# silicon-transfer-mcp-server
**Category:** 💻 Developer Tools
**Repository:** https://github.com/SiliconAINetworks/silicon-transfer-mcp-server
**npm Downloads (last month):** 150
**Views:** 0
**Installs:** 0
**Upvotes:** 0
**Directory Page:** https://allmcps.com/mcp/silicon-transfer-mcp-server
## Description
FTP/SFTP/FTPS MCP server with transfer proofs - every upload returns a checksum verdict.
## Claude Desktop Quick Installation
Heuristic fallback — verify the package name and runner against the repository README before running it. Uses `npx` (confidence: low):
```json
"mcpServers": {
"silicon-transfer-mcp-server": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y","silicon-transfer-mcp-server"]
}
}
```
## Documentation & README
# Silicon Transfer MCP Server
[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/silicon-transfer-mcp-server) [](https://www.npmjs.com/package/silicon-transfer-mcp-server) [](./LICENSE) [](https://nodejs.org)
**FTP / FTPS / SFTP for Claude and other MCP clients - with built-in transfer proofs.**
Every upload and download returns a verdict: `PROVEN` only when the SHA-256 of the
remote file matches your local file. No more "transfer complete" on blind trust.
> Philosophy: *prove it, then claim it.* Built from scratch by
> [Silicon Networks](https://siliconnetworks.ch) - the makers of [AEGIS Shield](https://aegis888.com).
## Why this one?
| | Typical FTP tools | Silicon Transfer |
|---|---|---|
| Upload result | "done" | verdict + SHA-256 of both sides |
| Directory sync check | manual | per-file proof walk with mismatch list |
| Remote file fingerprint | download first | streamed SHA-256, no disk contact |
| Protocols | often FTP only | FTP, FTPS, SFTP (password or SSH key) |
## Tools (13)
**Connection:** `silicon_connect`, `silicon_disconnect`, `silicon_status`, `silicon_server_info`
**Files:** `silicon_upload_file`, `silicon_download_file`, `silicon_delete_file`, `silicon_file_info`
**Directories:** `silicon_list_dir`, `silicon_make_dir`, `silicon_upload_dir`, `silicon_download_dir`, `silicon_rename`
Transfers accept `proof: "hash" | "size" | "none"` - hash is the default for single
files, size for directory trees (switch to hash when it matters).
## Install
```bash
npm install -g silicon-transfer-mcp-server
```
That's it - [live on npm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/silicon-transfer-mcp-server). Or run it without installing via `npx` (see config below).
From source
```bash
git clone https://github.com/SiliconAINetworks/silicon-transfer-mcp-server.git
cd silicon-transfer-mcp-server
npm install
npm run build
```
## Claude Desktop configuration
Add to your `claude_desktop_config.json` (no credentials in the config - you pass
them at runtime through `silicon_connect`, for **your own server**):
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"silicon-transfer": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "silicon-transfer-mcp-server"]
}
}
}
```
Running from source instead
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"silicon-transfer": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["C:/path/to/silicon-transfer-mcp-server/dist/index.js"]
}
}
}
```
## Usage example
Ask your AI assistant:
> "Connect to my server via SFTP (host example.com, user deploy, key at ~/.ssh/id_ed25519)
> and upload dist/app.js to /var/www/app.js - with hash proof."
The assistant calls `silicon_connect`, then `silicon_upload_file` and answers with the
verdict:
```json
{
"proof": {
"verdict": "PROVEN",
"detail": "SHA-256 identisch - Transfer bewiesen.",
"local_sha256": "9f2a...",
"remote_sha256": "9f2a..."
}
}
```
If the hashes ever differ you get `MISMATCH` with both fingerprints - retry instead
of trusting a broken deploy.
## Security notes
Built with the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026) in mind - specifically
ASI02 (Tool Misuse) and ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain).
**What this server does not do**
- No stored credentials. They are **runtime-only tool parameters** for your own
server - no defaults, no config files with secrets, no server addresses shipped.
- No dynamic tool definitions. Every tool is fixed in the source you can read;
nothing is fetched from a remote registry at runtime, so no third party can
rewrite what your assistant thinks a tool does.
- No telemetry, no phone-home, no analytics.
**Sharp edges - operate accordingly**
`silicon_delete_file`, `silicon_delete_directory` and `silicon_sync_deploy`
(with `deleteExtras`) can destroy remote data. An assistant reading untrusted
content - a web page, a PDF, an email - can be steered by instructions hidden
inside it (indirect prompt injection). Treat these tools like `rm -rf`:
- Connect with an account scoped to the directory you intend to touch, never root.
- Prefer SSH keys over passwords; give the key its own restricted account.
- Run `silicon_list_dir` before any delete, and read the plan before approving.
- Keep `deleteExtras` off unless you are deliberately mirroring.
**Verifying what you installed**
Package name is exactly `silicon-transfer-mcp-server`, published by
`aegisshield888`. Similar names on npm are placeholders we registered to prevent
typosquatting - they contain no code. Source: the GitHub repository linked above.
**Reporting**
Found a hole? Open an issue on GitHub, or write to security@siliconnetworks.ch.
## License
MIT (c) 2026 Silicon Networks. Built from scratch - single-author codebase.