# codemore **Category:** πŸ’» Developer Tools **Repository:** https://github.com/abhinavteja123/codemore **npm Downloads (last month):** 1464 **Views:** 0 **Installs:** 0 **Upvotes:** 0 **Directory Page:** https://allmcps.com/mcp/codemore ## Description The static analyzer your AI agent reads β€” fix-ready, machine-readable scan reports over MCP. ## Claude Desktop Quick Installation Heuristic fallback β€” verify the package name and runner against the repository README before running it. Uses `npx` (confidence: low): ```json "mcpServers": { "codemore": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y","codemore"] } } ``` ## Documentation & README
image # CodeMore ### The static analyzer your AI agent reads. AI agents ship code fast β€” and ship bugs fast. CodeMore scans the code, then hands the **agent that wrote it** a machine-readable report with the exact fix and the criteria to verify it. The agent closes its own findings. [**Website**](https://codemore.tech) Β· [**Docs**](https://codemore.tech/docs) Β· [**Rule Catalog**](docs/rules) Β· [**Report Schema**](docs/schema.md) Β· [**Changelog**](CHANGELOG.md) [![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/codemore?style=flat-square&color=cb3837&logo=npm)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/codemore) [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-4ef2ca.svg?style=flat-square)](LICENSE) [![Rules](https://img.shields.io/badge/native%20rules-64-success.svg?style=flat-square)](docs/rules) [![Adapters](https://img.shields.io/badge/external%20adapters-8-blueviolet.svg?style=flat-square)](docs/external-tools.md) [![Audit](https://img.shields.io/badge/last%20audit-2026--07--07-ff69b4.svg?style=flat-square)](accuracy-report-2026-07-07.md) [![BLOCKER TP rate](https://img.shields.io/badge/BLOCKER%20TP%20rate-~90%25-4ef2ca.svg?style=flat-square)](accuracy-report-2026-07-07.md) ```bash npx codemore@latest scan . ``` **64 native rules Β· 8 external adapters Β· CLI Β· MCP server Β· VS Code extension Β· GitHub Action β€” one report, byte-identical on every surface.**
--- ## Table of contents - [Why CodeMore](#why-codemore) - [Quick start](#quick-start) β€” [CLI](#cli) Β· [MCP server](#mcp-server--cursor-claude-code-codex-claude-desktop) Β· [VS Code](#vs-code-extension) Β· [GitHub Action](#github-action) Β· [Hosted](#web-scanner-hosted) - [What it catches](#what-it-catches) - [The report is the product](#the-report-is-the-product) - [Agentic fix loop](#agentic-fix-loop) - [Accuracy, measured honestly](#accuracy-measured-honestly) - [What CodeMore does *not* catch](#what-codemore-does-not-catch) - [Architecture](#architecture) - [Development](#development) Β· [Contributing](#contributing) Β· [License](#license) --- ## Why CodeMore AI-assisted coding ships vulnerabilities at a measured, growing rate: | Finding | Source | |---|---| | **45%** of AI-generated code carries an OWASP Top-10 vulnerability | Veracode 2025/26 | | **98%** of 1,072 scanned vibe-coded sites had β‰₯ 1 security flaw | Symbiotic | | **70%** of audited Lovable apps shipped with Supabase RLS disabled | DEV | | **2Γ—** baseline secret-leak rate on AI-tool-assisted commits | GitGuardian SOSS 2026 | | **35 CVEs/month** attributed to AI-generated code (was 6/month in January) | March 2026 | Existing scanners (SonarQube, DeepSource, Snyk) target **human reviewers sitting at dashboards**. But this code wasn't written by a human β€” and the LLM that wrote it is fully capable of fixing its own bug, *if the report is shaped for a machine reader*. That's the wedge. CodeMore is not another SAST dashboard. **It's the report contract between a scanner and a coding agent**: every finding carries a `suggestedFix` with a patch template and explicit `verificationCriteria` β€” not just "here's a problem," but "here's exactly how to know you fixed it." > **The agent that wrote the bug can also write the fix β€” if it can read the report.