1Password MCP Server

Give your AI assistant a locked door to 1Password — not a pile of passwords in the chat.

@takescake/1password-mcp is a community Model Context Protocol (MCP) server. It lets Claude, Cursor, VS Code Copilot, OpenAI Codex, Gemini, and other MCP clients manage vaults and credentials through a 1Password Service Account.

Built on the MCP TypeScript SDK v2 with protocol negotiation for 2026-07-28 (and legacy clients). Secrets stay in 1Password; agents prefer op:// references and op_run so plaintext never has to land in the model transcript.

Not an official 1Password product. Community-built, Apache 2.0 licensed.

Who this is for

You are…	You get…
Not deeply technical	A one-time setup: create a service account, paste the token into your AI app’s MCP settings, then ask in plain English (“list my automation vault”, “rotate the staging DB password”).
An agent / LLM	Fifteen typed tools, four workflow prompts, three browsable resources, and clear rules: prefer `op_run` + `op://` over revealing secrets.
A developer / SRE	Full item CRUD, secure notes, password generation, vault allow-lists, Keychain token loading on macOS, and CI-friendly env config.

Why teams pick this server

Security-first defaults — password_read and item_get return metadata unless you opt in with reveal: true.
op_run (the MCP equivalent of op run) — inject op://vault/item/field into a local command’s environment; plaintext is redacted from stdout/stderr and never logged back to the model.
Full vault toolkit — list, search, get, edit, create logins & notes, rotate passwords, archive, or delete.
Guided prompts — password generation, credential rotation, vault audit, and secret-reference helpers.
Browsable resources — vault and item catalogs over 1password://… URIs (no secrets in resource payloads).
Modern MCP — stdio transport, Zod 4 schemas, MCP 2026-07-28 negotiation with legacy client compatibility.

What you get

Tools (15)

Grouped the way agents and humans actually use them.

Discover

Tool	What it does
`vault_list`	List vaults the service account can access (id, name, description, type).
`item_lookup`	Search a vault by title substring; optional `limit` (max 200).
`item_list`	List every item in a vault (id, title, category, tags, `updatedAt`) — never secrets.

Read (safe by default)

Tool	What it does
`item_get`	Full item: title, category, tags, notes, fields. Concealed values stay hidden unless `reveal: true`. Accepts `op://…` or `vaultId` + `itemId`.
`password_read`	Read one field (default `password`) via `op://…` or ids. Metadata-only unless `reveal: true`. Prefer `op_run` to use a secret.
`op_check_ref`	Validate `op://vault/item/field` and return non-secret metadata only (vault, item, field). Never the value.

Create & update

Tool	What it does
`password_create`	Create a Login or Password item (username, URL, tags, notes). `returnSecret` defaults to `false`.
`note_create`	Create a Secure Note with optional tags and custom fields.
`password_update`	Rotate a password / concealed field (creates the field if missing).
`item_edit`	Update title, notes (empty string clears), tags, URL; upsert or remove fields. Unreferenced fields stay untouched.
`password_generate`	Cryptographically secure random password (length 8–128; symbols/numbers/uppercase toggles).
`password_generate_memorable`	Memorable passphrase from a ~500-word list (word count, separator, number/symbol suffixes).

Use secrets without revealing them

Tool	What it does
`op_run`	Run a local command (`command` or `argv`) with env vars. Values matching `op://…` are resolved into the child process only; resolved secrets are redacted from returned output. Optional `cwd`, `shell`, `timeout_ms`, `stdin`.

Soft-delete & destroy

Tool	What it does
`item_archive`	Move an item to the archive (hidden from normal views).
`item_delete`	Permanently delete an item — cannot be undone.

Prompts (4)

Prompt	When to use it
`generate-secure-password`	Generate (random or memorable) and optionally store — without dumping the password into chat.
`credential-rotation`	Find → verify access → generate → update → confirm `op://` reference.
`vault-audit`	Inventory a vault by category; flag duplicates / oddities — never reveal secrets.
`secret-reference-helper`	Build a paste-ready `op://vault/item/field` from names.

Resources (3)

URI	Contents
`1password://config`	Non-secret server config (name, version, log level, token source, Node version).
`1password://vaults`	JSON list of accessible vaults.
`1password://vaults/{vaultId}/items`	JSON item metadata for one vault (no secret values).

Before you start

You need two things:

Node.js 20 or newer
A 1Password Service Account with access to the vault(s) you want the AI to use

Create a service account (plain English)

Sign in to your 1Password account on the web.
Open Developer → Service Accounts (or follow 1Password’s guide).
Create a service account and grant it only the vaults you want automation to touch (for example an Automation or CI vault — not your personal banking vault).
Copy the token once. Treat it like a master key.

Quick start

Claude Desktop / Cursor / VS Code / most IDEs

Add this to your MCP config (exact file depends on the app):

config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "1password": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@takescake/1password-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN": "YOUR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN"
      }
    }
  }
}

Restart the app, then try: “List my 1Password vaults.”

macOS Keychain (no token in the config file)

Store the token in Keychain, then point the server at it:

config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "1password": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@takescake/1password-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "OP_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE": "op-service-account-claude-automation",
        "OP_KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT": "your-macos-username"
      }
    }
  }
}

Token resolution order: CLI (--service-account-token / --token) → OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN → macOS Keychain. OP_KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT is optional when the service name alone is unique.

