# app-store-connect-mcp [Health: Active]
**Category:** π» Developer Tools
**Repository:** https://github.com/abd3lraouf-studios/app-store-connect-mcp
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**Directory Page:** https://allmcps.com/mcp/app-store-connect-mcp
## Description
App Store Connect + StoreKit 2: 1,293 Apple operations behind 11 tools, writes confirmed.
## Claude Desktop Quick Installation
Install path detected from listing signals. Uses `npx` (confidence: high):
```json
"mcpServers": {
"app-store-connect-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y","@abd3lraouf/app-store-connect-mcp"]
}
}
```
## Documentation & README
# App Store Connect MCP Server
**Give Claude your App Store Connect account without giving it the keys to your pricing.**
An MCP server covering the App Store Connect API *and* the App Store Server API
(StoreKit 2) β 1,293 operations behind 13 tools, for Claude Code, Claude Desktop,
Cursor and anything else that speaks [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io).
[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@abd3lraouf/app-store-connect-mcp)
[](https://github.com/abd3lraouf-studios/app-store-connect-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
[](#receipts)
[](#receipts)
[](LICENSE)
[](#keeping-current-with-apple)
[](#the-eleven-tools)
[](#receipts)
[](package.json)
[](#known-limits)
[](#install)
```
1,293 operations Β· 13 tools Β· key never on disk Β· Apple signatures verified
```
```mermaid
flowchart LR
A["Claude
Cursor Β· any MCP client"] -->|"search Β· call Β· write"| B["app-store-connect-mcp
13 tools"]
B --> C{"risk tier"}
C -->|"READ Β· 811 ops"| D["Apple
App Store Connect API"]
C -->|"WRITE Β· 482 ops"| E["ask a human first"]
E -->|approved| D
E -->|declined| F["nothing is sent"]
B --> G["App Store Server API
StoreKit 2 Β· signatures verified"]
style E fill:#ffe8b3,stroke:#c98a00,color:#000
style F fill:#ffd6d6,stroke:#c00,color:#000
style D fill:#d6f5d6,stroke:#2a2,color:#000
style G fill:#d6f5d6,stroke:#2a2,color:#000
```
---
## Don't install this
Genuinely. There are cheaper ways to spend your afternoon, and several kinds of
person should close the tab now:
**You want an agent that just does things.** This one stops and asks before it
changes a price, deletes anything, or touches who can access your account β and
it asks *you*, not itself. If that sounds like friction, it is. That is the
product.
**You want every endpoint as its own tool.** Some servers register 890. Yours
would spend six figures of context on tool definitions before answering a single
question. This registers 11 and finds the rest by searching.
```text
tool definitions loaded into context, before you ask anything
one tool per endpoint βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ >100k tokens
this server β ~1k tokens
```
**You're on Windows or Linux and wanted Keychain.** Keychain storage is macOS
only. You can use a file path elsewhere, but the best part of this is
macOS-shaped.
**You want it to write your App Store copy.** It will fetch your reviews and
your localisations. It will not invent marketing prose and push it live, and
there is no flag to make it.
**You're evaluating this for a product you sell.** Read [the licence](https://github.com/abd3lraouf-studios/app-store-connect-mcp/blob/HEAD/LICENSE)
first. Internal use is free; reselling it isn't.
Still here? Then the rest is probably for you.
---
## What it refuses to do
Most of the engineering here went into restraint, so it is the honest place to
start.
**It won't run generated code.** The elegant way to cover a huge API is to let
the model write JavaScript and `eval` it in a sandbox. Node's `vm` is not a
sandbox β its own documentation says so β and any host object handed in leaks
the whole realm back through its prototype chain:
```js
spec.constructor.constructor('return process.env.HOME')() // β /Users/you
```
That is a reproduction of a real shipping MCP server's sandbox, and it returns
your home directory. Its 15-second timeout doesn't help either: it bounds only
*synchronous* code, so an `async` loop runs forever. This server dispatches
**parameters**, not code. Same coverage, same token cost, nothing to escape.
**It won't let a write pretend to be a read.** Reads and writes are separate
tools. `asc_write` carries `_meta["anthropic/requiresUserInteraction"]`, which
Claude Code honours **even under `bypassPermissions`**. The model cannot talk
its way past it; only the operator can, by starting the server with
`--no-confirm` β which drops the flag, the prompt and the token together, for
runs where nobody is present to answer.
