The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the Arthor Agent listing page.
Anime cyber kitsune sentinel for the DocSentinel console and documentation.
DocSentinel AI-powered SSDLC platform — Secure your software from requirements to operations
What is DocSentinel?
DocSentinel is an AI-powered SSDLC (Secure Software Development Lifecycle) platform for security teams. It automates security activities across all six phases of the software development lifecycle using intelligent AI agents orchestrated by LangGraph and powered by LangChain. It automates the review of security-related documents, forms, and reports — from requirements and design through development, testing, deployment, and operations — comparing inputs against your policy and knowledge base to produce structured assessment reports with risks, compliance gaps, and remediation suggestions.
Instead of only reviewing documents at the pre-release stage, DocSentinel embeds security from day one:
Built as a React console + FastAPI service + MCP/A2A agent gateway,
DocSentinel integrates into local security review workflows, CI/CD pipelines,
AI agents, and multi-agent platforms without giving external agents approval
authority.
LangGraph orchestration: Stateful, graph-based agent workflows with conditional branching per SSDLC stage.
Multi-format input: PDF, Word, Excel, PPT, text — parsed into a unified format for the LLM.
Knowledge base (RAG): Upload policy and compliance documents; the agent uses them as reference when assessing.
Multiple LLMs: Use OpenAI, Claude, Qwen, or Ollama (local) via a single interface.
Structured output: JSON/Markdown reports with risk items, compliance gaps, and actionable remediations.
Ideal for enterprises that need to scale security assessments across many projects and SSDLC stages without proportionally scaling headcount.
Product Tour
The local React console brings the main workflow into one operational surface:
Command Center: live API and LLM status, assessment throughput, review
demand, remediation queues, and recent activity.
Assessment Workbench: upload project documents, choose SSDLC phase/skill,
inspect AI-generated risks, and complete human review.
Governance Portal: create projects, apply public framework overlays,
generate controls, submit evidence, and track Pallas Lens readiness.
Knowledge Base: ingest policies and standards for RAG-backed review.
Agent Integrations: expose governed MCP and A2A tools to coding agents and
multi-agent platforms without granting approval authority.
Settings: switch providers such as DeepSeek, OpenAI, Anthropic, Qwen, or
Ollama; API keys are accepted locally and only shown as masked previews.
Why DocSentinel?
Pain Point
DocSentinel Solution
Fragmented SSDLC coverage Most tools only address testing/deployment.
Full lifecycle agents cover all 6 SSDLC phases with dedicated AI personas.
Fragmented criteria Policies, standards, and precedents are scattered.
Single knowledge base ensures consistent findings and traceability.
No automated threat modeling Threat models are created ad-hoc.
Design Agent generates STRIDE/DREAD threat models from architecture docs.
Heavy questionnaire workflow Endless review cycles.
Automated first-pass and gap analysis reduces manual back-and-forth rounds.
SAST/DAST report overload Too many findings, too little context.
Testing Agent triages, prioritizes, and maps findings to threat models.
Pre-release review pressure Everything lands on security at the end.
Shift-left approach catches issues early in requirements and design. Structured reports help reviewers focus on decision-making.
Scale vs. consistency Manual reviews vary by reviewer.
LangGraph workflows and unified pipeline ensure consistent, auditable assessment across projects.
SSDLC coverage gaps Security involvement is uneven across lifecycle stages; early stages get less scrutiny.
Stage-aware assessment covers all 6 SSDLC stages with dedicated skills and checklists.
See the full problem statement and SSDLC phase details in SPEC.md.
Architecture
DocSentinel is a React Console + FastAPI application with three governed
entry paths: REST APIs for the console and CI, MCP tools for coding agents, and
A2A JSON-RPC for remote agent delegation. These entry paths converge on the
same AssessmentService, LangGraph assessment pipeline, knowledge base, and
human-review lifecycle. Governance workflows from PallasGuard are now a
first-class domain beside assessment, backed by SQLModel records, policy packs,
control evidence, audit trails, and Pallas Lens readiness scoring.
