The full upstream README, mirrored here for reference. Install config, tool schemas, adoption signals, and an original overview live on the Fida listing page.
Keep secret values out of AI coding agents.
Fida is a local-first secret leak prevention layer for AI coding agents. It finds exposed credentials, gives agents redacted safe views of sensitive files and command output, and shows whether your installed agent integrations can still expose a raw value.
It is deliberately not a general agent policy engine, approval system, or developer workflow firewall. Fida does not decide which ordinary commands an agent may run, which files it may edit, or whether you may use curl | sh. Its one job is simple: a detected secret must not reach model context.
Project status: MVP implemented. Fida installs local integrations, verifies its redaction path with a synthetic credential, scans repo risk, and records redaction-safe audit events.
fida is install-and-forget: it wires every coding agent it detects, and running it again later checks for an update. Run from a terminal, the installer offers to do this for you; piped or in CI it stays quiet and just prints fida as the next step.
When an agent needs content that may contain a credential, Fida provides a sanitized view instead of the raw bytes:
Its integrations combine three layers:
fida_read and fida_shell return redacted file content and captured command output. fida_shell still runs the real command — the child process keeps the true credential, so the work succeeds — and redacts only the output handed back to the model: the agent uses a secret without seeing it. File reads are confined to the workspace by default, with optional explicit read roots for trusted user attachments; secrets outside those roots (e.g. ~/.aws) are covered only by the native-read hook on enforced agents.Normal clean reads, edits, commands, installs, network access, and approvals remain the agent's and developer's concern. Fida's gateway follows the same low-friction rule: it captures and redacts output; it does not apply a command allowlist or repository approval policy.
The built-in detector catalog recognizes dotenv assignments, PEM private keys, and high-precision formats for AWS, GitHub, Google, Slack, Stripe, OpenAI, Anthropic, and JWT credentials. It favors precision over recall: a credential in a format Fida does not recognize passes through unredacted. This is best-effort protection against accidental exposure, not a guarantee of zero leakage. Use a dedicated history scanner such as gitleaks or GitGuardian alongside Fida.
Fida fails closed on redaction: if it cannot prove a response is clean, it suppresses that response rather than returning a partial secret.
The binary is installed to ~/.local/bin by default. Run in an interactive terminal, the installer then offers to wire protection for you; otherwise start setup yourself:
Pin a version or choose another install directory:
Other options:
fida scan reports whether a raw secret could reach a detected agent. It never prints a secret value, its length, or a fragment of it.
| Agent | Coverage |
|---|---|
| Codex, Claude Code | enforced when the hook and gateway self-test pass |
| Cursor, OpenCode, GitHub Copilot, Windsurf, Antigravity, Kiro | best_effort gateway + steering |
fida status reports the actual state for each detected agent: enforced, best_effort, incomplete, or inactive.
Fida protects model-bound content on its installed integration paths. It is not an OS sandbox or a complete data-loss-prevention product. An agent that can ignore steering, bypass a hook, or access a file through an unmediated native tool may still need OS-level containment. Fida names that coverage honestly instead of turning ordinary development into a permission maze.
Please report security-sensitive issues privately when they could expose a secret, bypass redaction, or misrepresent protection coverage. See SECURITY.md.
Licensed under the terms in LICENSE.