# har-forensics-mcp

**Category:** 🔒 Security  
**Repository:** https://github.com/aryanspv/har-forensics-mcp  
**Views:** 0  
**Installs:** 0  
**Upvotes:** 0  
**Directory Page:** https://allmcps.com/mcp/har-forensics-mcp

## Description
Audit a .har capture: third-party risk, leaked credentials, JWT checks, redaction. No network calls.

## Claude Desktop Quick Installation
Heuristic fallback — verify the package name and runner against the repository README before running it. Uses `npx` (confidence: low):

```json
"mcpServers": {
  "har-forensics-mcp": {
    "command": "npx",
    "args": ["-y","har-forensics-mcp"]
  }
}
```

## Documentation & README

# har-forensics-mcp

Audit a `.har` capture from inside your editor. Other HAR tools show you a list
of requests. This one answers the question you opened the file for: what leaked,
who's on the page, and what to strip before you send it anywhere.

Reads a file from local disk, computes, writes to stdout. **It makes no network
calls**, which is the point: a real capture holds live session cookies,
`Authorization` headers, and sometimes card numbers.

Works with anything that speaks MCP over stdio — Cursor, Claude Code, Windsurf,
Zed, VS Code Copilot.

## Setup

**Claude Code:**

```bash
claude mcp add --scope user har-forensics -- npx -y har-forensics-mcp
```

`--scope user` registers it for every directory. Without it the server is scoped
to whichever directory you ran the command in — which still reports success, and
then the tools are silently absent everywhere else.

**Cursor** — `.cursor/mcp.json` in the project, or `~/.cursor/mcp.json` globally:

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "har-forensics": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "har-forensics-mcp"]
    }
  }
}
```

**Windsurf / Zed / VS Code Copilot** take the same `command` + `args` shape in
their own MCP config files.

Restart the editor, then point a tool at a capture:

> Run `analyze_har` on `~/Downloads/checkout.har`

Requires Node 20+. Nothing else — no clone, no build, no API key, no account.

## Tools

| Tool | Answers |
| --- | --- |
| `find_captures` | "Where are my .har files?" — scans Downloads, Desktop, Documents, cwd, temp. |
| `analyze_har` | "What's in this capture?" — triage overview, one verdict per check. **Start here.** |
| `har_brief` | The full audit as redacted markdown. The artifact to quote or paste. |
| `har_findings` | Findings, worst-first, filterable by severity. Paged. |
| `har_vendors` | Every third party, scored 0–100 by blast radius, with an HTTP Archive scrutiny tier. |
| `har_provenance` | Who loaded whom — the fourth parties your vendors brought with them. |
| `har_perf` | "Why was this slow?" — slowest requests by dominant phase, per-origin handshake cost, uncompressed assets, time lost to redirects. |
| `har_csp` | A starter Content-Security-Policy synthesized from observed traffic. |
| `har_hunt` | Query requests — `is:thirdparty`, `status:>=400`, `type:script`, `host:…`. Returns entry indices. |
| `har_entry` | Everything about one request: headers, cookies, body, timing phases. |
| `har_curl` | That request as a runnable cURL or `fetch()`, credentials masked. |
| `har_diff` | Before vs. after: what was added, what regressed, which third parties are new. |
| `sanitize_har` | Write a `.redacted.har` safe to attach to a ticket. |

`har_hunt` → `har_entry` → `har_curl` is the loop: find the request, read it,
replay it. Every tool that returns a list takes a `limit` and tells you the
total, so nothing silently returns a first page as if it were the whole answer.

Every tool except `sanitize_har` is annotated `readOnlyHint`, and all of them are
`openWorldHint: false` — the no-network guarantee below, in a form your client
can read and act on rather than prose you have to take on trust.

## Three properties it inherits from the web app

**No network.** The analyzers contain no `fetch`, and this transport does not add
one. That invariant is the product — Cloudflare shipped a DLP profile in March
2026 that detects HAR files in HTTP traffic and lets admins block the upload
outright, because unsanitized HARs are a known credential-exfiltration path.

**Summaries, never dumps.** Every tool returns a rendered conclusion, not raw
entries, and every list is bounded with its total stated. The captures this
exists for run to tens of thousands of entries and hundreds of megabytes;
handing an agent the entry list would blow its context and make it slower at a
job the analyzers already did. (This was a promise the code broke until 0.2.0 —
`har_findings` had no cap and returned ~93,000 tokens on a 10,000-entry capture.
The 27-entry demo returned ~175, which is exactly why it went unnoticed.)

**Redacted by default.** `har_brief` and `har_findings` route through the same
redactor the browser export uses, built from a single shared secret-pattern
table. An agent reading a capture in an editor is *more* likely to paste a
finding into a chat window than a human with a download folder.

## What it will not do

- **Overwrite anything.** `sanitize_har` refuses to write over an existing target
  or the original capture.
- **Read a file above ~512 MB.** Guarded rather than left to OOM — pinned just
  under V8's maximum string length, since the file is read as one string.
- **Answer a query it did not understand.** A misspelled filter (`is:third-party`,
  `staus:404`) is an error, not an empty result. Those were the same response
  until 0.2.0, which meant a typo could report a capture clean.
- **Judge time against your clock.** A HAR is a historical artifact, so token
  expiry is measured against each entry's `startedDateTime`. Comparing to `now`
  marks every token in a week-old capture as expired and buries the one that was
  genuinely dead when the browser sent it.

## Reading the code

This package ships one file, `dist/server.js`. It is deliberately not
minified — the build treats it as something a human debugging an editor
integration will read far more often than something a machine will parse for
size — so it is the same code a build would produce, already built. There is
no separate source repository to clone; the shipped file is the artifact to
audit.

## License

MIT. Bundled vendor data is generated from
[`third-party-web`](https://github.com/patrickhulce/third-party-web) — MIT,
Copyright (c) 2017 Patrick Hulce, derived from HTTP Archive.