# ShieldFive **Category:** 🔒 Security **Repository:** https://github.com/shieldfive/mcp **Views:** 0 **Installs:** 0 **Upvotes:** 0 **Directory Page:** https://allmcps.com/mcp/shieldfive ## Description Tidy your E2E-encrypted ShieldFive vault and local folders. Decrypts locally; revocable access. ## Claude Desktop Quick Installation Heuristic fallback — verify the package name and runner against the repository README before running it. Uses `npx` (confidence: low): ```json "mcpServers": { "shieldfive": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y","shieldfive"] } } ``` ## Documentation & README # @shieldfive/mcp A [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server that lets Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or a local model work with two things: - **your ShieldFive vault**, end-to-end encrypted: **move files off your computer into it** — each one encrypted here, uploaded, read back and matched byte for byte before its original is moved to a local trash folder, never deleted — and find duplicates, see what takes the space, rename, move and move to the Bin. It works on the folders you grant, decrypts on your machine, and every change can be undone; - **folders on your own disk**: the same tidying jobs, with no network access at all. ShieldFive's servers never see a file name or a byte of content in the clear, and that holds with this server running too. Decryption happens inside this process, on your computer. What the assistant then does with what it reads is a separate question, answered under [Security model](#security-model). ## Connect your vault in 60 seconds Requires Node 20 or newer. 1. Add the server to your assistant. For Claude Desktop, add this to `claude_desktop_config.json` (Cursor uses the same block in `~/.cursor/mcp.json`): ```json { "mcpServers": { "shieldfive": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@shieldfive/mcp"] } } } ``` For Claude Code: `claude mcp add shieldfive -- npx -y @shieldfive/mcp` 2. Restart the assistant and ask it to *tidy up my ShieldFive vault*. It calls `vault_connect`, which opens ShieldFive in your browser. 3. In that tab, choose the folders, *Read only* or *Read and organize*, and an expiry (1 hour to 90 days), then click **Authorize**. That is the whole setup: the connection is delivered straight to the server running on your computer — over `127.0.0.1`, never through ShieldFive — and stored in your system keychain. Nothing is copied by hand. To connect before you start a conversation, run `npx -y @shieldfive/mcp login`: same browser page, same result. `login --paste` takes a connection string you copied from Settings → AI assistants instead, for a machine with no browser. `npx @shieldfive/mcp status` shows which connection is configured and whether ShieldFive still accepts it. `npx @shieldfive/mcp logout` removes it from the keychain. Revoking it in ShieldFive is what cuts off access everywhere. For CI or a machine without a keychain, set `SHIELDFIVE_GRANT` to the connection string instead. Anything that can read the server's environment can then read the connection, so prefer the keychain wherever there is one. Setting `SHIELDFIVE_GRANT=none` keeps one client local-only on a machine whose keychain holds a connection for another. ### How the browser hand-off is kept honest - The page never accepts a callback URL, only a port number, and builds `http://127.0.0.1:/callback` itself. A crafted link cannot send your connection anywhere but your own machine. - The listener accepts exactly one delivery: a POST to `/callback`, `Host` exactly the loopback address (so a rebound DNS name is refused), no `Origin` but ShieldFive's, and a 256-bit state compared in constant time. Then it closes. - The connection string travels in a form body, never in a URL, so it does not land in browser history. - The listener exists only while a connection is being authorized, and for at most 10 minutes. ## Security model In plain terms: - **The connection string holds two things.** A *token* the server checks on every request, and a *secret* that never leaves your machine. ShieldFive stores only a hash of the token and has never seen the secret. - **The secret opens only the folders you chose.** When you create a connection, your browser wraps those folders' keys under a key derived from the secret. It wraps nothing else: not your vault root key, not your password, not your post-quantum secret key. Subfolders open through the vault's normal folder-key chain. A folder you did not choose cannot be opened with anything this server holds. - **ShieldFive enforces scope, expiry and revocation on every request.** The checks in this process only produce clearer errors; the server is the boundary. Revoking a connection makes its next request fail. Nothing is cached that would outlive a revocation. - **Decryption happens here, in memory.** No plaintext, key or ciphertext is written to disk. The vault modules do not import the filesystem, and a test asserts that. - **Nothing is deleted.