** --- ## Quick start ### CLI ```bash npx codemore@latest scan . ``` Prints a summary to the terminal. Add `--json` for the full [report](docs/schema.md) on stdout, or `--out codemore-report.json` to write it to disk: every finding pinned to `file:line:column` with rule citation, fix template, and verification criteria. Pipe it to your agent and watch findings close. ```bash npm install -g codemore # once β€” or prefix each command below with `npx codemore@latest` codemore update # global install pinned an old version? this pulls latest codemore scan . --fail-on BLOCKER # CI gate: non-zero exit on any BLOCKER codemore scan . --external-tools ruff,biome # opt in to external tools codemore scan . --external-tools all # ruff Β· golangci-lint Β· clippy Β· biome Β· bandit Β· gitleaks Β· npm-audit Β· pip-audit codemore scan . --format sarif --out codemore.sarif # GitHub code scanning (upload-sarif) codemore fix . --rule --write # agentic fix loop from the CLI (needs an LLM API key) codemore baseline create # adopt on an existing repo without drowning in legacy findings ``` ### MCP server β€” Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, Claude Desktop ```bash npx codemore mcp # print config snippet + every client's config path npx codemore mcp install --client cursor # merge into existing config (backs up first, --dry-run supported) ```
Manual config snippet ```jsonc { "mcpServers": { "codemore": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "codemore@latest", "serve-mcp"] } } } ```
Six tools exposed: `scan_project` Β· `scan_file` Β· `explain_issue` Β· `suggest_fix` Β· `apply_fix` Β· `validate_fix`. Per-client setup, exact config paths, and verified handshake evidence (Claude Code, Cursor, Claude Desktop, Codex CLI): [docs/ide-matrix.md](docs/ide-matrix.md). ### VS Code extension Install **CodeMore** from the [VS Code Marketplace](https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=codemore.codemore) (Extensions β†’ search "CodeMore" β†’ Install), or build the VSIX yourself: ```bash npm run vsce:package # builds codemore-.vsix code --install-extension codemore-.vsix ``` Inline diagnostics; code-action quick-fix invokes the agentic loop (plan β†’ generate β†’ validate β†’ retry, max 3 attempts). ### GitHub Action ```yaml # .github/workflows/codemore.yml on: pull_request: branches: [main] jobs: scan: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: read pull-requests: write steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - uses: abhinavteja123/codemore@v1 with: fail-on: BLOCKER ``` PR-comment bot; only fails the build on findings **new since** the committed `.codemore-baseline.json`. A full copy-paste security gate chaining CodeMore + Ruff + Biome + Bandit + Gitleaks + npm-audit + pip-audit + Checkov lives at [`templates/.github/workflows/codemore-security-gate.yml`](templates/.github/workflows/codemore-security-gate.yml) ([walkthrough](docs/security-gate.md)). ### Web Scanner (hosted) Sign in at [**codemore.tech**](https://codemore.tech), paste a public GitHub URL or upload a ZIP β€” same report, same fingerprint, zero install. --- ## What it catches **64 native rules** across **6 packs**, every rule mapped to a *cited real-world incident class* β€” not a hypothetical: | Pack | Rules | Highlights | |---|---:|---| | `core-security` | 22 | SQL injection (concat), path traversal, weak crypto, insecure deserialization, `eval`, shell injection, TLS-off, hardcoded secret patterns, hardcoded passwords (B105-class), SSRF, secret-in-log, LLM-output β†’ eval/exec/SQL sinks, prompt-injection sinks, DB write-without-WHERE, hallucinated imports | | `core-quality` | 21 | Unused vars/imports/exports, cyclomatic complexity, dead conditionals, leftover console/prints, async-without-await, unreachable code, loose equality, `as any`, non-null-assertion abuse | | `vibe-frontend` | 9 | XSS (`dangerouslySetInnerHTML`), CORS-with-credentials, missing rate limit, missing cookie flags, file-upload validation, missing input validation β€” CORS, cookie flags and input validation each in TS + Python (Flask/FastAPI) form | | `vibe-secrets` | 4 | Public env leaks (`NEXT_PUBLIC_*` / `VITE_*` / `REACT_APP_*`), hardcoded JWTs, MCP config secrets, CI/CD YAML secrets | | `vibe-auth` | 5 | BOLA (TS + Python), missing session/auth checks (TS + Python), inverted auth | | `vibe-supabase` | 3 | RLS-off, RLS-permissive (`USING (true)`), anon-key bundled to client | **8 external adapters** (off by default, opt in via `--external-tools`): `ruff` Β· `golangci-lint` Β· `clippy` Β· `biome` Β· `bandit` Β· `gitleaks` Β· `npm-audit` Β· `pip-audit`. Findings are namespaced `ext::` β€” no collision with native rules; a missing binary skips silently instead of crashing. **The walker catches what `.gitignore` hides.