# dns [Health: Active]
**Category:** π¬ Communication
**Repository:** https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp
**GitHub Stars:** 7
**npm Downloads (last month):** 87681
**Views:** 0
**Installs:** 0
**Upvotes:** 0
**Directory Page:** https://allmcps.com/mcp/dns
## Description
DNS & email security scanner β 51 tools for SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DNSSEC, SSL, and more.
## Tools
Capabilities this server exposes over MCP:
- **group** β functional group (`email_auth`, `infrastructure`, `brand_threats`, `dns_hygiene`, `intelligence`, `remediation`, `discovery`, `identity_secops`, `meta`).
- **tier** β scoring tier (`core` / `protective` / `hardening`); absent for non-scoring tools.
- **scanIncluded** β `true` when the tool runs inside `scan_domain`'s parallel audit.
- **recommended** β present (`true`) only on the curated **starter set** (`scan_domain`, `explain_finding`, `compare_baseline`); omitted otherwise. A client facing the full surface can lead with `tools.filter(t => t._meta.recommended)` to avoid overwhelming an LLM with all tools flat. Every tool is still listed β thisβ¦
## Claude Desktop Quick Installation
Heuristic fallback β verify the package name and runner against the repository README before running it. Uses `npx` (confidence: low):
```json
"mcpServers": {
"dns": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y","dns"]
}
}
```
## Documentation & README
# BLACK**V**EIL DNS
**Know where you stand.**
Source-available DNS & email security scanner for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, and MCP clients across Streamable HTTP, stdio, and legacy HTTP+SSE.
[](https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/stargazers)
[](https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/actions)
[](LICENSE)
[](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/)
[](https://workers.cloudflare.com/)
[](https://www.typescriptlang.org/)
---
## Try it in 30 seconds
**Claude Desktop** (one-click install):
Download the [Blackveil DNS extension](https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-claude-dns/releases/latest/download/bv-claude-dns.mcpb) and open it β the current 80-tool surface is available instantly. [Verify your download](https://blackveilsecurity.com/extensions/claude-dns#install).
**Claude Code** (one command):
```bash
claude mcp add --transport http blackveil-dns https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcp
```
Then ask: `scan anthropic.com`
**Smithery** (one command):
```bash
smithery mcp add MadaBurns/bv-mcp
```
**Verify the endpoint is live:**
```bash
curl https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/health
```
No install. No API key. One URL for hosted HTTP:
```
Endpoint https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcp
Transport Streamable HTTP Β· JSON-RPC 2.0
Auth None required
```
Transport support:
- `Streamable HTTP`: `POST /mcp`, `GET /mcp`, `DELETE /mcp`
- `Native stdio`: `blackveil-dns-mcp` CLI from the `blackveil-dns` npm package
- `Legacy HTTP+SSE`: `GET /mcp/sse` bootstrap stream plus `POST /mcp/messages?sessionId=...`
For Streamable HTTP, clients should retain the `Mcp-Session-Id` returned by `initialize` and send it on every subsequent request, including notifications. Send the negotiated version in `MCP-Protocol-Version`; unsupported values are rejected with HTTP `400`, while expired or terminated sessions return `404` and require a fresh `initialize`.