** `vault_trash` moves items into a folder in your Bin that belongs to the connection. There is no permanent-delete tool, and the API a connection can reach has no delete route. Every rename, move and trash appears in *Settings → AI assistants → Activity* with an Undo button. - **Every change is previewed first.** Mutating tools report a plan, and the confirmed call must carry that plan's token and is refused if the items changed in between. What this does not protect: - **Your AI provider sees what the assistant reads.** File names, and the contents of files the assistant opens, go to the assistant, and for a cloud assistant that means to its provider, like the rest of your conversation. The only way to avoid that is a local model. - **Revoking cannot un-read.** Anything the assistant has already read stays read. Nothing else survives it: file contents are streamed through ShieldFive on each request, so there is no download link to outlive a revocation. - **A connection is built from what the server shows your browser when you create it.** Every later extension is checked against your own keys, so a compromised server cannot widen a connection afterwards. At the moment of creation, though, a compromised server could mislabel which folder you picked. - **A copied connection string is a live key** to the folders it covers until it expires or you revoke it. Keep it in the keychain. - **Files can contain instructions aimed at the assistant.** This server marks every name and file content as data, fences file contents in a block the file cannot close, caps `vault_trash` at 50 items per call, requires a preview for every change, and keeps every change undoable. A model can still be talked into a reversible mistake inside the folders you granted. The full design, including the threat model and the reasoning behind each decision, is in [`docs/mcp-grants-design.md`](https://github.com/shieldfive/web/blob/main/docs/mcp-grants-design.md). ## Vault tools `vault_connect` is always available. The rest are registered once a connection exists — connecting mid-conversation announces them with `notifications/tools/list_changed`. Everything below names things by id; paths are for people. | Tool | Needs | What it does | |---|---|---| | `vault_connect` | — | opens ShieldFive in the browser to authorize a connection, and stores it in the keychain | | `vault_list_files` | read | files and folders in scope, with decrypted names, paths, sizes, dates | | `vault_search_files` | read | by name, path, extension, size or date, run locally over decrypted names | | `vault_storage_stats` | read | totals, the biggest folders and files, a breakdown by type | | `vault_find_duplicates` | read | same-size files decrypted in memory and compared by SHA-256; budgeted, and says when a result is a lower bound | | `vault_read_file` | read | text files as fenced, untrusted content (up to 1 M characters); other types return details only | | `vault_rename` | organize | rename a file or folder | | `vault_move` | organize | move into another folder in scope | | `vault_create_folder` | organize | create a folder in scope | | `vault_upload` | write | encrypt a local file here and put it in the vault, then read it back and compare before you are told it is safe to remove the original | | `vault_trash` | organize | up to 50 items into the connection's folder in the Bin | | `vault_move_in` | write | free up space: up to 50 local files uploaded and verified one by one, each original moved to the local trash only after its copy reads back identical — one approval, nothing deleted | Limits a user may meet: - **Post-quantum files uploaded from a phone or the CLI** show as `readable: false` until you next open ShieldFive on the web, which adds the key the connection needs. Files uploaded in the web app are ready straight away. - **The first listing of a large vault takes a while.** Each name costs about 70 ms of Argon2id, spread over your CPU cores (about 20 seconds for 2,000 names on 8 cores). Names are cached in memory for the rest of the session. - **Items at the very top of a whole-vault connection** can be read and moved into a folder, but not renamed in place, and nothing can be moved to the top. Their names are sealed under your vault root key, which a connection never holds. - **Uploads need a connection that may add files** ("Read, organize and add files" when you authorize it) and an upload allowance, which you choose then. Each file is at most 512 MB. Uploads and moves read local files, so the server needs roots as well as a connection. - **Moving files in frees no space by itself.