**It won't decide your pricing intent for you.** `preserve_current_price` is a
required parameter with no default. Apple defaults it to `false` β meaning your
existing subscribers get moved to the new price. Making it required forces that
decision into the open, where a person can see it.
**It won't create ongoing commitments to answer a question.** Fetching analytics
needs a report request, and `accessType: ONGOING` is a standing obligation on
your account, not a query. The tool reads reports; it will not create one
silently.
**It won't pretend it sanitised your reviews.** Customer review text is written
by strangers and lands in your model's context verbatim. Results carrying it
*lead* with a note saying it is data to report on, not instructions to follow.
It is deliberately not filtered for injection phrases β that is a game attackers
iterate against, and passing such a filter would imply a safety it cannot
deliver.
**It won't tell you a signature is fine when it hasn't checked.** See below.
---
## Install
**Claude Code, one line:**
```bash
claude mcp add --scope user app-store-connect \
--env ASC_KEY=keychain:my-asc-key \
--env ASC_BUNDLE_ID=com.example.app \
--env ASC_APP_APPLE_ID=1234567890 \
-- npx -y @abd3lraouf/app-store-connect-mcp
```
Nothing to clone or build. Or from source, if you'd rather read it first:
```bash
git clone https://github.com/abd3lraouf-studios/app-store-connect-mcp
cd app-store-connect-mcp && npm install && npm run build
```
Or, for Claude Desktop, Cursor and friends:
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"app-store-connect": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@abd3lraouf/app-store-connect-mcp"],
"env": {
"ASC_KEY": "keychain:my-asc-key",
"ASC_BUNDLE_ID": "com.example.app",
"ASC_APP_APPLE_ID": "1234567890"
}
}
}
}
```
Then ask it *"check the App Store Connect connection"* β that runs `asc_status`,
which verifies your credentials with one lightweight request and tells you
exactly what is missing if anything is.
### Your key belongs in the Keychain
Apple lets you download a `.p8` **exactly once**. A plaintext copy on disk is a
copy that can leak.
```bash
ASC_KEY=keychain:my-asc-key # recommended
ASC_KEY=/path/to/AuthKey.p8 # works, but plaintext
ASC_PRIVATE_KEY='-----BEGINβ¦' # discouraged: ps -E exposes it
```
Store it as base64 JSON so the identifiers travel *with* the key material β
`ASC_KEY_ID` then cannot drift out of sync with the key it names, a mismatch
that surfaces only as an opaque 401:
```bash
security add-generic-password -s my-asc-key -a api -w "$(
jq -nc --arg i "$ISSUER" --arg k "$KEYID" --arg p "$(cat AuthKey.p8)" \
'{issuerID:$i,keyID:$k,privateKeyPEM:$p}' | base64
)"
```
---
## The thirteen tools
**Five core**, covering everything:
| Tool | |
|---|---|
| `asc_status` | Credentials, reachability, remaining rate-limit budget. Run this first when anything fails β it separates a bad key from a bad request. |
| `asc_search_endpoints` | Search 1,293 operations across both APIs by keyword, method, tag or risk tier. |
| `asc_describe_endpoint` | Parameters, request-body schema with real field names, risk tier. |
| `asc_call` | **Reads.** Path and query parameters, pagination, both APIs. |
| `asc_write` | **Everything that changes data.** Confirmation, `dry_run`. |
**Eight composite**, for chains the raw API cannot express in a single call. A
tool that merely saved one request was left out β it would need keeping in step
with Apple forever and buys nothing `asc_call` doesn't already do:
| Tool | What it collapses |
|---|---|
| `asc_pricing_get` | ~175 lookups β a handful, for subscriptions **and** one-time purchases. The **currency lives on the territory**, not the price row, so reading prices by hand gives ambiguous numbers. |
| `asc_pricing_set` | The same chain plus the write, with the subscriber decision forced into the open. |
| `asc_preflight_version` | Six resources β **GO / NO-GO**, each gap naming the operation that fixes it. |
| `asc_listing_screenshots` | A request per locale β four, via `included`. |
| `asc_upload_screenshot` | Apple's reserve β PUT-at-offsets β commit-with-MD5 sequence, across two hosts. |