---
## What you get
- **80 MCP tools with 19 scoring categories** β SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DNSSEC, SSL/TLS, MTA-STS, NS, CAA, MX, BIMI, TLS-RPT, subdomain takeover, HTTP security headers, DANE, SVCB/HTTPS, DANE-HTTPS, subdomailing, reverse DNS (PTR/FCrDNS), and DNSKEY strength
- **Maturity staging** β Stage 0-4 classification (Unprotected to Hardened) with score-based capping to prevent inflated labels
- **Trust surface analysis** β detects shared SaaS platforms (Google, M365, SendGrid) and cross-references DMARC enforcement to determine real exposure
- **Guided remediation** β `generate` (artifact=`fix_plan`) produces provider-aware prioritized actions; its record artifacts (`spf_record`, `dmarc_record`, `dkim_config`, `mta_sts_policy`, `rollout_plan`) output ready-to-publish records; `validate_fix` confirms whether a fix was applied successfully
- **Supply chain mapping** β `map_supply_chain` correlates DNS signals to build a full third-party dependency graph with trust levels and risk signals
- **Attack path simulation** β `simulate_attack_paths` enumerates specific paths (spoofing, takeover, hijack) with severity, steps, and mitigations
- **Compliance mapping** β `map_compliance` maps scan findings to NIST 800-177, PCI DSS 4.0, SOC 2, and CIS Controls
- **Self-tuning scoring** β adaptive weights adjust category importance based on patterns seen across scans via Durable Object telemetry
- **Per-tier analytics** β usage tracking by auth tier with operator API for tier summaries, key-level usage, and daily digests
- **Passive and read-only** β all checks use public Cloudflare DNS-over-HTTPS; no authorization required from the target
---
## Tools
```
80 MCP tools Β· 7 prompts Β· 6 resources
Email Auth Infrastructure Brand & Threats Meta
βββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββ βββββββββββββββ βββββββββββββββ
check_mx check_dnssec check_bimi scan_domain
check_spf check_ssl check_tlsrpt batch_scan
check_dmarc check_ns check_lookalikes compare_domains
check_dkim check_caa check_shadow_domains compare_baseline
check_mta_sts check_http_security explain_finding
check_subdomailing check_dane
check_mx_reputation check_dane_https DNS Hygiene Remediation
check_svcb_https βββββββββββββ βββββββββββββββ
check_ptr check_txt_hygiene generate (one tool;
Intelligence check_srv artifact=fix_plan,
βββββββββββββ check_zone_hygiene spf_record,
get_benchmark check_resolver_ Discovery dmarc_record,
get_domain_rank consistency βββββββββββββ dkim_config,
get_provider_ discover_brand_ mta_sts_policy,
insights check_dbl domains rollout_plan)
assess_spoofability check_rbl brand_audit_single validate_fix
map_supply_chain cymru_asn brand_audit_batch_
analyze_drift rdap_lookup start
resolve_spf_chain check_nsec_ brand_audit_status
discover_subdomains walkability brand_audit_get_
map_compliance check_dnssec_chain report
prioritize_csc_leads
simulate_attack_paths check_fast_flux list_brand_audit_watches
check_agent_discovery check_dnskey_strength
check_authoritative_dns_infra
check_root_server_set register_brand_audit_watch
delete_brand_audit_watch
+ check_subdomain_takeover (standalone tool + internal β runs inside scan_domain)
+ check_authoritative_dns_infra and check_root_server_set (authoritative DNS infrastructure profile)
+ discover_brand_domains_start / discover_brand_domains_status / discover_brand_domains_findings
(async start β poll β fetch sibling of discover_brand_domains, for clients that time out on the ~24s sync call)
Operator-deploy only (BV_RECON binding; degrade to unprovisioned on self-hosted BUSL deployments):
+ check_realtime_threat_feed β curated intel-gateway threat feed lookup
+ scan_buckets_start β async cloud-bucket discovery scan (start β poll β findings)
+ scan_buckets_status β poll status of a running bucket scan
+ scan_buckets_findings β retrieve findings for a completed bucket scan
+ osint_investigate_domain_start β async domain OSINT investigation (start β poll β report)
+ osint_investigate_infrastructure_start β async deep-infrastructure OSINT (domain, IP, or org)
+ osint_investigate_supply_chain_start β async supply-chain OSINT investigation
+ osint_investigate_username_start β async username OSINT (owner/enterprise tier only)
+ osint_investigate_email_start β async email OSINT (owner/enterprise tier only)
+ osint_investigation_status β poll status of any running OSINT investigation
+ osint_investigation_report β retrieve report for a completed OSINT investigation
Operator-deploy only (proxied via the `BV_WEB` service binding, wired as the `m365Proxy` runtime option; Microsoft 365 / Entra identity security ops β degrade to unprovisioned without it):
+ query_signins β query Microsoft Entra sign-in logs for a tenant
+ query_ual β query the Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log for a tenant
+ get_ca_policies β retrieve Conditional Access policies for an Entra tenant
+ assess_coverage β assess Conditional Access coverage gaps for an Entra tenant
```
### Tool discovery metadata (`_meta`)
`tools/list` returns every tool with server-specific discovery metadata under each tool's `_meta` (the MCP-sanctioned extension point), so a client can group or filter the surface without hard-coding tool names:
- `group` β functional group (`email_auth`, `infrastructure`, `brand_threats`, `dns_hygiene`, `intelligence`, `remediation`, `discovery`, `identity_secops`, `meta`).