** `vault_move_in` puts each verified original in `.shieldfive-mcp-trash`, with a manifest naming its vault copy; the space comes back when you empty that directory. ## Local files Every path after the package name is a **root**. The local tools can read and write inside those directories and nowhere else, and make no network request. ```sh npx @shieldfive/mcp ~/Documents ~/Downloads ``` In `claude_desktop_config.json`: ```json { "mcpServers": { "shieldfive": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@shieldfive/mcp", "/Users/you/Documents", "/Volumes/Archive"] } } } ``` With a connection configured and no roots, only the vault tools are registered. With roots and no connection, only the local tools are, and the server behaves exactly as 0.2.0 did. With both, you get both. `SHIELDFIVE_MCP_ROOTS` adds roots as well — the two are combined, not alternatives — as a list separated by your platform's path separator (`:` on macOS and Linux, `;` on Windows): ```sh SHIELDFIVE_MCP_ROOTS="/Users/you/Documents:/Volumes/Archive" npx @shieldfive/mcp ``` Whitespace around a root is ignored. In a path given to a tool it is not: there, every character is part of the path. ### See it work first ```bash npm run demo ``` `demo/run-demo.mjs` builds five files in a temporary directory — two with identical contents under different names, a same-size decoy, a 12 MB archive and a two-year-old PDF — runs the read tools over them, previews a trash call, then confirms it and shows the manifest. It touches nothing outside that directory and removes it at the end (`--keep` leaves it in place). ## What the local tools cannot do **They cannot tell you whether a local file is already in your vault.** Matching a local name and size against a vault listing is how a tool deletes the only copy of something, and this server will not guess. **They cannot stop the results from reaching your AI provider.** The local tools make no network request, and that is worth exactly what it says and no more: everything they return — paths, file names, sizes, dates, the digests they report — goes back to the AI client that called it, and if that client is a cloud assistant, those names travel to the assistant's provider like the rest of your conversation. Choose roots on that basis. **It will never infer that two files are the same from their names and sizes.** Duplicate detection reads both files and compares a full SHA-256 of their contents. Name matching is how a deduplication tool deletes the only copy of something, and the cost of getting it right is a few seconds of disk I/O. Hashing is budgeted, though, and the budget can make the answer incomplete. Candidates are bucketed by size, screened on a hash of the first 64 KiB where the files are bigger than that, then confirmed with a full digest. Every read of either kind counts against `max_files_hashed`, 20,000 by default. When the budget runs out, the rest goes unhashed — the group it runs out in is hashed in part, oldest copies first — and the result says how many files and how much space were never checked. Groups are processed largest-first, so what survives a tight budget is what was worth the most. What counts as reclaimable is counted per file on disk. Names that are hardlinks to one file are one copy, because removing one of them frees nothing. APFS clones — what Finder's Duplicate makes on an APFS volume — share their storage too, but nothing this server can read tells a clone from a real copy, so clones are reported as reclaimable when trashing one frees little or nothing. The copy nominated to keep is the one modified earliest; a tie goes to the shorter path, then to the path in code-unit order, so the same tree always nominates the same copy. **It deletes nothing of yours, with one exception.** `trash_local` *moves* files into a `.shieldfive-mcp-trash` directory on the same volume they are on, and writes a `manifest.json` recording where each one was. **No disk space is freed** until you delete that directory yourself, in your own file manager, with your own undo. The tool says so in its own output so the assistant cannot report the space as reclaimed. The exception is a `move_local` between volumes, which has to copy: its source is removed, but only after the copy has been verified — see [Moving across volumes](#moving-across-volumes). That holds for overwriting too. `move_local` with `overwrite: true` moves the item already at the destination into the trash and then takes its place; it does not remove it. The preview tells you how many files and how many bytes would be displaced, not just how many are being moved. If the move then fails, the displaced item is put back. **Every tool that changes anything does nothing by default.** Call it without `confirm: true` and it resolves the paths, checks containment, reports exactly what it would do, and stops. The preview runs the same checks as the action, so a plan that reports a refusal is a refusal. **And a confirmed call has to be the plan you saw.