** When a developer "hides" a leaked secret file by gitignoring it, most scanners stop seeing it β€” but it's still on disk, in tarballs, in Docker images. CodeMore always scans secret-shaped filenames (`.env*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, `firebase-adminsdk*.json`, `credentials.json`, `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, …) even when gitignored. This is exactly how the audits found real production OpenAI keys, Google API keys, and Firebase admin SDK creds that other tools silently missed. Opt out with `--respect-gitignore-fully`. Per-rule documentation: [`docs/rules`](docs/rules) β€” 64 pages, one per rule. --- ## The report is the product Every surface emits the same schema-stable [`codemore-report.json`](docs/schema.md) β€” verified **byte-identical** (modulo timestamps and instance IDs) on every release by [`test/parity.test.ts`](test/parity.test.ts): ``` CLI : issues=224 BLOCKER=5 fingerprint=sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23… MCP : issues=224 BLOCKER=5 fingerprint=sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23… Daemon : issues=224 BLOCKER=5 fingerprint=sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23… ``` **One brain, four skins.** The schema is the API; surfaces are interchangeable.
Full report example β€” codemore-report.json v1.0.0 ```jsonc { "schemaVersion": "1.0.0", "tool": { "name": "codemore", "version": "0.3.0" }, "project": { "root": ".", "framework": "next.js", "language": "typescript", "fingerprint": "sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23…" }, "summary": { "issuesTotal": 42, "bySeverity": { "BLOCKER": 2, "CRITICAL": 5, "MAJOR": 15, "MINOR": 18, "INFO": 2 }, "byCategory": { "security": 12, "bug": 7, "…": "…" }, "filesAnalyzed": 87, "linesOfCode": 12450, "technicalDebtMinutes": 1840 }, "issues": [ { "id": "vibe-supabase-rls-disabled", "ruleVersion": "1.2.0", "instanceId": "01HZ…", "severity": "BLOCKER", "confidence": 0.95, "category": "security", "title": "Supabase table has no RLS policy", "evidence": { "file": "supabase/migrations/001_init.sql", "line": 14, "column": 1, "endLine": 14, "endColumn": 60, "snippet": "create table profiles (id uuid primary key, …);", "matchedPattern": "create-table-without-rls" }, "whyItMatters": "Public Supabase client can read/write all rows. 70 % of Lovable apps leak data through this.", "citation": "https://codemore.tech/rules/vibe-supabase-rls-disabled", "suggestedFix": { "type": "code-patch", "instructions": "Add `ALTER TABLE profiles ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;` plus at least one policy scoped to authenticated users.", "patchTemplate": "…", "verificationCriteria": [ "Migration contains ALTER TABLE … ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY", "At least one CREATE POLICY exists for the table", "Re-scan no longer reports vibe-supabase-rls-disabled for this file" ] }, "suppression": { "available": true, "directive": "// codemore-ignore: vibe-supabase-rls-disabled", "scope": "same-line | next-line | file" } } ], "agentInstructions": { "preamble": "You are fixing issues found by CodeMore. Apply patches one issue at a time. After each, request re-scan via validate_fix.", "orderingHint": "blockers β†’ criticals β†’ majors", "doNotTouch": ["node_modules/**", "*.lock", ".env*"], "stopOn": "first-validator-failure" }, "meta": { "rulesEnabled": 64, "packsLoaded": ["core-security", "core-quality", "vibe-supabase", "…"], "scanDurationMs": 4321 } } ```