server.ts
flowchart TB
subgraph Access["Users and Agent Access"]
direction LR
Staff["Security staff"]
Console["React Console<br/>(Vite + Tailwind)"]
RESTClient["REST / CI clients"]
AgentClient["MCP / A2A clients"]
end
subgraph Runtime["FastAPI Runtime"]
direction LR
Security["Security boundary<br/>CORS, rate limit, JWT/RBAC,<br/>gateway token or loopback"]
REST["REST API routers<br/>assessments, KB, skills,<br/>settings, governance"]
Gateway["Agent Gateway<br/>MCP tools + A2A JSON-RPC"]
Tasks["AssessmentService<br/>async tasks, activity log,<br/>human review queue"]
end
subgraph Pipeline["Assessment Pipeline"]
direction LR
Parse["Parse + guardrails<br/>Docling or legacy"]
Graph["LangGraph workflow<br/>skill, isolated document data,<br/>policy/history/evidence context"]
Review["LLM draft + review<br/>via LangChain"]
Validate["Schema validation<br/>+ S2O rule checks"]
Report["Structured report<br/>risks, gaps, remediations"]
end
subgraph Governance["Governance / Pallas Domain"]
direction LR
Projects["Projects + framework selection"]
Controls["Control generator<br/>questionnaires + applicability"]
Evidence["Gate submissions<br/>evidence + audit logs"]
Lens["Pallas Lens<br/>readiness + exports"]
end
subgraph Support["Shared Support Services"]
direction LR
KB["KnowledgeBaseService<br/>Chroma + LightRAG + history"]
Policies["Policy packs + overlays<br/>schema service + S2O ontology"]
LLMFactory["LLM factory<br/>settings + llm_config.json<br/>base_url SSRF guard"]
Providers["OpenAI, Anthropic, Qwen,<br/>DeepSeek, Ollama, local OpenAI"]
DB["SQLModel DB<br/>SQLite or Postgres"]
end
Staff --> Console
Console --> Security
RESTClient --> Security
AgentClient --> Security
Security --> REST
Security --> Gateway
REST --> Tasks
Gateway --> Tasks
REST --> Projects
REST --> KB
Tasks --> Parse --> Graph --> Review --> Validate --> Report
Report --> Tasks
Report -->|project_id present| Evidence
Projects --> Controls --> Evidence --> Lens
Graph --> KB
Graph --> Policies
Review --> LLMFactory --> Providers
Validate --> Policies
Policies --> Controls
Projects --> DB
Controls --> DB
Evidence --> DB
Data flow (simplified):
Security staff work in the React console; REST clients call /api/v1/*;
coding agents call MCP or A2A through the agent gateway.
REST write paths use JWT/RBAC dependencies. Agent protocols use a bearer
gateway token or loopback-only development access. LLM-costly POST paths are
rate limited by IP or bearer token.
Assessment submissions enter AssessmentService, which creates an async
task, parses uploaded or approved local documents, applies guardrails, and
invokes the LangGraph assessment pipeline.
The LangGraph pipeline loads the selected skill, wraps untrusted document
content as data, retrieves policy/history/evidence context from the KB, asks
the LLM for draft/review text, and converts the result into the structured
assessment schema.
Deterministic services remain authoritative for governance decisions:
policy-pack schemas, the S2O rule engine, control applicability, and schema
validation cross-check LLM output before it enters the review queue.
When an assessment is linked to a project, findings are persisted as Gate 3
control evidence. Governance workflows then use the same SQLModel store for
projects, controls, submissions, audit logs, Pallas Lens scoring, and exports.
The KB persists chunks in Chroma, optional graph artifacts in LightRAG, and
prior assessment history for reuse. Runtime LLM settings are loaded from
.env plus llm_config.json, and every provider base URL is checked by the
network guard before client construction.
Six dedicated AI agents, each with phase-specific skills, prompts, and knowledge base collections. Run individual phases or a full end-to-end SSDLC assessment:
Submit security questionnaires, design documents, or audit reports. DocSentinel analyzes them using configured LLMs and identifies:
Security Risks: Classified by severity (Critical, High, Medium, Low).
Compliance Gaps: Missing controls against frameworks like ISO 27001, PCI DSS.
Remediation Steps: Actionable advice to fix identified issues.
Governance & Compliance Workflows
PallasGuard governance capabilities are merged into DocSentinel as first-class
project workflows:
Policy packs: generic-ssdlc plus eight public overlays for NIST SSDF,
MAS TRM, ISO 27001:2022, EU AI Act, ISO 42001, China MLPS 2.0, OWASP SAMM,
and EU CRA.