** The preview returns a `plan_token`; `confirm: true` without it is refused. The confirmed call plans again from the filesystem as it is now, compares that plan with the one the token approved — the paths, what each entry is, its size and modification time, and the file and byte counts underneath it — and refuses if anything differs, naming what changed. A token performs one change and expires after ten minutes. So a directory that grew, a destination that appeared, or a path that now points at a different file stops the call instead of silently widening it. ## Local tools | Tool | Reads | Writes | |---|---|---| | `list_local` | files, sizes, dates | — | | `find_duplicates` | file contents (SHA-256) | — | | `find_large_files` | sizes | — | | `find_old_files` | modification times | — | | `storage_summary` | sizes, by extension and directory | — | | `move_local` | sizes of both the source and anything it would displace | moves a file, folder or symlink; moves a displaced destination to the trash; between volumes, copies, verifies, then removes the source | | `rename_local` | — | renames in place, never over an existing name | | `create_local_folder` | — | creates a directory | | `trash_local` | sizes of the subtree being trashed | moves into the trash directory on the item's own volume, writes a manifest | Defaults, all overridable per call: `list_local` returns 200 rows, the other listings 100. `find_large_files` starts at `min_bytes` 100,000,000 (100 MB). `find_old_files` at `older_than_days` 365. `find_duplicates` skips empty files (`min_bytes` 1), hashes at most `max_files_hashed` 20,000 of them and returns 100 groups, each listing at most 50 of its copies. `storage_summary` reports the top 15 extensions and top 15 directories. Every scan stops at `max_files` 200,000 files across all roots, and walks the root and 64 levels of subdirectories below it. Every override has a ceiling, enforced by the MCP schema and again by the tool itself: `limit` 10,000 rows, `max_files` 1,000,000, `max_files_hashed` 1,000,000, `paths` 1,000 per `trash_local` call, 4,096 characters for a path and 255 bytes for `new_name`. A refusal quotes only the start of a value that was too long. `find_old_files` reports modification time, which is a weak signal: some copy operations reset it to the copy date, and an untouched file is not an unwanted one. The tool says this in its own result rather than leaving the assistant to present a shortlist as a verdict. ### The walk is not exhaustive Every read tool walks the same way, and it skips things by default: - **Hidden entries**, unless you pass `include_hidden: true`. - **Nineteen build and cache directories** by name, wherever they appear: `node_modules`, `.git`, `.svn`, `.hg`, `.cache`, `.venv`, `venv`, `__pycache__`, `.next`, `.turbo`, `dist`, `build`, `target`, `Pods`, `.gradle`, `.tox`, `.mypy_cache`, `.pytest_cache`, and this server's own trash. `build`, `dist` and `target` are ordinary folder names outside a code tree, so this can exclude real data — there is no way to override the list yet. - **Symlinks**, always, with no override. All three are counted and reported in the result's warnings, so a total that looks too small says why. It still means `storage_summary` is not a disk-usage tool: point it at a developer's home directory and it will tell you so, but it will not tell you where the space went. When the `max_files` budget runs out before every root has been walked, the result lists the roots it walked under `scanned` and the others under `not_scanned`, and its warning names them. ### Emptying the trash This server does not, and cannot. `trash_local` moves each item into `.shieldfive-mcp-trash//` in the highest directory, between the item and its root, that is on the item's own volume: the root itself, unless the item is on a drive mounted inside the root, and then that drive's top directory. `` is a timestamp, a process id and a counter, so no two calls share one. The `manifest.json` beside the items is written before any of them moves and lists where each came from; an entry whose `trashed_to` does not exist was planned but not moved. Removing them for real is a `rm -rf` you run yourself, once you have looked at what is in there. Nothing here frees disk space on its own. A mount point cannot be trashed, because no directory on its own volume inside the root can hold it. If `.shieldfive-mcp-trash` is a symlink or a file, `trash_local` and an overwriting `move_local` refuse rather than follow it. ### Moving across volumes `rename(2)` cannot cross volumes, so a move between them is a copy followed by removing the source — the one place this server removes something you made. It is done so that a failure at any point loses nothing: - The copy is made under a fresh hidden name beside the destination (`.shieldfive-mcp-incoming--`), created exclusively, and put in place without replacing anything. Nothing that was already there is touched. - A folder holding a symlink, a FIFO, a socket or a device file is refused before any of it is removed, because a copy cannot carry those faithfully. - Every file is flushed to disk and compared with its source — same size, same SHA-256 — and the source must not have changed since it was copied. If either check fails, the copy is discarded and the source stays. - The source