claude, Cursor, Windsurf or VS Code.
Verdict: choose AtlaSent MCP Server for security work as a local process; choose Emilia Protocol for security as a local process. You can also run both side by side in one mcpServers block.
ATLASENT_MODE, ATLASENT_API_KEY, ATLASENT_BASE_URL.evaluate, verify_permit, deploy_service.ep_guard_action, ep_check_signoff, ep_verify_receipt.Rows where the two servers differ are marked.
| Spec | ||
|---|---|---|
| Category | Security | Security |
| Quality signal | 63/100 · Good | 71/100 · Great |
| Install command | Confirmed | Confirmed |
| Transport | Local subprocess (stdio) | Local subprocess (stdio) |
| Auth | Not declared | No auth required |
| Pricing | Freemium | Free |
| Required env vars | ATLASENT_MODEATLASENT_API_KEYATLASENT_BASE_URL | None listed |
| Verified owner | Community listing | Community listing |
| GitHub stars | 0 | 611 |
| Directory activity | 1 views 0 installs 0 upvotes | 6 views 0 installs 0 upvotes |
| Tools | 20 | 3 |
| Full listing | View AtlaSent MCP Server | View Emilia Protocol |
evaluateCall this BEFORE performing any sensitive action. Returns a Decision: `allow` (verify the returned permit_token at the execution boundary before proceeding), `deny` (you MUST NOT proceed), or `hold` (do not proceed; route for review).verify_permitCall this AFTER `evaluate` returns allow and BEFORE the protected native side effect. It verifies the permit for the presented execution context. Proceed only when `valid` is true; expired, invalid, replayed, mismatched, or error outcomes must block the action.deploy_serviceExample protected tool. Every call is authorized AND its Permit is verified by AtlaSent before the deploy runs. Denied, held, expired, replayed, mismatched, or unverifiable calls are blocked and never touch the target system.atlasent_evaluateEvaluate an action against your published AtlaSent policies. Returns allow/deny/hold/escalate with a permitToken on allow. Use this when ATLASENT_MODE=remote and you need to gate an action against your hosted policy engine. For agent.* actions the result may carry bound_payload_hash and bound_actor_id: pass them to verify_permit as payload_hash and actor_id, since the permit is bound to them.atlasent_list_policiesList all constraint bundles / policies for this organization.atlasent_list_audit_eventsRetrieve recent evaluation events from the audit log.atlasent_explain_authorityExplain why a principal currently has (or lacks) authority for a scope. Answers 'why may principal P exercise scope/action A in organization O right now?' — strictly read-only, does not change /v1-evaluate, /v1-verify-permit, or any deny/hold/allow semantics; it explains the same facts those paths already read. Every matched authority mechanism (direct_grant, delegation, role_capability) is reported as its own path entry; every excluded or ambiguous relationship is reported as its own unresolved finding.atlasent_integrity_auditAudit the organization's authority graph for internal inconsistency and return the report verbatim. Strictly read-only; changes no policy, permit, or decision. THIS IS NOT A PASS/FAIL HEALTH CHECK and the tool synthesizes no verdict of its own. Each finding carries a three-way `classification`: `defect` is a genuine inconsistency; `non_exercisable` is frequently the CORRECT, healthy state (e.g. an expired grant that is supposed to be expired) and must not be read as a failure; `unresolved` means the proposition COULD NOT BE VERIFIED and must never be treated as clean. Read `summary.audited_scope` before drawing any conclusion from an empty findings list — a short decision window is not an absence of findings. If the audit cannot complete, the server refuses rather than returning a partial report, and this tool surfaces that as an error — never an empty report.atlasent_list_permitsList issued permit tokens for audit and monitoring.atlasent_await_approvalWait for a person to approve or reject a held action in the AtlaSent console. Use the approval_request_id from a 'hold' result. This tool cannot approve anything; it only waits. If approved, it returns a permit_token that you MUST verify with verify_permit before running the action. Any other outcome (rejected, expired, timed out) means the action must not run.atlasent_lookup_actionLook up canonical action specifications from the Authorization Intelligence Library. Returns the permanent canon_id, gate flags (requires_human_approval, requires_mfa, requires_verified_actor, requires_state_snapshot), authorization pattern, risk posture, AI risk classification, regulatory mappings, evidence requirements, and the action's knowledge-graph relationships (what it requires and produces, and which frameworks / control objectives it satisfies) for every governed action type in the Canon. Use `slug` for an exact match (e.g. 'production.deploy') or `query` to describe what you want to do in plain language (e.g. 'deploy the api service to prod', 'grant admin access', 'close the books'). `query` is ranked offline against the vendored Canon and returns a `retrieval` block with `confidence` = confident | ambiguous | none — act only on `confident`; the tool never invents an action type, and a `none` result means the Canon has no such action (see the hint). Omit both to list the full Canon.atlasent_atlas_lookupLook up a canonical AtlaSent concept from the Knowledge Atlas — the compiled graph of the system's own vocabulary (Caller, Authority, Policy, Decision, Permit, Verification, Evidence, Audit Chain, Gate, Trust Root, ...). Returns the concept's canonical definition (its source-of-truth doc), its relationships (what it depends on and what depends on it), the surfaces that realize it, and its ADR / API / SDK / implementation anchors — so every AI host reasons from the same canonical knowledge instead of guessing. Use `id` for an exact concept id (e.g. 'permit', 'audit-chain', 'gate') or `query` for a case-insensitive substring search across id, term, and definition. Omit both to list every concept.ep_guard_actionRequest authorization before an irreversible action: payments, wire transfers, fund releases, deletions, record or account changes, or sending messages with real-world effect. Submits the exact action for policy evaluation and human authorization. This MCP tool does not itself sit at the executor choke point: even after approval, the executor MUST match the returned action_hash and atomically consume the receipt before effect. If BLOCKED, poll ep_check_signoff with the receipt_id.ep_check_signoffPoll a pending authorization after ep_guard_action returns BLOCKED. Pass the receipt_id. Returns PENDING, APPROVED_PENDING_CONSUME, CONSUMED, or DENIED. Approval alone is not permission to execute: the executor must match action_hash and atomically consume the receipt at its own choke point.ep_verify_receiptAsk the configured EMILIA service to verify a stored trust receipt and report its hash and anchor status. Read-only, but not an offline verifier: the result is the service response for the supplied receipt_id.Paste either block (or both) into your client config, e.g. claude_desktop_config.json or ~/.cursor/mcp.json. We only show a config when the install command is confirmed.
{
"mcpServers": {
"atlasent-mcp-server": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@atlasent/mcp-server"
],
"env": {
"ATLASENT_MODE": "YOUR_ATLASENT_MODE_HERE",
"ATLASENT_API_KEY": "YOUR_ATLASENT_API_KEY_HERE",
"ATLASENT_BASE_URL": "YOUR_ATLASENT_BASE_URL_HERE"
}
}
}
}
{
"mcpServers": {
"emiliaprotocol-emilia-protocol": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@emilia-protocol/mcp-server"
]
}
}
}