# hush **Category:** 💻 Developer Tools **Repository:** https://github.com/royashbrook/hush **Views:** 0 **Installs:** 0 **Upvotes:** 0 **Directory Page:** https://allmcps.com/mcp/hush ## Description A secret store for AI agents: the agent never sees the plaintext. ## Claude Desktop Quick Installation Heuristic fallback — verify the package name and runner against the repository README before running it. Uses `npx` (confidence: low): ```json "mcpServers": { "hush": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y","hush"] } } ``` ## Documentation & README

hush

a secret store for AI agents, the one with no get.

CI MIT cross-platform no get

get a secret once into the OS keychain, then inject it into commands forever, the value never hits stdout, the transcript, or the cloud.

--- A secret store for AI agents, with one hard rule: **the agent never sees the plaintext.** Values never reach stdout, so they never land in the tool result, the transcript, or the cloud. A secret only ever moves from the store straight into the consumer. There's no `get` on purpose, a plain getter is the leak. The point: you (an agent) are running as the user with their CLIs already authed, so you can already set a server-side secret or call a service, you just can't *see* the value without it landing in the chat. hush gets it once into the OS keychain, then you inject it into those commands forever. No chat paste, no temp files, no `.env` to commit by accident. ## agents: start here **If you were handed this repo's url, install yourself, then follow the playbook.** Get the `hush` script onto the box and read [`SKILL.md`](SKILL.md), that's the whole onboarding (it covers store / mint / inject and how to adopt hush in the repo you're working in). The script is one self-contained bash file; put it wherever your agent loads tools or just on your `PATH`: ```sh git clone https://github.com/royashbrook/hush chmod +x hush/hush # then put hush/hush on your PATH, or move it into your agent's skills/tools dir ``` or run it straight from npm without cloning: `npx @royashbrook/hush ` (mac/linux; on windows use the clone, the orchestrator is bash). Claude Code convenience (auto-loads as a skill): clone straight into the skills dir instead, whole session `git clone https://github.com/royashbrook/hush ~/.claude/skills/hush`, or one project `./.claude/skills/hush`. Other agents: see [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md). That's it, the human points you here and says "use the hush skill," and you take it from here. The one thing only a human can do is paste a secret they hold: when you hit that, run `hush set ` and a hidden dialog pops on *their* screen (you never see the value). ## install (humans) Same clone as above, or just grab the single `hush` script and put it on your PATH. Backends: macOS Keychain, Linux libsecret (`secret-tool`), and Windows DPAPI (via PowerShell) are built in. On other platforms keep the same contract with your OS secret store (see [SKILL.md](SKILL.md)). Cross-OS tested in CI (manual `workflow_dispatch`, all three runners). ## quick start ```sh hush set my-vendor-token # paste a value you hold (hidden prompt) printf '%s' "$TOK" | hush set my-vendor-token # ...or pipe it in (scripts/CI), still off argv hush set my-vendor-token --gui # force the dialog (or --tty / --pipe; HUSH_PROMPT= too) hush mint app-operator-key # generate + store a random one hush run TOKEN=my-vendor-token -- some-cmd # inject into a command, never printed hush sync lastpass --dry-run # preview a one-way LastPass sync hush sync lastpass # upsert every name under LastPass group "hush" hush sync keepass --database vault.kdbx --db-secret keepass-password --dry-run hush sync bitwarden --dry-run # requires an unlocked BW_SESSION hush list # names only, never values ``` **On an agent host where the dialog won't open** (some runners have no GUI session, so macOS can't post the paste dialog, `Connection Invalid ... hiservices-xpcservice`): hush now says so plainly instead of a misleading "cancelled or empty", and the fix is to **pipe the value** (`printf '%s' "$VAL" | hush set `) or run `hush set ` from a GUI-attached Terminal. Naming: keep the default `hush` namespace and **prefix names by project** (`blame-cf-token`, `lifescored-gemini-key`) so one keychain search for `hush` finds everything. `HUSH_NS` is only for a genuinely separate store, not per-project. Need to fix an existing name? `hush rename ` moves the value internally (never re-asked, never printed). Full docs + the portable contract: [SKILL.md](SKILL.md). ## sync to LastPass Install and log into the official LastPass CLI once, then preview and run the sync: ```sh brew install lastpass-cli # macOS lpass login you@example.com hush sync lastpass --dry-run # names + destinations only, no values fetched hush sync lastpass # all names -> hush/ hush sync lastpass --group team/secrets api-key deploy-key hush sync lastpass --exclude local-only # repeat to keep local-only names out of bulk sync ``` This is an upsert into each LastPass entry's password field. A missing entry is created, a unique entry is updated, and duplicate LastPass names fail closed. Values move over stdin, never argv, stdout, or a temp file. Each write uses `--sync=now`, so hush reports success only after LastPass has synchronized it to the server. Multiline hush values are refused because `lpass` password-field edits accept one line and would otherwise truncate them. The sync runs wherever both hush and the official `lpass` CLI run: macOS, Linux, and Cygwin. The official CLI does not currently provide a native PowerShell or Node entry point, so native Windows remains limited by that dependency rather than by the hush store backend. ### schedule it with experimental auto-login (macOS) A cold npm install includes an optional Node-based launchd helper: ```sh npm install -g @royashbrook/hush brew install lastpass-cli hush-lastpass-schedule install --auto-login --email you@example.com --every 6h hush-lastpass-schedule status ``` Auto-login is experimental. Its complete contract passes deterministic fake-CLI tests, but we could not complete a real trusted login because Homebrew `lastpass-cli` crashed in its MFA path before any vault access. This matches upstream [`lastpass-cli` issue #719](https://github.com/lastpass/lastpass-cli/issues/719). It may work with account/MFA combinations unaffected by that bug, but it is not live-tested. The design performs one interactive `lpass login --trust`, then asks once for the LastPass master password through hush's hidden prompt. Scheduled runs are intended to use that local Keychain value to restore the `lpass` session after reboot. This is explicit opt-in: no LastPass login material is stored unless `--auto-login` is present. The helper never uses `lpass --plaintext-key`, and its dedicated login secret is always excluded from vault sync. Failed setup installs nothing; revoked or expired trust makes later jobs fail closed. Use `hush-lastpass-schedule remove` to unload the job. It retains the non-secret config and the hush login secret so removal cannot silently destroy credentials. Delete that secret separately with `hush rm hush-lastpass-master-password` if you want to revoke the opt-in completely. An API key cannot replace this login: the published [LastPass Business API](https://developer.lastpass.com/business/docs/index.md) manages accounts, companies, and reports, but does not expose vault-item writes. The scheduler is Node so other native schedulers can be added without changing the sync contract, but this release installs launchd on macOS only. ## sync to a local KeePass database [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/) opens the same encrypted KDBX file on macOS, Linux, and Windows. Put that file in an iCloud Drive folder and it becomes an offline-first backup that another iCloud machine can open without a service login: ```sh brew install --cask keepassxc hush set hush-keepass-master-password hush sync keepass --database "$HOME/Library/Mobile Documents/com~apple~CloudDocs/hush/hush.kdbx" \ --db-secret hush-keepass-master-password --init ``` `--init` refuses to overwrite a file. Later runs omit it and upsert entries in group `hush`: ```sh hush sync keepass --database "$HOME/Library/Mobile Documents/com~apple~CloudDocs/hush/hush.kdbx" \ --db-secret hush-keepass-master-password --dry-run hush sync keepass --database "$HOME/Library/Mobile Documents/com~apple~CloudDocs/hush/hush.kdbx" \ --db-secret hush-keepass-master-password --exclude local-only ``` The database password and entry passwords reach `keepassxc-cli` only over stdin. They are never put on argv, stdout, logs, or a temp plaintext file. The database-password secret is always excluded. Missing entries are created, unique entries are updated, duplicate names fail closed, and multiline values are refused rather than truncated. ### schedule it into iCloud (macOS) The npm package includes a Node/launchd helper. A cold setup creates the database if absent, asks for its password through hush when needed, performs the first sync, and loads the recurring job: ```sh npm install -g @royashbrook/hush brew install --cask keepassxc hush-keepass-schedule install --every 6h hush-keepass-schedule status ``` The default destination is `iCloud Drive/hush/hush.kdbx`. Scheduled runs update an encrypted local mirror under `Application Support/hush`, then atomically publish a completed copy. KeePassXC never opens CloudDocs from launchd, avoiding macOS's headless iCloud privacy block. A publish that takes more than 30 seconds fails with an actionable error instead of hanging. Use `--database`, `--db-secret`, `--group`, repeatable `--exclude`, or positional names to narrow it. `remove` unloads the LaunchAgent but keeps the destination, local mirror, and mode-0600 metadata config. Keep one durable copy of the database password outside this KDBX. After a machine loss, the iCloud file cannot recover the hush secret that unlocks it. Treat one machine as the writer while iCloud is syncing to avoid conflicted KDBX copies. ## sync to Bitwarden The official [Bitwarden CLI](https://bitwarden.com/help/cli/) supports create and edit operations, API-key login, and session-based vault access. Install it, then keep the three required credentials in hush: ~~~sh brew install bitwarden-cli hush set bitwarden-client-id hush set bitwarden-client-secret hush set bitwarden-master-password ~~~ Bitwarden's personal API key authenticates the CLI, but [does not replace the master password](https://bitwarden.com/help/personal-api-key/). Vault reads and writes still require an unlock session. The npm-shipped scheduler handles that lifecycle without repeated interaction: ~~~sh hush-bitwarden-schedule install --every 6h hush-bitwarden-schedule status ~~~ Install verifies all three hush names, performs bw login --apikey when needed, unlocks with --passwordenv, runs a value-free dry-run, then installs launchd. Each scheduled run obtains a short-lived session, syncs, and locks the CLI. API credentials, the master password, and the session are absent from argv, logs, the plist, and the mode-0600 metadata config. The underlying command can also be used inside any already-unlocked Bitwarden CLI session: ~~~sh hush sync bitwarden --dry-run hush sync bitwarden # all non-auth secrets -> folder hush hush sync bitwarden --folder backups api-key deploy-key hush sync bitwarden --exclude local-only ~~~ Missing login items are created and unique items are updated. Exact duplicate names in the target folder fail closed. Existing item JSON flows directly from bw into the JSON transformer, and encoded create/edit bodies flow directly into bw over stdin. Passwords never enter argv, stdout, logs, or temp files. The three default Bitwarden auth secrets are always excluded. Bitwarden automatically pushes successful create and edit changes to the server. The core sync is Bash plus Node and follows the platforms supported by hush and bw. The included scheduler currently installs a macOS LaunchAgent. hush-bitwarden-schedule remove unloads it while retaining the non-secret config and hush credentials. ## not a vault An agent with shell access can read+write this store, so it's not a lock against a hostile process. It's structure that keeps plaintext out of the transcript and makes "store once, inject everywhere" the easy path. It's also only as durable as the machine it's on (a local keychain), back the machine up, or sync onward into a real secret manager, and don't make hush the only copy of a secret you can't regenerate. MIT licensed.