Gate workflows: Gate 1/3 questionnaire, submission, approval, audit, and
evidence tracking flows backed by SQLModel and Alembic migrations.
Control generation: Framework overlays generate applicable SCD controls
and expected evidence without replacing DocSentinel's existing assessment
engine.
Pallas Lens: Project readiness scoring summarizes control coverage,
evidence depth, and next actions in the React governance portal.
Intelligent Agent Orchestration (LangGraph)
Structured workflows: LangGraph nodes separate context collection, drafting,
evidence review, schema conversion, and governance persistence
Cross-phase traceability: Threats from Design link to test cases in Testing and monitoring rules in Operations
Conditional routing: Agents activate based on project risk level, compliance requirements, or user selection
Human-in-the-loop: Agent-created assessments enter a review queue and cannot
approve themselves
Planned hardening: Explicit plan gates, durable LangGraph checkpoints, and
resumable execution are tracked in the development roadmap below
Threat Evidence Critic
Design-phase STRIDE threats are independently checked against the currently
uploaded architecture documents in one inference-time pass:
Every threat receives a supported, contradicted, or
insufficient_evidence verdict with a support score and reviewer-facing
rationale.
Evidence references use content hashes plus stable line locators and include
the exact source excerpt shown in the Assessment Workbench.
Only current-project document passages are accepted. Invented, missing, policy,
or historical references cannot make a threat appear supported.
Verification failures safely abstain as insufficient_evidence; all verdicts
still require human review.
No training or fine-tuning pipeline is required. The critic uses the configured
OpenAI, Anthropic, Qwen, DeepSeek, compatible, or local runtime model.
Upload your organization's security policies, standards, and past audits. Phase-specific collections ensure each agent retrieves the most relevant context:
Powered by LangChain + LangGraph — stateful, graph-based agent workflows with conditional routing per SSDLC stage. Parallel execution of Policy and Evidence agents, followed by Drafter and Reviewer agents.
API-First, MCP & A2A Ready
Use the local React console for human review, integrate CI/CD pipelines through the
REST API, or expose the same assessment capabilities to AI agents (Claude Desktop,
Cursor, OpenClaw) through MCP. A2A-compatible platforms can delegate assessment
tasks to DocSentinel as a specialist security agent.
Reproducible Evaluation Harness
DocSentinel includes an evals/ harness for measuring assessment quality against
public and future golden datasets without going through HTTP or the UI. The first
implemented path covers OWASP Benchmark v1.2 SAST triage:
Dataset hygiene: raw benchmark data is fetched locally into ignored paths;
only the fetch script, checksum, manifest, and tiny test fixture are committed.
Direct pipeline execution: the runner calls AssessmentService.submit()
with phase="testing" and skill_id="ssdlc-testing", matching production task
semantics while staying self-contained.
Hard-key scoring: M1 scores CWE-based binary triage with accuracy,
precision, recall, F1, and false-positive rate, with no LLM judge.
Threat grounding scoring: the Evidence Critic scorer measures verdict
accuracy, supported precision/recall/F1, contradiction recall, abstention rate,
citation validity, and the full verdict confusion matrix.
Scorecards: every run writes machine-readable scorecard.json and a
human-readable scorecard.md under evals/reports/<run_id>/.
This roadmap turns the project's agent-safety principles into implementation
work that can be delivered and reviewed incrementally. It is informed by
Microsoft Learn's
Designing Agent Architecture and SDLC Integration
module and follows one governing rule: agents propose; deterministic policy
and authorized humans accept.
The target control flow is:
text
Task contract -> Visible plan -> Bounded execution -> Objective evaluation
-> Human/policy approval -> Published result
Status legend: [x] implemented baseline, [ ] planned work. Priorities indicate
delivery order rather than release dates.
Current Baseline
Phase-specific SSDLC skills and a shared assessment pipeline for REST,
MCP, and A2A entry points.
Human review is mandatory for agent-gateway submissions; external agents
cannot approve their own work.
Structured reports with citations, document hashes, confidence, threat
evidence verification, and remediation tracking.
Reproducible evaluation harness with OWASP triage and threat-grounding
scorecards.
M0 — Repository Governance (P0)
Goal: make the pull request the enforceable control point for human and
agent-generated changes.
Add CODEOWNERS for security-sensitive paths, including
.github/workflows/, app/core/, app/agent_gateway/, migrations,
deployment files, and policy packs.
