The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the Ardupilot Mavlink MCP listing page.
An MCP server that lets an AI agent talk to an ArduPilot vehicle over MAVLink. Read state, inspect and change parameters, switch modes, read prearm failures, and (gated) arm or disarm. SITL-first.
Install: pipx install ardupilot-mavlink-mcp
mcp-name: io.github.rmeadomavic/ardupilot-mavlink-mcp
[!WARNING] This tool can ARM and command a real aircraft. A bad command can spin props or fly a vehicle away. Defaults are built to stop that: actuation is OFF unless you pass
--enable-actuation, and even then it refuses a real (non-loopback) link unless you also pass--allow-real-vehicle. Develop against SITL. On hardware, bench-test with props off first. No warranty — you own the outcome.
Most ArduPilot tooling for LLMs targets post-flight log analysis. This one drives the live link: connect to a running vehicle, read its state and params, change modes, and diagnose why it won't arm — in the moment, not after landing. The useful case: point an agent at a vehicle that won't arm, have it read the params and the prearm STATUSTEXT, and tell you why, instead of you squinting at a GCS message log. The arm tool reports the real COMMAND_ACK result and hands back the prearm reasons on refusal; it never force-arms.
MAVLink is an async stream; MCP tools are synchronous. One background thread owns the link and is the only reader — it caches the latest message of each type and routes PARAM_VALUE into a param store. Tool calls read from those caches (params block until the data arrives). No two threads ever call recv_match.
ardupilot_arm returns the COMMAND_ACK result and, on refusal, the prearm STATUSTEXT (e.g. AHRS: waiting for home, Accels inconsistent). Safety checks are respected — no ARMING_CHECK=0, no force-arm magic number.set confirmed by the echoed PARAM_VALUE.You need an ArduPilot SITL instance. From an ardupilot checkout:
Install and run the server (read-only by default):
To allow parameter writes, mode changes, and arm/disarm against SITL, add --enable-actuation.
Claude Code:
Claude Desktop / any mcpServers config:
Connection strings are pymavlink syntax: tcp:127.0.0.1:5760 (SITL), udp:127.0.0.1:14550, serial:/dev/ttyACM0:115200.
| Tool | Kind | What it does |
|---|---|---|
ardupilot_connect | — | Connect to a vehicle. Default is local SITL. |
ardupilot_vehicle_state | read | Mode, armed, GPS, battery, attitude, position — from cache. |
ardupilot_recent_statustext | read | Recent STATUSTEXT/prearm messages. Read this to see why arming failed. |
ardupilot_get_param | read | Read one parameter. |
ardupilot_set_param | write | Set a parameter, confirmed via echoed PARAM_VALUE. |
ardupilot_list_params | read | List params, optional glob (ATC_RAT_*). |
ardupilot_set_mode | write | Send a request to set flight mode by name. |
ardupilot_arm / ardupilot_disarm | write | Gated. Confirmed via COMMAND_ACK. |
Write tools are gated and carry the MCP destructiveHint. Live telemetry is also exposed as the resource ardupilot://telemetry.
| Vehicle | Firmware | Status |
|---|---|---|
| ArduCopter | 4.5 | ✓ validated on SITL |
| ArduRover (UGV/USV) | 4.x | ~ mode map present, not yet validated |
| ArduPlane | 4.x | ~ mode map present, not yet validated |
| ArduSub | 4.x | ~ untested |
MAVLink2 is assumed. Not flown on hardware — SITL only so far.
--enable-actuation.--allow-real-vehicle is also set.arm, disarm, set_param, and set_mode all pass through this gate before sending.set_param rejects ARMING_CHECK writes (case-insensitive) on every link, even when both actuation flags are enabled.Working: reads plus gated parameter writes, mode changes, and arm/disarm against ArduCopter SITL. Validated three ways — unit tests (Python 3.10–3.12), a real-MAVLink-wire check (scripts/wire_check.py), and a live ArduPilot SITL run (scripts/sitl_check.py).
Open targets: validate Rover/Plane/Sub; mission upload/download and guided flight (takeoff/goto/land) are deferred — mission protocol is a stateful handshake and guided commands are fly-away risk. See ROADMAP.md.
MIT — Kyle Adomavicius