- `tier` β scoring tier (`core` / `protective` / `hardening`); absent for non-scoring tools.
- `scanIncluded` β `true` when the tool runs inside `scan_domain`'s parallel audit.
- `recommended` β present (`true`) only on the curated **starter set** (`scan_domain`, `explain_finding`, `compare_baseline`); omitted otherwise. A client facing the full surface can lead with `tools.filter(t => t._meta.recommended)` to avoid overwhelming an LLM with all tools flat. Every tool is still listed β this is an additive signal, not a filter.
### Authoritative DNS infrastructure
`check_authoritative_dns_infra` scores authoritative DNS hosting behavior for a hostname. It is designed to consume raw UDP/TCP DNS, authoritative AA/RA behavior, zone-transfer refusal, DNSSEC, abuse-resistance, BGP/RPKI, and multi-vantage evidence from the `BV_INFRA_PROBE` service binding when that worker is provisioned.
`check_root_server_set` validates the DNS root-server set against the embedded official root hints. With `BV_INFRA_PROBE`, it also checks live root priming, glue, parent/child delegation, DNSKEY, and SOA serial evidence across roots.
Self-hosted or local deployments without `BV_INFRA_PROBE` still return structured partial results. The worker-only mode records the embedded root hints and marks live raw-DNS, routing, RPKI, and vantage capabilities as inconclusive rather than pretending they ran.
---
## Quality & Reliability
The server classifies detected MCP clients by their default response format:
- **Interactive clients**: `claude_mobile`, `claude_code`, `cursor`, `vscode`, `claude_desktop`, `claude_connector`, `windsurf` (auto-format: `compact`)
- **Non-interactive clients**: `mcp_remote`, `blackveil_dns_action`, `bv_claude_dns_proxy`, `unknown` (auto-format: `full`)
The `bv_load_test` class identifies internal load/chaos/tranco-scan traffic so it stays out of real-client analytics segments.
The comprehensive chaos suite validates session stability, authentication precedence, format negotiation, and transport-specific edge cases across Streamable HTTP and Legacy SSE for its supported client fixtures. Without an API key it exercises the public/free-tier path; with a valid key exported as `BV_API_KEY`, it covers Bearer authentication, legacy self-host `?api_key=` compatibility, authenticated SSE bootstrap, and authenticated batch behavior.
Run the client/session chaos suite locally: `python3 scripts/chaos/chaos-test-clients.py`.
Run repeat force-refresh scans to detect production scoring drift:
```bash
BV_API_KEY=... python3 scripts/chaos/score-stability-test.py --count 20 --rounds 3 --concurrency 5
```
The stability harness negotiates MCP protocol `2025-06-18`, accepts JSON and Streamable HTTP SSE responses, and exits non-zero on any transport/tool error or score/category drift. Use `--from ` with a JSON array of domains for a targeted provider-diversity sweep.
SSOT guardrails are enforced by focused audit tests:
- Tool counts and public resource copy are derived from the `TOOLS` registry.
- Domain-required validation is derived from each tool input schema.
- Scan timeout budgets are resolved from shared runtime config.
- WASM tool permissions are generated from MCP tool annotations.
- Public quota copy is checked against runtime quota config.