Schema source-of-truth: [`shared/report/schema.json`](shared/report/schema.json). Breaking changes bump `schemaVersion` major and ship a migration guide. --- ## Agentic fix loop `apply_fix` runs a four-stage loop, up to 3 retries per finding β€” it terminates on first PASS and **never silently keeps a failing patch**: ``` detect ──► plan ──► generate ──► validate β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€β–Ί (fail) β†’ re-plan, retry (≀ 3) └──► (pass) β†’ apply patch Β· next finding ``` - [`agenticFixer.ts`](daemon/services/agenticFixer.ts) β€” orchestrator; reads finding + rule citation + framework context - [`validatorHarness.ts`](daemon/services/validatorHarness.ts) β€” applies the patch in a tempdir copy, re-runs the rule, re-runs file-scoped tests, returns `pass | fail` + diagnostics - LLM provider plug-ins: OpenAI Β· Anthropic Β· Gemini Β· local, configurable via workspace setting (VS Code) or `CODEMORE_LLM_PROVIDER` env (CLI) --- ## Accuracy, measured honestly Synthetic benchmarks lie; real codebases don't. Every release is audited against real projects, and the numbers are published β€” including the bad ones. **2026-07-07 audit** ([full report](accuracy-report-2026-07-07.md)) β€” 7 codebases (Python app, 1.35M-LOC TS monorepo, polyglot Rust, synthetic ground-truth apps, self-scan): **100% of planted vulnerabilities detected**, a real OpenAI key caught in a production `.env`, **~90% BLOCKER true-positive rate**, self-scan noise reduced 85% after fixing four false-positive classes. **2026-06-12 audit** ([full report](accuracy-report-2026-06-12.md)) β€” 10 real codebases, aggregate **~85% BLOCKER TP rate**, above DeepSource's β‰₯ 75% production bar:
Per-project results | Project | Findings | BLOCKERs | TP rate | Notes | |---|---:|---:|---:|---| | EchoVault | 122 | 10 | **100%** | Real Supabase RLS holes | | ProofSnap | 134 | 4 | **100%** | | | AImentor | 224 | 5 | **100%** | Real OpenAI keys hidden by `.gitignore` | | Hackathonnn | 129 | 3 | **100%** | | | shopsec | 113 | 5 | **100%** | | | Senti | 155 | 8 | **100%** | | | open-design | 8,615 | 101 | ~80% | | | Gen ai | 63 | 4 | 75% | Real Firebase admin SDK creds | | codemore self | 282 | 6 | 17% | Intentional landing-demo data | | **Aggregate (excl. self)** | **9,755** | **140** | **~85%** | |
### Quality gates, enforced in CI - **100% TP / 100% FP** on the 128-fixture corpus regression suite β€” every rule ships with at least one true-positive and one false-positive fixture under `corpus/rules//{tp,fp}/` - Lifecycle gating: rules are `experimental` β†’ `beta` β†’ `stable`, promotion requires fixture pairs plus real-world FP-rate evidence via opt-in telemetry; rules below the precision bar are gated behind `--enable-experimental` or ship with reduced confidence so agents weight them lower | Lifecycle | Default | Promotion bar | |---|---|---| | `experimental` | off by default | one fixture pair | | `beta` | on by default | β‰₯ 3 fixture pairs + 14-day FP rate < 15% | | `stable` | ships in default pack | 30-day FP rate < 5% + reference apps clean | | `deprecated` | warns, removed next major | β€” | --- ## What CodeMore does *not* catch Out of scope **by design** β€” static analysis can't judge these, and an agent can't auto-fix them from a source diff. The rule is *"agent-actionable or it's not a rule"*: Weak password policies Β· audit-log completeness Β· business-logic flaws Β· race conditions Β· open S3/GCS buckets Β· DAST findings Β· MFA presence. Full list with reasoning: [`docs/limitations.md`](docs/limitations.md). For these, pair CodeMore with OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite, `checkov`, or your IdP's compliance dashboard. --- ## Telemetry β€” opt-in only Off by default. Enable per-scan with `--telemetry`. Collected: tool version, hashed project fingerprint, surface, rule-fire events. **Never collected:** file paths, contents, snippets, evidence text β€” the endpoint enforces a Zod `strict()` schema and rejects any payload containing those keys with HTTP 400. 