is removed file by file, each only if it is still the file that was copied, and folders only once they are empty. Anything that changed or appeared during the move is left where it is and listed in `source_left_in_place`. A crash in the middle can leave a partial copy under that hidden name. The source is intact until its copy is in place. ### Cancellation A cancelled request starts no change. `trash_local` stops between items, never inside one, so each item is either moved and recorded or untouched, and the error says which. A `move_local` cancelled before its source starts being removed is undone, including putting back anything it displaced; after that point it finishes, because stopping would leave half a tree on each side. The MCP SDK sends no response to a cancelled request, so what a cancelled call did is written to the server's stderr log and, for the trash, to the manifest. ## How containment works Every path an assistant supplies is used exactly as given, so `"report "` is never `"report"`, and resolved with `realpath` — following every symlink — before anything reads it or writes through it. The result must sit inside a configured root. A separator-aware boundary check means `/data/roots-evil` does not match the root `/data/root`. That ordering is the point. A string check on the supplied path is defeated by `..`; a check after `path.resolve` is still defeated by a symlink, because `/allowed/link -> /etc` resolves to a string under `/allowed` while reading `/etc`. Resolving links first closes both, and it is why the directory walk uses `lstat` and never follows a link — a link the walk traversed would be a path containment never got to see. Destinations that do not exist yet — a move target, a new folder — are checked by resolving the nearest existing ancestor and re-appending the rest, so writing through a symlinked parent is caught before the write rather than after it. A symlink whose target does not exist is refused wherever a write would pass through it: `realpath` reports it exactly like a missing path, and taking that at its word would let a copy land wherever the link points. The one thing not followed is the item a mutating tool acts on. A symlink given to `move_local`, `rename_local` or `trash_local` is moved, renamed or trashed itself, the way `mv` treats it, and what it points to is not touched; only the link's own position has to be inside a root. The same goes for the destination of a move: a symlink there, dangling or not, is an existing entry that `overwrite: true` would move to the trash, not a folder to move into. Give the folder's real path for that. `rename_local` and `move_local` do not replace something that appears at the destination after they have checked it. A file is hard-linked to its new name and only then unlinked from the old one, a symlink is recreated, and a folder is renamed over an empty placeholder made a moment before, so something appearing in between makes the operation fail rather than be overwritten. Where there is no such operation — FIFOs, sockets and device files, filesystems without hard links such as FAT and exFAT, and folders on Windows — the tool checks and then renames, and a file created in that instant would be replaced. ## What the tests assert `npm test` runs 225 tests. The ones worth knowing about: - A symlink pointing out of a root is refused, on both the read and the write side, and so is a dangling symlink on a write path. - A `.shieldfive-mcp-trash` that is a symlink out of the root is refused, and nothing is written through it. - Two files with the same name and the same size but different contents are **not** reported as duplicates, and two names for one file are not counted as space to reclaim. - `trash_local` leaves the bytes readable at their new location, on the same volume, and reports `space_freed_bytes: 0`. - On a RAM disk mounted inside a root, a move across volumes keeps a source whose copy arrives corrupt or that changes while it is copied, leaves an existing file at its old staging name alone, refuses a folder holding a FIFO, and never writes through a dangling symlink. These run on macOS and are skipped elsewhere. - A file that appears at the new name between the check and the rename is not replaced. - A cancelled request moves nothing, and a trash batch cancelled midway says exactly what it moved. - Only `src/vault/api.mjs` calls `fetch`, and only to an https ShieldFive origin. No local-tool module imports anything from the vault half, and the only environment variables read are `SHIELDFIVE_MCP_ROOTS`, `SHIELDFIVE_GRANT` and `SHIELDFIVE_API_URL`. - The browser hand-off is the one inbound socket and the one subprocess in the package: `src/vault/connect.mjs` binds a random port on `127.0.0.1`, opens no connection of its own, and launches the browser with a fixed command and no shell. A delivery from another origin, with another state, to another `Host`, by another method, or after the first one, is refused. - The vault modules