Expand the pull request template with required Goal, Scope, Plan, Success
Criteria, Risk/Mitigations, Evidence, and Rollback/Escalation sections.
Add a required Plan Gate workflow that validates meaningful PR fields and
classifies changes as low, medium, high, or critical risk.
Configure the main ruleset to require pull requests, passing CI and Plan
Gate checks, resolved conversations, and CODEOWNERS approval for sensitive
changes.
Upload test, coverage, contract, and evaluation outputs as durable GitHub
Actions artifacts named with the workflow run ID and commit SHA.
Exit criteria: a planless change or an unreviewed sensitive-path change cannot
be merged into main.
M1 — Task Contract and Plan–Act–Evaluate Graph (P1)
Goal: make agent intent, authority, outputs, and success conditions inspectable
before effects occur.
Persist the task contract and expose it through the assessment API and
review console.
Add an explicit read-only planning node and immutable PlanArtifact to the
assessment graph.
Implement a risk policy: low-risk tasks may use plan + execution in one
review; workflow, authentication, infrastructure, and production-impacting
tasks require plan-first approval.
Separate evaluation from generation so schema validation, evidence
grounding, deterministic rules, and evaluation thresholds remain independent
of the drafting agent.
Add transition and authorization tests proving that agents cannot skip the
plan/evaluation stages or approve their own output.
Exit criteria: every assessment can answer what was requested, what the agent
was allowed to do, what plan it followed, and which signals determined success.
M2 — Durable Execution and Reliability (P1)
Goal: make long-running assessments restart-safe, bounded, and recoverable.
Replace in-memory assessment task state with database-backed task,
revision, activity, and review records.
Compile LangGraph workflows with a database-backed checkpointer using
task_id as the stable execution/thread identifier.
Make nodes idempotent and store node input/output hashes to prevent
duplicate side effects during resume.
Add bounded retries for transient failures only; after two repeated
failures, stop and escalate with attempted actions, evidence, and a suggested
human next step.
Add cancellation, timeout, resume, and disaster-recovery tests.
Exit criteria: a process restart can resume an assessment without losing review
history, duplicating effects, or entering an infinite retry loop.
M3 — Observability, Tools, MCP, and Secrets (P2)
Goal: make every meaningful agent action attributable and enforce least
privilege independently of model instructions.
Create an evidence manifest for each run containing task and graph-run
IDs, node, source channel, document/output hashes, skill and policy-pack
versions, model/prompt identifiers, citations, timestamps, and reviewer
decision.
Define capability profiles: planning and review agents are read-only;
execution agents receive narrow allowlisted tools for the current task.
Treat additions or expansions to MCP tools as high-risk governed changes
with explicit security tests and owner review.
Add pre-action policy hooks, post-action audit hooks, and error hooks for
escalation; hooks must be able to block actions without relying on the LLM.
Scope secrets to the smallest runtime component and environment, prevent
secret values from entering prompts/artifacts, and document network-egress
policy for hosted deployments.
Exit criteria: operators can determine who or what performed an action, against
which inputs and code state, under which capability policy, and with what result.
M4 — Evaluation and Release Gates (P2)
Goal: turn assessment quality and production safety into objective release
signals.
Expand the evaluation harness across all SSDLC phases and add held-out
expert-labelled cases with inter-annotator agreement.
Version approved scorecard baselines and fail CI on agreed grounding,
recall, false-positive, calibration, or latency regressions.
Report variance across repeated runs and preserve judge rationales and
human-audit results as reviewable artifacts.
Require protected GitHub Environments and authorized reviewers for
production-impacting exports or deployments; agents may prepare but not
approve or execute the final release action.
Deploy sensitive configuration from an explicit commit or tag rather than
an unpinned branch head, with a tested rollback procedure.
Exit criteria: releases have reproducible quality evidence, an approved code
reference, a human decision for critical effects, and a verified rollback path.
Definition of Done for Roadmap Work
Every roadmap PR must include:
a bounded plan and changed-path scope;
verifiable functional and security success criteria;
automated tests for allowed and denied behavior;
durable evidence or artifacts linked to the commit under test;
documentation and migration notes where contracts or persistence change; and
rollback and escalation guidance for high-risk changes.
Implementation should proceed in milestone order because M0 establishes the
repository controls used to review M1–M4 safely. Each unchecked item is intended
to be small enough to become a dedicated GitHub issue and pull request.