| `asc_upload_iap_screenshot` | The same sequence for an in-app purchase's review screenshot β the field that keeps an IAP in `MISSING_METADATA`. |
| `asc_availability_set` | One PATCH per territory (up to 175; Apple has no bulk endpoint), then **re-reads every one** and reports what did not take. |
| `asc_analytics_report` | Five hops β signed URL β gunzip β rows, with **every segment stitched**. |
Why asc_upload_screenshot cannot be one API call
Apple's asset flow spans two hosts and ends in a checksum that fails *silently*
if you get it wrong β the upload simply sits in `AWAITING_UPLOAD` looking like
nothing happened. `uploadOperations` appears in Apple's OpenAPI document only as
a value in a `fields[]` enum, so an agent reading the spec can see the field
exists and still have no idea it must act on it.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant M as Claude
participant S as this server
participant A as App Store Connect
participant U as Apple asset host
M->>S: asc_upload_screenshot(set, file)
S->>A: POST /v1/appScreenshots (fileName, fileSize)
A-->>S: id + uploadOperations[]
loop each byte range
S->>U: PUT bytes at offset, Apple's headers
Note over S,U: pre-signed URL β no bearer token sent
end
S->>A: PATCH uploaded=true + MD5 checksum
A-->>S: assetDeliveryState
S-->>M: state, and how to clean up if it failed
```
Plus **four resources** (`@asc:cookbook`, `@asc:enums`, `@asc:risk`,
`@asc:sources`) and **four workflows** as slash commands:
`/mcp__asc__release-readiness`, `pricing-audit`, `review-triage`,
`testflight-status`.
---
## Write safety
An HTTP method is a poor proxy for consequence. `PATCH /v1/subscriptionPrices`
and `PATCH /v1/appInfos/{id}` are both writes; only one changes what customers
are charged, and neither is undone by repeating it. So every operation carries a
tier (counts are App Store Connect; StoreKit 2 adds 14 reads and 16 writes):
| Tier | Count | |
|---|---|---|
| `READ` | 797 | No change. |
| `WRITE` | 238 | Changes data. |
| `REVENUE` | 61 | Pricing, subscriptions, entitlements. |
| `DESTRUCTIVE` | 132 | Deletes. |
| `RELEASE` | 12 | Builds, submissions, what ships. |
| `ACCESS` | 12 | Who can reach the account. |
| `INFRASTRUCTURE` | 11 | Certificates, identifiers, callback URLs. |
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A["asc_write called"] --> B{"--read-only?"}
B -->|yes| Z["blocked"]
B -->|no| N{"--no-confirm?"}
N -->|yes| S["send it"]
N -->|no| C{"risk tier"}
C -->|"WRITE"| S["send it"]
C -->|"REVENUE Β· DESTRUCTIVE
INFRASTRUCTURE Β· ACCESS Β· RELEASE"| D{"client supports
elicitation?"}
D -->|yes| E["ask the person
method Β· path Β· body Β· tier"]
D -->|no| F["issue a token
hash-bound to this exact request"]
E -->|accepted| S
E -->|declined| Z
F --> G["caller repeats the call
with the token"]
G --> S
style Z fill:#ffd6d6,stroke:#c00,color:#000
style E fill:#ffe8b3,stroke:#c98a00,color:#000
style F fill:#ffe8b3,stroke:#c98a00,color:#000
style S fill:#d6f5d6,stroke:#2a2,color:#000
```
The bottom five ask before running. Where your client supports **elicitation**,
it asks *you* directly, showing the method, path, body and tier. Otherwise it
issues a confirmation token bound by hash to the exact operation, path, query
and body β so one obtained for a cheap call cannot be spent on an expensive one.
A client that claims elicitation but fails to deliver it falls back rather than
sailing through.
```
--read-only block every write --confirm confirm every write
--no-confirm never confirm (default) confirm the five tiers above
dry_run: true report the exact request without sending it (a parameter of asc_write)
```
`--no-confirm` is the unattended mode, and it is total: no elicitation prompt,
no confirmation token, and the write tools stop declaring
`requiresUserInteraction`, so Claude Code does not stop for them either. Anything
short of that would hand an unattended run a confirmation it cannot answer.
---
## Signature verification
Decoding a JWS tells you what the bytes say. **Verifying** it tells you Apple
said it. That distinction matters here more than most places, because these
payloads are the evidence behind *"is this person a paying subscriber?"* β and a
decoded but unverified transaction is exactly the shape a forged one takes.