---
## Architecture
```
MCP Client
β
β POST /mcp (JSON-RPC 2.0)
β
βββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Cloudflare Worker β
β β
β Hono ββΊ Origin check β
β ββΊ Auth β
β ββΊ Rate limiting β
β ββΊ Session mgmt β
βββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββββββ
β
βββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Tool Handlers β
β 19 scoring categories β
βββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββββββ
β
βββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Generic Scoring Engine β
β Three-tier model β
βββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββββββ
β
βββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Cloudflare DoH β
β DNS-over-HTTPS β
ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
```
- **Generic Scoring Engine**: Runtime-agnostic, string-keyed three-tier scoring with configurable weights
- **Infra Probe Binding**: Optional `BV_INFRA_PROBE` service binding supplies raw authoritative DNS, root-server, BGP/RPKI, and vantage evidence for the authoritative DNS infrastructure profile
- **WASM Policy Engine**: High-performance permission and token checks via `bv-wasm-core`
- **Reliable Sessions**: Hardened tombstone logic prevents race-condition revival of terminated sessions
- **Protocol Enforcement**: Unsupported MCP versions fail closed; notifications and SSE connections use the same session-validity rules as other post-initialize requests
- **Bounded Egress**: Public CT and target-HTML responses are streamed under byte ceilings before parsing or fingerprinting
- **Cryptographic Identifiers**: Session and CSC report identifiers use Web Crypto randomness
- **Adaptive Scoring**: Durable Object telemetry adjusts weights based on real-world distributions
- **Client Awareness**: Automatic response formatting (`compact` vs `full`) based on client `User-Agent`
### Brand-discovery modes (`discover_brand_domains` / `brand_audit_*`)
The `discovery_mode` argument accepts two values:
- **`classic`** (the default everywhere this repo runs out-of-the-box) β the public, BUSL-licensed signal-sweep pipeline. Uses only public-internet data sources (DNS, RDAP, CT logs, MX/TXT inspection). This is the only mode supported for self-hosted deployments and the only mode the open test suite covers end-to-end.
- **`tiered`** β layers a portfolio-aware Tier 0 / infrastructure-graph Tier 1 / declared-evidence Tier 2 pipeline in front of the classic sweep. Tiered mode requires private BlackVeil-internal cross-Worker bindings (`BV_INFRA_GRAPH`, `BV_INTEL_GATEWAY`, `BV_ENTERPRISE`) that are **not packaged with the open distribution** β they live in BlackVeil's production deploy overlay (`.dev/wrangler.deploy.jsonc`) and call into proprietary Workers. Self-hosters cannot enable tiered mode without those bindings.
BlackVeil's hosted production at `dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com` flips its runtime default to `tiered` via the env var `BRAND_AUDIT_DISCOVERY_MODE_DEFAULT="tiered"` in the private overlay; the public schema default in `src/schemas/tool-args.ts` stays `'classic'` permanently so anyone building from `main` gets the BUSL-licensed behaviour unchanged. An explicit caller-supplied `discovery_mode` always wins over the env default.
---
## Client setup
The free tier requires no authentication. Authenticated requests bypass per-IP rate limits and follow your tier's daily quota. Hosted production supports:
- **Header**: `Authorization: Bearer `
- **OAuth 2.1**: optional authorization-code flow with PKCE, enabled only when operators set `ENABLE_OAUTH=true`; owner-key consent is separately gated by `ENABLE_OWNER_OAUTH=true`.
The `?api_key=` fallback is legacy/self-host compatibility only. BlackVeil hosted production sets `REJECT_QUERY_API_KEY=true`; clients that cannot send headers should use OAuth or an `mcp-remote` header bridge.
For full hosted setup examples, stdio usage, OAuth setup, and legacy fallback endpoints, see [**docs/client-setup.md**](docs/client-setup.md).
---
## Operator configuration
These settings apply to operators running their own deployment. They are optional β self-hosted (BUSL) deployments fall back to privacy-preserving defaults when they are unset.