OpenAI Codex (TOML)

Option A — token in config:

toml

[mcp_servers."1password"]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "@takescake/1password-mcp"]

[mcp_servers."1password".env]
OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN = "YOUR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN"

Option B (recommended) — config only names the env var:

toml

[mcp_servers."1password"]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "@takescake/1password-mcp"]
env_vars = ["OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN"]

Set OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN in your shell or CI. Note: codex mcp add ... --env OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN=... writes the secret into Codex config; prefer env_vars when you can.

On macOS you can omit the token env and use OP_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE (+ optional OP_KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT) instead.

Optional: lock `op_run` / `op_check_ref` to certain vaults

By default those tools may resolve op:// references from any vault the service account can see. To allow-list vaults:

config.json

{
  "env": {
    "OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN": "YOUR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN",
    "OP_MCP_ALLOWED_VAULTS": "Automation, CI"
  }
}

Names or IDs work. References outside the list are rejected before resolution. Same setting via --allowed-vaults.

For agents: how to handle secrets

Follow this order every time:

Discover with vault_list → item_lookup / item_list (metadata only).
Confirm a reference with op_check_ref — never reveal just to see if a path exists.
Use a secret in a command or API call with op_run and op://vault/item/field in env.
Reveal with password_read / item_get + reveal: true only when the human explicitly needs the value in chat.
Rotate with password_generate → password_update (keep returnSecret: false unless asked).
Prefer item_archive over item_delete unless permanent removal is required.

`op_run` sketch

config.json

{
  "argv": ["curl", "-sS", "https://api.example.com/health"],
  "env": {
    "API_TOKEN": "op://Automation/Example API/credential"
  },
  "timeout_ms": 60000
}

Prefer argv over a shell command string when you can — fewer quoting surprises.

Configuration reference

Environment variables

Variable	Required	Description
`OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN`	Usually yes	Service account token. Not required on macOS if Keychain vars are set.
`OP_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE`	No	macOS: Keychain service name for the token.
`OP_KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT`	No	macOS: optional account to narrow the Keychain lookup.
`OP_MCP_ALLOWED_VAULTS`	No	Comma-separated vault names/IDs allowed for `op_run` / `op_check_ref`. Empty = unrestricted.
`OP_INTEGRATION_NAME`	No	Name reported to the 1Password SDK (default: `1password-mcp`).
`OP_INTEGRATION_VERSION`	No	Version reported to the SDK (default: package version).
`MCP_LOG_LEVEL`	No	`debug` \| `info` \| `warn` \| `error` (default: `info`).
`MCP_DEBUG`	No	If set, forces debug logging.

CLI flags

Code

--service-account-token <token>   1Password service account token
--token <token>                   Alias for --service-account-token
--log-level <level>               error | warn | info | debug (default: info)
--integration-name <name>         Custom integration name for the 1Password SDK
--integration-version <version>   Custom integration version
--allowed-vaults <list>           Comma-separated allow-list for op_run / op_check_ref

Security & privacy

Read this before pointing the server at a vault you care about.

LLM privacy — Anything revealed to the model may be sent to your AI provider and retained under their policies.
MCP is not end-to-end encrypted for secrets in flight — Values are plaintext inside the MCP workflow and toward the model. They are encrypted at rest in 1Password once stored.
Best fit — Automation credentials: CI tokens, bot accounts, disposable env secrets.
Avoid — Banking, primary personal logins, recovery codes, or anything you cannot afford to expose to a model provider.
Token = master key — Scope the service account tightly; rotate immediately if leaked; never commit tokens or MCP configs with secrets.
Prefer references — op://… + op_run beat pasting passwords into prompts or files.
Least privilege — Dedicated automation vaults beat sharing your whole account.

Protocol & compatibility

Piece	Detail
Package	`@takescake/1password-mcp`
Runtime	Node.js ≥ 20
Transport	stdio
MCP SDK	`@modelcontextprotocol/server` v2
Protocol	Negotiates 2026-07-28; keeps legacy client compatibility
Registry name	`io.github.CakeRepository/1password`

Development

bash

git clone https://github.com/CakeRepository/1Password-MCP.git
cd 1Password-MCP
npm ci
npm run build
npm test
npm run lint

Watch mode: npm run dev.

Project layout

Code

src/
  index.ts                 # Entrypoint — MCP stdio + protocol negotiation
  config.ts                # CLI / env / Keychain / allow-list
  client.ts                # 1Password SDK client
  logger.ts                # Structured logs on stderr (stdout is protocol)
  secret-ref.ts            # op:// parsing & allow-list checks
  utils.ts                 # Result helpers, password generation
  tools/                   # All 15 MCP tools
  prompts/                 # Interactive workflow prompts
  resources/               # 1password:// resources
tests/

See CONTRIBUTING.md. Maintainers / agents: AGENTS.md.

Changelog

See CHANGELOG.md for version history, including the 4.0.0 MCP v2 / 2026-07-28 migration and the 3.0.0 op_run / reveal-opt-in security changes.

License

Apache License 2.0

1Password MCP Server

Who this is for

Why teams pick this server

What you get

Tools (15)

Discover

Read (safe by default)

Create & update

Use secrets without revealing them

Soft-delete & destroy

Prompts (4)

Resources (3)

Before you start

Create a service account (plain English)

Quick start

Claude Desktop / Cursor / VS Code / most IDEs

macOS Keychain (no token in the config file)

OpenAI Codex (TOML)

Optional: lock op_run / op_check_ref to certain vaults

For agents: how to handle secrets

op_run sketch

Configuration reference

Environment variables

CLI flags

Security & privacy

Protocol & compatibility

Development

Project layout

Changelog

License

Optional: lock `op_run` / `op_check_ref` to certain vaults

`op_run` sketch