Agent Integration (MCP + A2A)
Use MCP to expose bounded tools to Claude Desktop, Cursor, coding agents, and
workflow platforms. Use A2A to expose DocSentinel as a remote specialist agent.
REST, MCP, and A2A submissions share the same task lifecycle and activity log.
Agent-created assessments always remain drafts until a human reviewer approves
them in the console.
Interface
Endpoint
Purpose
MCP stdio
python app/mcp_server.py
Local desktop and coding-agent integration
MCP Streamable HTTP
POST /mcp/
Remote tool discovery and invocation
A2A Agent Card
GET /.well-known/agent-card.json
Standards-based agent discovery
A2A JSON-RPC
POST /a2a
Remote task delegation
Integration status
GET /api/v1/integrations/agents/status
Non-secret protocol and capability status
Console
/console/integrations
Human-readable integration state
MCP exposes five governed tools:
submit_document_assessment
get_assessment_status
assess_document (compatibility tool)
query_knowledge_base
get_agent_gateway_status
The A2A Agent Card advertises assessment submission, assessment retrieval, and
security knowledge query skills.
What can it do?
Once connected, you can ask your AI agent:
"Analyze the attached requirements.pdf for missing security requirements using DocSentinel."
"Run a STRIDE threat model on system-design.pdf using the Design Agent."
"Triage these SonarQube SAST findings and prioritize by risk."
assess_document only reads files inside MCP_DOCUMENT_ROOTS. Use : to
separate multiple roots on macOS/Linux, or ; on Windows. If unset, the
server only allows ./examples.
FastAPI also serves Streamable HTTP MCP at /mcp/ and publishes the A2A Agent
Card at /.well-known/agent-card.json. Tokenless protocol access is
loopback-only. External agents cannot approve, reject, or bypass human review.
For network, Docker, or reverse-proxy access, configure:
Clients send Authorization: Bearer <AGENT_GATEWAY_TOKEN>. Keep
MCP_DOCUMENT_ROOTS, allowed hosts, and allowed origins as narrow as possible.
Docker bridge traffic is not treated as loopback, so published MCP/A2A ports
require a token.
The Vite dev server proxies /api, /health, and /config to http://localhost:8000.
The Settings page can update the running server's LLM provider, model, base URL, and API key. API keys are only returned to the UI as masked previews. For persistent startup defaults, set the matching values in .env.
Example: Submit an SSDLC assessment
bash
# Run a Design phase assessment (threat modeling)
curl -X POST "http://localhost:8000/api/v1/assessments" \
-F "files=@examples/architecture-doc.pdf" \
-F "phase=design" \
-F "scenario_id=threat-modeling"# Response: { "task_id": "...", "status": "accepted" }
# Get the result
curl "http://localhost:8000/api/v1/assessments/TASK_ID"
Example: Upload to KB and query
bash
# Upload a security policy to the requirements KB collection
curl -X POST "http://localhost:8000/api/v1/kb/documents" \
-F "file=@examples/sample-policy.txt" \
-F "collection=kb_requirements"# Query the KB (RAG)
curl -X POST "http://localhost:8000/api/v1/kb/query" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query": "What are the access control requirements?", "top_k": 5}'
pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
pytest
pytest tests/test_skills_api.py # Run specific test
pytest evals/tests # Run evaluation harness tests
Contributing
Issues and Pull Requests are welcome. Please read CONTRIBUTING.md for setup, tests, and commit guidelines. By participating you agree to the CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md.
AI-Assisted Contribution: We encourage using AI tools to contribute! Check out CONTRIBUTING_WITH_AI.md for best practices.
Submit a Skill Template: Have a great security persona for an SSDLC phase? Submit a Skill Template or add it to examples/templates/.
Security
Vulnerability reporting: See SECURITY.md for responsible disclosure.
Security requirements: Follows security controls in SPEC §7.2.
Document confinement: MCP/A2A document paths must resolve inside MCP_DOCUMENT_ROOTS; symlink escapes are rejected before file reads.
Agent authority: External agents may submit and inspect drafts, but cannot approve their own assessments.
Remote access: Tokenless MCP/A2A access is loopback-only. Network deployments require a bearer token, TLS, and narrow Host/Origin allow-lists.
License
This project is licensed under the MIT License — see the LICENSE file for details.