import no filesystem module, so decrypted data cannot be written to disk. No module uses a cipher, HMAC or KDF of its own. All cryptography comes from `@shieldfive/crypto`. - Against an in-memory ShieldFive that serves real ciphertext in all three vault formats, over a real MCP client: - files decrypt through the grant's keys only, and nothing outside the scope is listed, read or even requested; - a revoked or expired connection fails the very next call; - renames and moves re-seal names and keys so the owner's own keys still open them; - the grant secret and token never appear in any request body or path. - A file whose contents tell the assistant to trash everything comes back inside a fence it cannot close. Reading it issues only reads, and a 51-item trash call is refused. - A real MCP client over a real stdio transport sees exactly the nine local tools when no connection is configured, including when the server is started through a symlink the way npm installs it. The network assertion has a limit worth stating: it proves what `src/` does, not what the dependency tree could do. `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` ships HTTP transports for other people's servers. What closes that gap is that `server.mjs` imports the stdio transport and no HTTP one, which is also asserted. ## Limits - **The plan check narrows the gap between preview and action; it does not close it.** The comparison happens inside the confirmed call, so a change arriving between that check and the write itself is still possible. Each tool re-checks its own destination immediately before writing, which is what makes that window small rather than absent, and no path-based tool can do better. - **A plan binds what it named.** For a directory, that is the entry itself plus the file and byte counts underneath it — enough to catch content appearing, disappearing or changing size, but not a file edited in place to exactly the same length within the same second. - **Sizes are file-content sizes.** They exclude directory overhead and ignore filesystem compression, sparse files, hardlinks and APFS clones, so totals will not match a disk utility exactly; `storage_summary` counts every name of a hardlinked file. - **APFS clones look like copies.** `find_duplicates` reports them as reclaimable, and trashing one frees little or nothing. - **Scans are capped** by default at 200,000 files, and at the root and 64 levels of subdirectories below it. When a cap is hit the result says so, in the summary line as well as in a field: a scan that stopped at a cap otherwise reads exactly like one that finished, and the assistant reports a partial list as the whole of it. - **Cross-volume behaviour is tested on macOS only,** against a RAM disk the tests mount inside their own temporary directory. - **Windows is untested.** The code uses no POSIX-only API, and path handling goes through `node:path`, but nobody has run it there. [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/shieldfive/mcp/blob/HEAD/SECURITY.md) carries the rest: time-of-check/time-of-use, the windows in which a rename can still replace something, hardlinks, what inheriting the environment does and does not mean, and what the no-network assertion covers. ## Privacy Policy This server sends nothing anywhere unless a ShieldFive connection is configured, and then only to ShieldFive's API (`https://shieldfive.com`, or the origin in `SHIELDFIVE_API_URL`): - **What it sends:** requests the vault tools need — listings, reads and changes by id, and for uploads the ciphertext and wrapped keys it produced on this machine. File names and contents are encrypted before they leave; a storage upload goes straight to a presigned storage URL and never carries the connection credential. - **What it never sends:** plaintext names or contents, local paths, anything about your local folders, telemetry or analytics. The local tools make no network request at all. - **What ShieldFive keeps:** a record of the connection and of each request it makes (ids, action, result, time — no names, contents, IP address or user agent), kept while your account exists and deleted with it. Section 3.9 of the [ShieldFive Privacy Policy](https://shieldfive.com/privacy) covers these records, their retention and your rights over them. - **What your assistant receives:** whatever it reads through this server, decrypted here, goes to whoever runs the assistant, under their terms — as anything else in that conversation would. - **Credential:** kept in the OS keychain (or `SHIELDFIVE_GRANT`), never logged, returned or written to a file. Contact: [support@shieldfive.com](mailto:support@shieldfive.com), or [security@shieldfive.com](mailto:security@shieldfive.com) for vulnerabilities. ## Security Report vulnerabilities to `security@shieldfive.com`. See [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/shieldfive/mcp/blob/HEAD/SECURITY.md). ## Licence MIT. Versions up to and including 0.6.3 were published under Apache-2.0.