64 KB payload cap, per-fingerprint rate limiting, RLS denies all reads. --- ## Architecture ``` codemore/ β”œβ”€β”€ shared/ ← one brain, shared across all surfaces β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ packs/ ← 64 rule modules across 6 packs β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ rules/ ← registry, lifecycle gating, suppression, AST helpers (TS + Python) β”‚ └── report/ ← codemore-report.json v1.0.0 schema + types + writer β”œβ”€β”€ daemon/ β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ cli/ ← CLI entry Β· walker Β· ignore resolver Β· baseline diff β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ mcp/ ← MCP server (6 tools) β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ external/ ← 8 opt-in adapters, fail-loud parsers β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ services/ ← agentic fixer Β· validator harness Β· scan orchestrator β”‚ └── llm/ ← OpenAI Β· Anthropic Β· Gemini Β· local provider plug-ins β”œβ”€β”€ src/ ← VS Code extension (forks daemon, renders diagnostics) β”œβ”€β”€ web/ ← Next.js: landing Β· dashboard Β· docs Β· /api/telemetry β”œβ”€β”€ corpus/rules//{tp,fp}/ ← 64 TP/FP fixture pairs, 1:1 with the rule catalog β”œβ”€β”€ docs/ ← schema Β· limitations Β· security-gate Β· 64 per-rule pages └── templates/ ← copy-paste GitHub Action workflows ``` **One brain (`shared/`), four skins (CLI, MCP, extension, Action), one report schema** β€” kept honest by the parity test, not by a slogan. --- ## Development ```bash git clone https://github.com/abhinavteja123/codemore cd codemore npm ci # postinstall skips binary downloads in dev automatically npx tsc -p tsconfig.publish.json # type-check the publishable surface npm run test:unit # unit tests (mocha + ts-node) npx mocha --require ts-node/register test/parity.test.ts # surface-parity proof node cli.js scan corpus/rules/vibe-no-rate-limit/tp --json --enable-experimental cd web && npm ci && npm run dev # landing + dashboard + docs β†’ localhost:3000 ``` VS Code extension: `F5` in VS Code, or `npm run watch` + `code --extensionDevelopmentPath=.` --- ## Contributing Two paths: 1. **New rules** β€” read [`CONTRIBUTING-RULES.md`](CONTRIBUTING-RULES.md). The PR bot gates every submission: rule module + TP fixture (must fire) + FP fixture (must not fire) + docs page + pack registration. The bot is the first reviewer; humans review after it passes. 2. **Everything else** (CLI, MCP, extension, daemon, web, docs) β€” read [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md). Before opening a PR: ```bash npx tsc -p tsconfig.publish.json # type-check node scripts/validate-rule-pr.js # rule-PR bot equivalent (must report "passed") node scripts/measure-accuracy.js # corpus regression (must stay 100% TP / 100% FP) npm run test:unit # full unit suite ``` Found a false positive? [Open a rule-FP report](.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE) β€” FP reports directly feed the betaβ†’stable promotion pipeline. **Security findings:** do **not** open a public issue β€” use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting flow ([`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md)). --- ## Roadmap - MCP registry listing (VS Code Marketplace: live) - Demo video: open a real vibe-coded app, scan, hand the report to Claude Code, watch every BLOCKER close - 50-app benchmark study with published dataset β€” live: [`benchmark/REPORT.md`](benchmark/REPORT.md) (40% of 50 AI-built repos had β‰₯ 1 BLOCKER; 24% after honest FP triage) - Telemetry-driven rule auto-demotion β€” live: nightly [`auto-demote-rules.yml`](.github/workflows/auto-demote-rules.yml) opens a review issue when a rule's FP rate crosses 10% - JetBrains plugin Β· cross-language taint tracking (research) Details: [`docs/roadmap.md`](docs/roadmap.md). --- ## License MIT β€” see [LICENSE](LICENSE). CodeMore is open source from line one and stays that way. The wedge is the report contract, not gatekeeping. ---
**The static analyzer your AI agent reads.** [Website](https://codemore.tech) Β· [Docs](https://codemore.tech/docs) Β· [Rules](https://codemore.tech/docs/rules) Β· [Schema](https://codemore.tech/docs/schema) Β· [npm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/codemore) Β· [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)