### Detailed analytics capture
The public `/mcp` path writes a per-event access log enriched with geolocation and network identity. The write path, PII depth, and retention are operator-controlled:
| Binding / var | Type | Purpose |
| ------------------------- | ----- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `MCP_ANALYTICS_QUEUE` | Queue | **Operator-deploy only.** Batches access-log writes off the request path. Absent on self-hosts β inline-insert fallback (no reverse-DNS lookup). |
| `ANALYTICS_PII_LEVEL` | var | `coarse` (default) \| `standard` \| `full`. Controls access-log PII depth: `coarse` = country/region/ASN + hashed/masked IP; `standard` adds encrypted IP + city; `full` adds lat/long + reverse-DNS (PTR). |
| `ANALYTICS_RETENTION_DAYS` | var | Access-log retention window in days (default `90`, clamped `1`β`365`). Rows older than the window are pruned by the scheduled handler. |
| PTR third-party disclosure | β | At `ANALYTICS_PII_LEVEL=full`, caller-IP PTR lookups resolve through the configured DoH chain, whose final fallback is Google Public DNS β an external disclosure of caller-IP-derived queries that operators should weigh before enabling `full`. Per-subject erasure: `POST /internal/analytics/erase?key_hash=β¦\|ip_hash=β¦` (strict internal bearer; self-audited). |
### Internal analytics endpoints
These live under the internal auth gate (`/internal/*`) and are called by bv-web, not the public surface:
| Endpoint | Source | Notes |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `GET /internal/analytics/usage?days=&key_hash=` | D1 | Precise per-customer usage report. |
| `GET /internal/analytics/geo?days=` | Analytics Engine | Geographic rollup (country/region/city/ASN) for dashboards. |
| `GET /internal/analytics/forensics?days=&ip_hash=&key_hash=` | D1 | **STRICT-gated, operator-only.** Returns decrypted client IP + PTR for abuse investigation; every call writes a self-audit row. |
---
## Pricing
| | **Free** | **Pro** | **Enterprise** |
| -------------- | ---------- | ------- | ------------------------------------------- |
| **Price** | $0 | $39/mo | [Contact us](https://blackveilsecurity.com) |
| **Scans/day** | 25 | 500 | 10,000+ |
| **Checks/day** | Tool-specific limits | Tool-specific limits | Contract limits |
| **Rate limit** | 50 req/min | None | None |
| **API access** | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| **MCP access** | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Offensive/recon and multi-domain tools (subdomain discovery, attack-path simulation, lookalike/shadow-domain detection, fast-flux detection, supply-chain mapping, real-time threat feed, bucket/OSINT investigations, `batch_scan`, `compare_domains`, brand audits) require a paid plan (Pro / developer tier or higher); free, unauthenticated, and agent-tier callers get an HTTP 403 upgrade-required response. Unauthenticated callers are additionally capped at a small number of distinct domains per day (best-effort, fail-open). The OSINT/bucket status and report pollers stay free.
---
## Example prompts
These demonstrate core functionality β paste any of them into Claude with the Blackveil DNS connector enabled:
| Prompt | What it does |
| ------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------- |
| `Scan blackveilsecurity.com and tell me what needs fixing` | Full security audit β score, grade, prioritized findings |
| `Compare the email security of google.com and microsoft.com` | Side-by-side comparison of two domains' postures |
| `Generate a DMARC record for example.com with reject policy` | Produces a ready-to-publish DNS record |
| `What attack paths exist for example.com?` | Enumerates spoofing, takeover, and hijack vectors |
| `Map example.com's compliance against NIST 800-177` | Maps findings to compliance framework controls |
---
## Support
- **Bug reports & feature requests:** [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/issues)
- **Security vulnerabilities:** [security@blackveilsecurity.com](mailto:security@blackveilsecurity.com) (see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md))
- **General questions:** [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/MadaBurns/bv-mcp/discussions)
---
## Responsible use
This tool is intended for **authorized security assessments** of domains you own or have explicit permission to test. Do not use it for unauthorized reconnaissance, harassment, or any activity that violates applicable laws. Findings from attack simulation, spoofability, and subdomain discovery tools should be used to **improve your own security posture**, not to exploit others.
If you discover a vulnerability in a third-party domain, please follow [coordinated disclosure](https://www.cisa.gov/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure-process) practices.
---
Built and maintained by [**BLACKVEIL**](https://blackveilsecurity.com) β NZ-owned cybersecurity consultancy.
[Privacy Policy](https://www.blackveilsecurity.com/privacy) Β· [License](LICENSE) (BUSL-1.1 β MIT on 2030-03-17)