Every signed field is checked against **Apple Root CA - G3**, vendored in
`certs/` so verification cannot be switched off by a network failure. Chain
validation, expiry, revocation and the bundle/environment checks go through
Apple's own library, because those are precisely where a plausible-looking
implementation accepts bad input.
Outcomes are **per field**, not per response β one bad signature in a history of
two hundred is the case that matters:
```json
"signedTransactionInfo_decoded": { "productId": "premium.monthly" },
"signedTransactionInfo_verification": { "verified": true }
```
Where it cannot run, payloads are still decoded and **every field says so**.
Silence would be the dangerous outcome.
---
## How it compares
| | Approach | Kept | Rejected |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hand-wrapped tools | One tool per endpoint | Typed, discoverable arguments | 70β900 tool definitions, >100k tokens, stale the moment Apple ships a version |
| Code Mode | Model writes JS, server `eval`s it | Two tools, ~1k tokens, full coverage | Runs generated code in a process holding a signing key |
| **Meta-tools** | `search` β `call` with **parameters** | Same context win, no code execution | β |
Credit where due: several ideas here were adapted from reading
[erayendes/app-store-connect-mcp](https://github.com/erayendes/app-store-connect-mcp)
and [TrialAndErrorAI/appstore-connect-mcp](https://github.com/TrialAndErrorAI/appstore-connect-mcp).
No code was copied. Heimdall in particular is the most developed server in this
space, and if you want 890 typed tools organised into profiles, use it instead β
it is good, and it is a different trade to this one.
---
## Receipts
Claims are cheap. These are checkable:
```
378 tests Β· 90% line coverage Β· offline, no credentials, runs on every PR
```
- **Both directions of signature verification.** A verifier that rejected
everything would look just as healthy as a correct one, so a generated chain
carrying the two Apple OIDs the verifier insists on proves the *accept* path,
while forged, tampered, wrong-bundle and wrong-environment payloads are all
rejected.
- **The protocol version is measured, not assumed.** Claude Code 2.1.235
negotiates MCP `2025-11-25` and declares `elicitation` β recorded by having it
connect to a probe server. That is why this stays on SDK v1: the v2 packages
implement 2026-07-28, which replaces elicitation with MRTR, and elicitation is
what makes `asc_write` ask a human.
- **MSW, not nock,** for HTTP mocking β `nock` patches `node:http`, and Node's
global `fetch` is undici, which bypasses it entirely. It would have
intercepted nothing, silently.
- **One test spawns the real binary** and asserts every stdout line parses as
JSON, because a single stray `console.log` corrupts the JSON-RPC channel and
no in-process harness can catch it.
```bash
npm test # 378 tests, offline
npm run verify # 14 read-only checks against the live APIs
npm run fetch:specs # re-download both API descriptions from Apple
```
---
## Keeping current with Apple
Coverage is a property of Apple's spec, not of how many endpoints somebody got
around to wrapping.
- **App Store Connect** β 1,263 operations, spec v4.4.1. Apple publishes an
OpenAPI document; it is downloaded and compiled into a slim index (360KB
against a 3.3MB spec).
- **App Store Server** β 30 operations. Apple publishes **no** OpenAPI document
for this one, so the endpoint set is parsed out of Apple's own client library
at a pinned release tag, and diffed against this repo's catalogue on every
`verify` run.
- **Enum tables are generated**, all 90 of them. A widely-copied cookbook
elsewhere lists an `eventState` value Apple does not have and omits two it
does; generating them makes that impossible here.
- A weekly job re-fetches both and opens a branch if Apple moved.
---
## Transports
```bash
node dist/index.js # stdio (default)
node dist/index.js --transport http --http-token "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
```
HTTP binds to loopback and **refuses to start without a bearer token**. It
validates `Host` and `Origin` too: a browser page can otherwise reach a
loopback-bound server as same-origin, where a token alone is no defence.
Docker builds distroless and runs as non-root. Note that stdio needs
`docker run -i` and must **not** get `-t` β a TTY mangles the JSON-RPC stream.
---
## The skill
The server answers questions. It cannot stop a model drawing the wrong
conclusion from a correct answer β an empty list because a territory was written
`US` instead of `USA`, one page of thirty read as the whole account, "no
subscriptions" for an app that sells a one-time purchase. There is no error to
catch in any of those; the response was a 200.
