# WardenPoint **Category:** 📊 Monitoring **Repository:** https://github.com/WardenPoint/wardenpoint-mcp **Views:** 0 **Installs:** 0 **Upvotes:** 0 **Directory Page:** https://allmcps.com/mcp/wardenpoint ## Description Configure on-call alerting from an AI agent: recipients, groups, escalation policies, schedules. ## Claude Desktop Quick Installation Heuristic fallback — verify the package name and runner against the repository README before running it. Uses `npx` (confidence: low): ```json "mcpServers": { "wardenpoint": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y","wardenpoint"] } } ``` ## Documentation & README # WardenPoint MCP server An [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server that lets an agent configure a [WardenPoint](https://wardenpoint.com) account — recipients, contacts, groups, notification rules, escalation policies, on-call schedules, alert-source integrations, routing rules and telephony — without anyone opening the dashboard. It speaks stdio and exposes **one tool per operation of your installation's own OpenAPI description**. ```json { "mcpServers": { "wardenpoint": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@wardenpoint/mcp-server"], "env": { "WARDENPOINT_BASE_URL": "https://wardenpoint.com", "WARDENPOINT_API_TOKEN": "acb_xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx" } } } } ``` That is the whole installation. Your MCP client starts the server on demand; nothing runs between sessions. ## The one rule this server exists to keep **There is no second copy of the contract here.** Every tool — its name, its text, its arguments, their descriptions, their enums and bounds, the responses it can answer with — is read at startup from the OpenAPI description **served by the installation you are configuring** (`GET {WARDENPOINT_BASE_URL}/docs`). Nothing about the API is restated in this package. That is deliberate, and it is why the tools cannot quietly drift: - an endpoint added to your installation appears as a tool the next time the server starts — no package upgrade involved; - a description reworded upstream rewords the agent's instructions with it; - an operation nobody described is invisible to the agent, which is the correct failure and the reason `--spec-report` exists. A description bundled inside this package would describe whatever was current when the package was published, while the agent talks to whatever you actually run. There is no offline fallback for the same reason: every tool here is an HTTP call to that installation, so if it cannot be reached, a complete tool list would be a list of things that cannot be done. ## Requirements Node 20 or newer. No build step, no native modules. ## Environment | Variable | Required | Meaning | | --- | --- | --- | | `WARDENPOINT_BASE_URL` | yes | Origin of the installation — no trailing slash, no `/api/v1` suffix. The description carries full paths. | | `WARDENPOINT_API_TOKEN` | to call | A company API key from **Dashboard → Integrations → API keys**. Sent as `X-API-Key`. Not needed for `--list-tools` or `--spec-report`. | | `WARDENPOINT_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS` | no | `1` disables certificate verification. **Development stands only** — never against production. | | `WARDENPOINT_TIMEOUT_MS` | no | Per-request timeout, default `30000`. | | `WARDENPOINT_TOOLS` | no | Comma-separated patterns limiting which tools are offered, e.g. `recipients,groups` or `v1_schedules_*`. Unset means all of them. | | `WARDENPOINT_OPENAPI_PATH` | no | Read the description from a local file instead of the installation. For developing against a description that is not deployed yet. | The token is read from the environment at every start and is never written anywhere by this package. ### What the key is allowed to do Abilities are chosen when you issue the key, and a 403 names the one that was missing: - `config.read` — read the whole configuration. A good place to start: the agent can explain an account somebody else built and change nothing. - `config.write` — create, update, delete. - `notifications.send` / `notifications.read` — fire alerts and inspect them. **No ability can read a secret.** There is no such ability in the vocabulary, so it cannot be granted by mistake. The API reports whether a credential is set and whether it verified — never its value. ## What the tool list costs Every tool definition is sent to the model before the person says anything, so it is spent whether or not the conversation ever touches WardenPoint. The full set of 89 tools is roughly **64k tokens** — on a 200k context window, a third of it. The server prints the figure at startup so it is not an invisible cost: ``` wardenpoint-mcp-server: 89 tools (~63k tokens of context; narrow it with WARDENPOINT_TOOLS) from … ``` If a session only ever touches part of the product, say so: ```json "env": { "WARDENPOINT_TOOLS": "recipients,groups,schedules" } ``` That drops the same run to a handful of tools and a few thousand tokens. Patterns match tool names (`v1_recipients_store`), and `*` works. Leave it unset and you get everything, which is the safe default: a tool that quietly disappeared looks like a missing product capability. ## Running ```bash npx -y @wardenpoint/mcp-server --list-tools # every tool, with its arguments npx -y @wardenpoint/mcp-server --spec-report # gaps in the description itself ``` Both talk to `WARDENPOINT_BASE_URL` to fetch the description; neither needs a token. Without arguments the process speaks MCP over stdio and is meant to be started by a client, not by hand. ## Two credentials, and why they are not interchangeable - **API key** (`WARDENPOINT_API_TOKEN`) — who you are. Every configuration tool uses it. - **Integration secret** — proves a specific alert-source webhook is genuine. Two tools accept it as an argument; it is not read from the environment and not stored here. ## What this server deliberately cannot do Two steps in setting up an account need a human at a screen, and both stay that way on purpose: - **Scanning a Telegram QR code.** - **Typing a provider secret.** For each, the agent asks the installation to issue a one-time link, shows it to the person, and polls for the result. The person opens that link in the dashboard, behind their own login, and types the value themselves. Ask an agent to relay a secret through the conversation and it will refuse — that is what the link exists to avoid. ## Errors reach the agent intact The API spends real effort explaining refusals — which ability was missing, which field failed validation, why a send queued nothing. This server passes the body through whole, on success and failure alike, because an agent repairs itself from that text and nothing else. ## Licence MIT. See [LICENSE](https://github.com/WardenPoint/wardenpoint-mcp/blob/HEAD/LICENSE). Issues and contributions: .