That judgement ships as a Claude Code skill:
```bash
npx -p @abd3lraouf/app-store-connect-mcp asc-mcp-skill
```
It installs into `~/.claude/skills/app-store-connect` (`--scope project` for
`./.claude/skills`, `--link` to symlink a checkout so edits are live). It adds
nothing to `settings.json`.
The skill is a list of checks that fire *before* a conclusion, not a tour of the
API. It hand-copies nothing that can be derived β no enum tables, no endpoint
lists β and a test asserts that every tool name, resource URI, prompt and
enum-shaped value in it still traces back to `src/` or to Apple's spec.
### Failures are recorded
Today a failure exists only as a tool result in a transcript. When the
conversation ends, so does Apple's `x-request-id` β the one value Apple support
asks for β along with any evidence of which operations a model tried and could
not find.
Both halves now write to `failures.jsonl`: the server records its own HTTP,
network and swallowed failures, and the skill records the ones the server cannot
see, the interpretation failures that arrived as a 200.
```
npm run triage # what keeps failing, and what the cookbook never warned about
```
Where it writes, in order: `ASC_FAILURE_LOG_DIR` if set (and then nowhere else β
an explicit destination that silently becomes a different destination is worse
than none); otherwise a **working checkout of this package**, identified by
carrying `src/` and `.git/`, which `npm pack` publishes neither of; otherwise the
installed skill's own directory; otherwise `~/.claude`.
On a machine with no checkout and no installed skill, it writes **nothing**
unless `ASC_FAILURE_LOG=1` says otherwise. `ASC_FAILURE_LOG=0` disables it
everywhere.
What it will not write: request headers or request bodies, ever β only body
*keys*, because `appStoreReviewDetails` carries a live `demoAccountPassword` in
a plain body. Response payloads are reduced to Apple's error object. Pre-signed
asset URLs are recorded as a hostname, since the signature is in the path. JWTs,
bearer tokens, PEM blocks and email local-parts are scrubbed as a second line of
defence.
Records are appended as single bounded writes to an `O_APPEND` descriptor, so
the server and the skill can share one file without a lock. That guarantee is
POSIX's and does not hold on NFS β point `ASC_FAILURE_LOG_DIR` at local disk.
---
## Known limits
Stated plainly, because you will find them anyway:
- **Risk tiers are pattern-matched** from method and path. Deliberately
cautious, but heuristics. Read `asc_describe_endpoint` before a write.
- **Keychain storage is macOS-only.** Elsewhere, use a file path with
restrictive permissions.
- **`--no-confirm` disables every gate** β token, elicitation and the
`requiresUserInteraction` flag. It exists for CI and unattended agents, and is
a poor default anywhere a person is present.
- **`--no-online-checks` skips OCSP**, which means accepting a revoked
certificate.
- **The failure log's lock-free append relies on `O_APPEND` atomicity**, which
network filesystems do not honour. `npm run triage` skips torn lines rather
than failing, but a network mount can lose records.
- **The accept path for signatures is proven against a substituted trust
anchor**, not Apple's β getting a genuinely Apple-signed payload needs a real
customer transaction. The chain logic is Apple's own library.
## Releasing
Bump, merge, done. Both registries authenticate with the workflow's own OIDC
identity, so there is no token to rotate and no tag to remember:
```bash
npm run release:version patch # or minor, major, or an exact version
git commit -am "Release v1.0.1" && git push
```
CI notices a version that is not yet on npm, runs the full gate, then publishes
to npm and the MCP Registry, tags the commit and opens a GitHub Release. The
trigger is the version rather than a tag, which makes the job idempotent β
re-running it publishes nothing.
## Licence
[Business Source License 1.1](https://github.com/abd3lraouf-studios/app-store-connect-mcp/blob/HEAD/LICENSE). Free for internal use, evaluation and
development; offering it to third parties as a hosted or embedded service, or
redistributing it inside a commercial product, needs a licence. Converts to
Apache-2.0 on 2030-08-19.
Apple's OpenAPI description and root certificate are vendored here under
Apple's terms, not this licence β see [NOTICE](https://github.com/abd3lraouf-studios/app-store-connect-mcp/blob/HEAD/NOTICE).
Apple, App Store, App Store Connect, StoreKit and TestFlight are trademarks of
Apple Inc. This project is not affiliated with Apple.